


## ETSI/IQC Quantum Safe Cryptography Conference 2026

# Achieving operational governance of cryptographic agility in banking

Presented by: Thibaud Ecarot – Cryptography specialist



**BANQUE  
NATIONALE**

18/06/2026

# Symptoms of limited cryptographic agility

The challenge is no longer only to identify cryptographic mechanisms, but to assess agility and steer cryptographic resilience.

“ Cryptographic visibility is improving, but operational improvement of **cryptographic agility remains limited**.

## **01 Limited change speed**

The organization cannot adapt cryptographic mechanisms fast enough when change becomes necessary.

## **02 Reduced resilience**

Weak agility reduces the ability to absorb urgent cryptographic change safely.

## **03 Risk response friction**

Risk signals do not easily translate into prioritized and coordinated cryptographic action.

### Symptoms we observe



#### Decision gap

Visibility does not clearly indicate what to change, where to act first, or what impact to expect.



#### Fragile impact analysis

Dependencies, process roles and cascading effects remain difficult to assess.



#### Qualitative agility assessment

Agility cannot be measured operationally when the required information is missing, disconnected, or not contextualized.



#### Cryptographic Resilience difficult to steer


Without reliable assessment and bottlenecks detection, cryptographic resilience becomes hard to plan and govern.

**>>> The challenge: Cryptographic resilience depends on governed change**



# Root cause: cryptographic inventories start from **sources**, not **decisions**

An inventory can improve visibility while still failing to support cryptographic change




“ A structural issue is that cryptographic inventories are often source-driven, while operational governance requires question-driven models.

To govern cryptographic change, the model must start **from decisions**, not **sources**

# Descriptive inventories lack the logic of cryptographic change

Inventories and CBOM are essential for visibility, but operational agility requires additional context to govern a transition.


“A descriptive model can tell what exists, but not reliably what will break or how the transition should be governed.”



**Visibility is necessary, but cryptographic agility requires process-level reasoning**

# A process-based model to govern cryptographic agility


A **unified view** that makes usage and change options explicit.



# Revealing the bottlenecks of cryptographic change

The process model provides transition evidence.  
The agility framework reveals what slows down change.

## Example: internal TLS certificate migration



### Current

### Target

Leaf cert: RSA-2048

CA hash: SHA-256

Deployment: Manual

Leaf cert: ML-DSA-65

CA hash: SHA3-256

Deployment: Automated



### Parameter changes


- Signature algorithm
- CA hash
- Certificate profile



### Dependencies & constraints

- CA policy
- Legacy client
- Change window
- Rollback readiness

## Cryptographic agility assessment lens



Context is provided by process evidence


## What the model reveals

### Cryptographic agility profile



- Transition capability limited
- Upgradeability constrained
- Operational friction visible
- Measurability incomplete

### Bottlenecks revealed



- Manual validation gate
- CA policy / parameter mismatch
- Missing process documentation
- Untested certificate rollover

### Targeted improvement plan



- Document end-to-end process
- Automate validation and issuance checks
- Prepare rollback and fallback patterns

# Conclusion

Process-based reasoning for governed cryptographic change



## Key takeaway



Process modeling makes cryptographic change analyzable.



Agility assessment reveals bottlenecks, not just score



Improvement actions target change velocity and resilience

# Thank you

Questions and discussion



## Open Cryptographic Process Standard (OCPS) example

```
ubuntu@ocps: ~/projects

$ ocps compile ./diploma-sign-usecase
OCPS Compiler 0.1.0

Scanning directory: ./diploma-sign-usecase
Discovered 9 OCPS files

Loaded models:
[business]  diploma_issuance_business_process
[crypto]    diploma_signature_process
[blueprint] signing_key_lifecycle_blueprint
[blueprint] digital_signature_architecture_blueprint
[blueprint] crypto_inventory_evidence_blueprint

Loaded projections:
business_to_crypto
crypto_to_lifecycle
crypto_to_architecture
crypto_to_inventory

Compiled artifact: diploma_issuance.bundle.ocps
Compilation report: diploma_issuance.compile-report.txt
Result: success
```

All models and projections  
are aggregated into  
**one compiled bundle**

Multiple process and projection views can be compiled  
into one reasoning model.



## Acknowledgements

Thanks to colleagues across organizations, and to the discussions within the CFDIR Quantum Readiness Working Group, especially John Buselli, for helping raise the ambition for actionable cryptographic agility.