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**5G;  
Security Aspects of Proximity based Services (ProSe) in the  
5G System (5GS)  
(3GPP TS 33.503 version 17.4.0 Release 17)**



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# Foreword

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In the present document, modal verbs have the following meanings:

- shall** indicates a mandatory requirement to do something
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The constructions "shall" and "shall not" are confined to the context of normative provisions, and do not appear in Technical Reports.

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- should** indicates a recommendation to do something
- should not** indicates a recommendation not to do something
- may** indicates permission to do something
- need not** indicates permission not to do something

The construction "may not" is ambiguous and is not used in normative elements. The unambiguous constructions "might not" or "shall not" are used instead, depending upon the meaning intended.

- can** indicates that something is possible
- cannot** indicates that something is impossible

The constructions "can" and "cannot" are not substitutes for "may" and "need not".

- will** indicates that something is certain or expected to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document
- will not** indicates that something is certain or expected not to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document
- might** indicates a likelihood that something will happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document

**might not** indicates a likelihood that something will not happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document

In addition:

**is** (or any other verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact

**is not** (or any other negative verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact

The constructions "is" and "is not" do not indicate requirements.



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# 1 Scope

The present document specifies the security and privacy aspects of the Proximity based Services (ProSe) in the 5G System (5GS). 5G ProSe security features include: 5G ProSe Direct Discovery security, 5G ProSe Direct communication security, and 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay security.

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# 2 References

The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.

- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.

- [1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
- [2] 3GPP TS 23.304: "Proximity based Services (ProSe) in the 5G System (5GS)".
- [3] 3GPP TS 33.501: "Security architecture and procedures for 5G system".
- [4] 3GPP TS 33.303: "Proximity-based Services (ProSe); Security aspects".
- [5] 3GPP TS 33.535: "Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA) based on 3GPP credentials in the 5G System (5GS)".
- [6] 3GPP TS 33.536: "Security aspects of 3GPP support for advanced Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) services".
- [7] 3GPP TS 23.503: "Policy and charging control framework for the 5G System (5GS); Stage 2".
- [8] 3GPP TS 33.220: "Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA)".
- [9] 3GPP TS 33.223: "Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) Push function".
- [10] 3GPP TS 23.502: "Procedures for the 5G System".
- [11] 3GPP TS 33.102: "3G security; Security architecture".
- [12] Void
- [13] Void
- [14] IETF RFC 7542: "The Network Access Identifier".
- [15] IETF RFC 9048: "Improved Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for 3rd Generation Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA)".

## 3 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations

### 3.1 Terms

For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].

For the purposes of the present document, the following terms given in 3GPP TS 23.304 [2] apply:

- 5G ProSe Direct Communication
- 5G ProSe Direct Discover
- 5G ProSe-enabled UE
- 5G ProSe Remote UE
- 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay
- Direct Network Communication
- Discovery Filter
- Discovery Query Filter
- Discovery Response Filter
- Indirect Network Communication
- Mode of communication
- Model A
- Model B
- Open ProSe Discovery
- ProSe Application Code
- ProSe Application ID
- ProSe Application Mask
- ProSe Query Code
- ProSe Response Code
- ProSe Restricted Code
- Restricted ProSe Application User ID
- Restricted ProSe Discovery

### 3.2 Symbols

Void.

### 3.3 Abbreviations

For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in TR 21.905 [1].

5G DDNMF	5G Direct Discovery Name Management Function
5G PKMF	5G ProSe Key Management Function
CP-PRUK	Control Plane ProSe Remote User Key
AF	Application Function
AKMA	Authentication and Key Management for Applications
AV	Authentication Vector
BSF	Bootstrapping Server Function
CP	Control Plane
DCR	Direct Communication Request
DUCK	Discovery User Confidentiality Key
DUIK	Discovery User Integrity Key
DUSK	Discovery User Scrambling Key
GBA	Generic Bootstrapping Architecture
GPI	GBA Push Info
GPS	Global Positioning System
MIC	Message Integrity Check

NAI	Network Access Identifier
NITZ	Network Identity and Time Zone
NRPEK	NR PC5 Encryption Key
NRPIK	NR PC5 Integrity Key
NTP	Network Time Protocol
PAnF	ProSe Anchor Function
ProSe	Proximity-based Services
RPAUID	Restricted ProSe Application User ID
RSC	Relay Service Code
SBI	Service Based Interface
UP	User Plane
UP-PRUK	User Plane ProSe Remote User Key
UTC	Universal Time Coordinated

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## 4 Overview

### 4.1 General

The overall architecture for 5G ProSe is given in TS 23.304 [2]. 5G ProSe includes several features that may be deployed independently of each other. For this reason, no overall security architecture is provided and each feature describes its own architecture.

Security for the 5G ProSe common procedures is described in clause 5, while the overall security of the 5G ProSe features is described in clause 6.

### 4.2 Reference points and functional entities

#### 4.2.1 Functional entities

##### 4.2.1.1 General

Architectural reference model is specified in clause 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.2.3, and 4.2.7 of TS 23.304 [2].

##### 4.2.1.2 5G ProSe Key Management Function

In addition to the architectural reference model specified in TS 23.304 [2], the architectural reference model shall support the functional entity 5G ProSe Key Management Function (5G PKMF) which is the logical function handling network related actions required for the key management and the security material for discovery of a 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay by a 5G ProSe Remote UE, and for establishing a secure PC5 communication link between a 5G ProSe Remote UE and 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay.

The 5G ProSe Remote UE and the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay know from which 5G ProSe Key Management Function(s) to get the needed discovery security materials for protecting discovery messages and UP-PRUK(s) for establishing a secure PC5 link between the 5G ProSe Remote UE and the UE-to-Network Relay as the address of the 5G PKMF(s) is either pre-provisioned or provided by the 5G DDNMF (or the PCF) in the HPLMN of the 5G ProSe Remote UE to the 5G ProSe Remote UE, and by the 5G DDNMF (or the PCF) in the HPLMN of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay to the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay.

The 5G PKMF interacts with the 5G ProSe-enabled UE using procedures over PC8 reference point defined in clause 4.2.2. The protection for the key request/response messages are described in clause 5.2.5.

The 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE shall request the discovery security materials from the 5G PKMFs of the potential 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relays from which the 5G ProSe Remote UE gets the relay services.

The 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay shall request the security materials (e.g. Knrp and Knrp freshness parameter) from the 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE for PC5 communication.

### 4.2.1.3 Prose Anchor Function

In addition to the architectural reference model specified in TS 23.304 [2], the architectural reference model shall support the functional entity Prose Anchor Function (PAnF) which is the logical function handling network related actions required for the key management and the security material for establishing a secure PC5 communication link between a 5G ProSe Remote UE and 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay over Control Plane.

The PAnF shall store the Prose context info (i.e. SUPI, RSC, CP-PRUK, CP-PRUK ID) for a 5G ProSe Remote UE.

The PAnF interacts with AUSF using procedures over Npc11 reference point defined in clause 4.2.2. The PAnF interacts with UDM using procedures over Npc12 reference point defined in clause 4.2.2.

### 4.2.2 Reference points

In addition to the reference points are specified in clause 4.2.5 of TS 23.304 [2], the 5G Prose architectural reference model shall support the following reference points:

**PC8:** The reference point between the UE and the 5G ProSe Key Management Function (5G PKMF). PC8 relies on 5GC user plane for transport (i.e. an "over IP" reference point). It is used to transport security material to UEs for 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery and communication.

**Npc9:** The reference point between the 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE and the 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay. It is used to transport security material between two 5G PKMFs.

**Npc10:** The reference point between the UDM and the 5G PKMF. It is used to de-conceal SUCI to gain SUPI, obtain a GBA Authentication Vector (AV) for a UE, or request relay service authorization information from the UDM.

**Npc11:** The reference point between the AUSF and Prose Anchor Function (PAnF). It is used to store the Prose context info for a 5G ProSe Remote UE.

**Npc12:** The reference point between the PAnF and UDM. It is used to check with the UDM whether the Remote UE is authorized to use the UE-to-Network Relay service.

**Npc13:** The reference point between the SMF and PKMF. It is used to obtain the SUPI of Remote UE from PKMF.

**Npc14:** The reference point between the SMF and PAnF. It is used to obtain the SUPI of Remote UE from PKMF.

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## 5 Common security procedures

### 5.1 General

This clause describes the security requirements and procedures that are commonly applied to different modes of ProSe communication, including unicast mode ProSe Direct Network Communication and unicast mode ProSe Indirect Network Communication via the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay.

### 5.2 Network domain security

#### 5.2.1 General

5G Prose uses several interfaces between network entities, e.g. Npc4 between the 5G DDNMF and the UDM, Npc8 between the 5G DDNMF and the PCF (see TS 23.304 [2]). This clause describes the security for those interfaces.

## 5.2.2 Security of Npc2 reference point

### 5.2.2.1 General

Npc2 is the reference point between the ProSe Application Server and the 5G DDNMF as specified in clause 4 of TS 23.304 [2]. When the ProSe Application Server is in a 3rd party's network, the Npc2 comprises two interfaces, i.e. the service-based interface between the 5G DDNMF and the NEF, and the N33 interface between the NEF and the Prose Application Server. When the Prose Application Server is in a MNO's network, the Npc2 is a purely service-based interface.

### 5.2.2.2 Security requirements

When the ProSe Application Server is controlled by a 3rd party, requirements on security aspects of NEF are captured in clause 5.9.2.3 of TS 33.501 [3].

### 5.2.2.3 Security procedures

When the ProSe Application Server is controlled by a 3rd party, security procedures specified in clause 12 of TS 33.501 [3] is applicable.

When the Prose Application Server is controlled by a MNO, security procedures specified in clause 13 of TS 33.501 [3] is applicable.

As specified in TS 23.304 [2], the 5G System architecture supports the service based Npc2 interface between 5G DDNMF and ProSe Application Server and optionally supports PC2 interface between the 5G DDNMF and the ProSe Application Server. The security of PC2 reference point specified in TS 33.303 [4] shall be reused.

## 5.2.3 Security of UE - 5G DDNMF interface

### 5.2.3.1 General

PC3a is the reference point between the 5G Prose-enabled UE and the 5G DDNMF as specified in clause 4.2.5 of TS 23.304 [2].

### 5.2.3.2 Security requirements

3rd parties shall not be allowed to provide configuration data impacting the 5G ProSe-related network operations to the 5G ProSe-enabled UE. The 5G ProSe-enabled UE and the 5G DDNMF shall mutually authenticate each other.

The transmission of the material for 5G Prose discovery between the 5G DDNMF and the 5G ProSe-enabled UE shall be integrity protected.

The transmission of the material for 5G Prose discovery between the 5G DDNMF and the 5G ProSe-enabled UE shall be confidentiality protected.

The transmission of the material for 5G Prose discovery between the 5G DDNMF and the 5G ProSe-enabled UE shall be protected from replays.

### 5.2.3.3 Security procedures for configuration transfer to UICC

See clause 5.3.3.1 in TS 33.303 [4].

### 5.2.3.4 Security procedures for PC3a using GBA

For the security procedures for protecting data transfer between the UE and the 5G DDNMF on the PC3a interface, the use of either TLS v1.2 or TLS v. 1.3, as described in clause 5.3.3.2 in TS 33.303 [4] applies with the following modifications:

- The ProSe function is replaced by the 5G DDNMF.

- Confidentiality protection shall be enabled.

### 5.2.3.5 Security procedures for PC3a using AKMA

Security procedures specified in clause B.1.3.2 of TS 33.535 [5] is applicable with the additional changes:

- The 5G DDNMF takes the role of AF.
- Confidentiality protection shall be enabled.

### 5.2.3.6 Privacy issue in PC3a interface

PC3a interface will be used to transfer the configuration data that is used to perform 5G ProSe Direct Discovery. According to clause 6.3.1.4 of TS 23.304 [2], the UE identity is included in the Discovery Request message. Privacy of UE identity is ensured by the confidentiality protection over PC3a interface.

## 5.2.4 Security of service-based interfaces used in 5G Prose

### 5.2.4.1 Security requirements

The 5G Prose network entities shall be able to authenticate the source of the received data communications.

The transmission of data between 5G Prose network entities shall be integrity protected.

The transmission of data between 5G Prose network entities shall be confidentiality protected.

The transmission of data between 5G Prose network entities shall be protected from replays.

### 5.2.4.2 Security procedures

Npc4, Npc6, Npc7, Npc8, Npc9 and Npc10 specified in clause 4.2.5 of TS 23.304 [2], Npc11 and Npc12 specified in clause 4.2.2 are realized by corresponding NF service-based interfaces, therefore security procedures specified in clause 13 of TS 33.501 [3] apply to these interfaces.

## 5.2.5 Security for UE - 5G PKMF interface

### 5.2.5.1 General

The 5G ProSe-enabled UEs have interactions with the 5G PKMF over the PC8 interface in the ProSe features described in clause 4.2.2.

### 5.2.5.2 Security requirements

The 5G PKMF for commercial services and for public safety services provides the security keys and security material affecting the 5G ProSe-related network operations to the 5G ProSe-enabled UE for discovery of a 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay and PC5 communication with a 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay.

The 5G ProSe-enabled UE and the 5G PKMF shall mutually authenticate each other.

The 5G System shall support that the transmission of the security keys and security material between the 5G PKMF and the 5G ProSe-enabled UE shall be integrity protected.

The 5G System shall support that the transmission of the security keys and security material between the 5G PKMF and the 5G ProSe-enabled UE shall be confidentiality protected.

The 5G System shall support that the transmission of the security keys and security material between the 5G PKMF and the 5G ProSe-enabled UE shall be protected from replays.

The 5G System shall support that the transmission of the UE identity on the PC8 interface shall be confidentiality protected.

### 5.2.5.3 Security procedures for PC8 using GBA

For the security procedures for protecting data transfer between the UE and the 5G PKMF on the PC8 interface, the use of either TLS v1.2 or TLS v. 1.3, as described in clause 5.3.3.2 of TS 33.303 [4] applies with the following modifications:

- The ProSe function is replaced by the 5G PKMF.
- Confidentiality protection shall be enabled.

### 5.2.5.4 Security procedures for PC8 using AKMA

Security procedures specified in clause B.1.3.2 of TS 33.535 [5] is applicable with the additional change:

- The 5G PKMF takes the role of AF.
- Confidentiality protection shall be enabled.

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## 6 Security for 5G ProSe features

### 6.1 Security for 5G ProSe Discovery

#### 6.1.1 General

This clause describes the security requirements and procedures that are specifically applied to 5G ProSe Discovery defined in TS 23.304[2].

The security requirements for 5G ProSe Discovery are defined in clause 6.1.2.

The security procedures for open 5G ProSe Direct Discovery is defined in clause 6.1.3.1, the security procedures for restricted 5G ProSe Direct Discovery is defined in clause 6.1.3.2.

#### 6.1.2 Security requirements

The 5G System shall support integrity protection and replay protection of discovery messages in open 5G ProSe Direct Discovery.


The 5G System shall support confidentiality protection, integrity protection and replay protection of discovery messages in restricted 5G ProSe Direct Discovery.

The 5G System shall support a method to verify source authenticity of discovery messages.

#### 6.1.3 Security procedures

##### 6.1.3.1 Open 5G ProSe Direct Discovery

The open 5G ProSe Direct Discovery security procedure is described as follows.



**Figure 6.1.3.1-1: Open 5G ProSe Direct Discovery security procedure**

1. The Announcing UE sends a Discovery Request message containing the ProSe Application ID to the 5G DDNMF in its HPLMN in order to be allowed to announce a code on its serving PLMN (either VPLMN or HPLMN).
2. If the Announcing UE wants to send announcements in the VPLMN, it needs to be authorized from the VPLMN 5G DDNMF. The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN requests authorization from the VPLMN 5G DDNMF by sending Announce Auth.() message.
3. VPLMN 5G DDNMF responds with an Announce Auth. Ack () message, if authorization is granted. There are no changes to these messages for the purpose of protecting the transmitted code for open 5G ProSe Direct Discovery. If the Announcing UE is not roaming, these steps do not take place.



4. The 5G DDNMF in HPLMN of the Announcing UE returns the ProSe Application Code that the Announcing UE can announce and a Discovery Key associated with it. The 5G DDNMF stores the Discovery Key with the ProSe Application Code. In addition, the 5G DDNMF provides the UE with a CURRENT\_TIME parameter, which contains the current UTC-based time at the 5G DDNMF, a MAX\_OFFSET parameter, and a Validity Timer. The UE sets a clock which is used for ProSe authentication (i.e. ProSe clock) to the value of CURRENT\_TIME and the UE stores the MAX\_OFFSET parameter, overwriting any previous values. The Announcing UE obtains a value for a UTC-based counter associated with a discovery slot based on UTC time. The counter is set to a value of UTC time in a granularity of seconds. The UE may obtain UTC time from any sources available, e.g. the RAN via SIB9, NITZ, NTP, GPS, via Ub interface (in GBA) (depending on which is available).

NOTE 1: The UE may use unprotected time to obtain the UTC-based counter associated with a discovery slot. This means that the discovery message could be successfully replayed if a UE is fooled into using a time different to the current time. The MAX\_OFFSET parameter is used to limit the ability of an attacker to successfully replay discovery messages or obtain correctly MICed discovery message for later use. This is achieved by using MAX\_OFFSET as a maximum difference between the UTC-based counter associated with the discovery slot and the ProSe clock held by the UE.

NOTE 2: A discovery slot is the time at which an Announcing UE sends the announcement.

5. The Announcing UE starts announcing, if the difference between UTC-based counter provided by the system associated with the discovery slot and the UE's ProSe clock is not greater than the MAX\_OFFSET and if the Validity Timer has not expired. For each discovery slot it uses to announce, the Announcing UE calculates a 32-bit Message Integrity Check (MIC) to include with the ProSe Application Code in the discovery message. Four least significant bits of UTC-based counter are transmitted along with the discovery message. The MIC is calculated as described in clause A.6 using the Discovery Key and the UTC-based counter associated with the discovery slot.
6. The Monitoring UE sends a Discovery Request message containing the ProSe Application ID to the 5G DDNMF in its HPLMN in order to get the Discovery Filters that it wants to listen for.
7. The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE sends Monitor Req. message to the 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Announcing UE.
8. The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Announcing UE sends Monitor Resp. message to the 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE.
9. The 5G DDNMF returns the Discovery Filter containing either the ProSe Application Code(s), the ProSe Application Mask(s) or both along with the CURRENT\_TIME and the MAX\_OFFSET parameters. The Monitoring UE sets its ProSe clock to CURRENT\_TIME and stores the MAX\_OFFSET parameter, overwriting any previous values. The Monitoring UE obtains a value for a UTC-based counter associated with a discovery slot based on UTC time. The counter is set to a value of UTC time in a granularity of seconds. The Monitoring UE may obtain UTC time from any sources available, e.g. the RAN via SIB9, NITZ, NTP, GPS (depending on which is available).
10. The Monitoring UE listens for a discovery message that satisfies its Discovery Filter, if the difference between UTC-based counter associated with that discovery slot and UE's ProSe clock is not greater than the MAX\_OFFSET of the Monitoring UE's ProSe clock.
11. On hearing such a discovery message, and if the UE has either not checked the MIC for the discovered ProSe App Code via Match Report previously or has checked a MIC for the ProSe App Code via Match Report and the associated Match Report refresh timer (see steps 14 and 15 for details of this timer) has expired, or as required based on the procedure specified in TS 23.304 [2], the Monitoring UE sends a Match Report message to the 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE. The Match Report contains the UTC-based counter value with four least significant bits equal to four least significant bits received along with discovery message and nearest to the Monitoring UE's UTC-based counter associated with the discovery slot where it heard the announcement, and other discovery message parameters including the ProSe App Code and MIC. If a Match Report is not required, the Monitoring UE shall locally process the discovery message and the rest of the procedure is not performed.
12. The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE passes the discovery message parameters including the ProSe Application Code and MIC and associated counter parameter to the 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Announcing UE in the Match Report message.

13. The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Announcing UE shall check the MIC is valid. The relevant Discovery Key is identified by the ProSe Application Code.
14. The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Announcing UE shall acknowledge a successful check of the MIC to the 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE via the Match Report Ack message. The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Announcing UE include a Match Report refresh timer in the Match Report Ack message. The Match Report refresh timer indicates how long the UE will wait before sending a new Match Report for the ProSe Application Code.
15. The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE acknowledges the MIC check result to the Monitoring UE. The 5G DDNMF returns the parameter ProSe Application ID to the UE. It also provides the CURRENT\_TIME parameter, by which the UE (re)sets its ProSe clock. The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE may optionally modify the received Match Report refresh timer based on local policy and then include the Match Report refresh timer in the message to the Monitoring UE.

### 6.1.3.2 Restricted 5G ProSe Direct Discovery

#### 6.1.3.2.1 General

The security for both models of restricted 5G ProSe Direct Discovery is similar to that of open 5G ProSe Direct Discovery described in clause 6.1.3.1. Both models also use a UTC-based counter (see step 9 in clause 6.1.3.1) to provide freshness for the protection of the restricted 5G ProSe Direct Discovery message on the PC5 interface. The parameters CURRENT\_TIME and MAX\_OFFSET are also provided to the UE from the 5G DDNMF in its HPLMN to ensure that the obtained UTC-based counter is sufficiently close to real time to protect against replays.

The major differences are that restricted 5G ProSe Direct Discovery requires confidentiality protection of the discovery messages (e.g. to ensure a UE's privacy is not disclosed to unauthorized parties or tracked due to constantly sending the same ProSe Restricted/Response Code in the clear) and that the MIC checking may be performed by the receiving UE (if allowed by the 5G DDNMF).

The security parameters needed by a sending UE to protect a discovery message (i.e. in Model A the Announcing UE and in Model B the Discoverer UE sending the ProSe Query Code and the Discoveree UE sending the ProSe Response Code) are provided in the Code-Sending Security Parameters. Similarly, the security parameters needed by a UE receiving a discovery message (i.e. in Model A the Monitoring UE and in Model B the Discoverer UE receiving a ProSe Response Code and the Discoveree receiving a ProSe Query Code) are provided in the Code-Receiving Security Parameters.

In addition to clause 6.1.3.4.1 in TS 33.303 [4], 5G Prose introduced two new features:


- During the discovery request procedure, 5G DDNMF may optionally provide the PC5 security policies to the UEs.
- A ciphering algorithm for message-specific confidentiality is configured at the UE during the Discovery Request procedure.

5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery is different from 5G ProSe Restricted Direct Discovery. In 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, the discovery security materials are provided by the PKMF for RSC(s) representing user-plane based security procedure, and by the DDNMF or the PCF for RSC(s) with Control Plane Security Indicator set representing control-plane based security procedure. The 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery procedures described in clause 6.1.3.2.2.1 and clause 6.1.3.2.2.2 apply with adjustment when 5G DDNMF or 5G PKMF is used for 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery.

#### 6.1.3.2.2 Security flows

##### 6.1.3.2.2.1 Restricted 5G ProSe Direct Discovery Model A

The security procedure for restricted 5G ProSe Direct Discovery Model A is described as follows.



**Figure 6.1.3.2.2.1-1: Security procedure for restricted 5G ProSe Direct Discovery Model A**

NOTE 1: When the user-plane based security procedure for the UE-to-Network Relay is used, the 5G PKMF takes the role of the 5G DDNMF as described in clause 6.3.3.2 of the present document.

Steps 1-4 refer to an Announcing UE:

1. Announcing UE sends a Discovery Request message containing the Restricted ProSe Application User ID (RPAUID) to the 5G DDNMF in its HPLMN in order to get the ProSe Code to announce and to get the associated security material. In addition, the Announcing UE shall include its PC5 UE security capability that contains the list of supported ciphering algorithms by the UE in the Discovery Request message.

For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay plays the role of the Announcing UE and sends a Relay Discovery Key Request instead of a Discovery Request. The Relay Discovery Key Request message includes the Relay Service Code (RSC) and the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay's PC5 security capability.

2. The 5G DDNMF may check for the announce authorization with the ProSe Application Server.

For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, the 5G DDNMF may check with the UDM whether the UE-to-Network relay is authorized to announce UE-to-Network relay discovery message.

3. If the Announcing UE is roaming, the 5G DDNMFs in the HPLMN and VPLMN of the Announcing UE exchange Announce Auth.
4. The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Announcing UE returns the ProSe Restricted Code and the corresponding Code-Sending Security Parameters, along with the CURRENT\_TIME and MAX\_OFFSET parameters. The Code-Sending Security Parameters provide the necessary information for the Announcing UE to protect the transmission of the ProSe Restricted Code and are stored with the ProSe Restricted Code. The Announcing UE takes the same actions with CURRENT\_TIME and MAX\_OFFSET as described for the Announcing UE in step 4 of clause 6.1.3.1 of the present document. The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Announcing UE shall include the chosen PC5 ciphering algorithm in the Discovery Response message. The 5G DDNMF determines the chosen PC5 ciphering algorithm based on the ProSe Restricted Code and the received PC5 UE security capability in step 1. The UE stores the chosen PC5 ciphering algorithm together with the ProSe Restricted Code.

In addition, the 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Announcing UE may associate the ProSe Restricted Code with the PC5 security policies and include the PC5 security policies in the Discovery Response message.

For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, a Relay Discovery Key Response is used instead of the Discovery Response, and the RSC is used instead of the ProSe Restricted Code.

NOTE 2: 5G DDNMF may get the PC5 security policies in different ways (e.g. from PCF, from ProSe Application Server, or based on local configuration).

Steps 5-10 refer to a Monitoring UE:

5. The Monitoring UE sends a Discovery Request message containing the RPAUID and its PC5 UE security capability to the 5G DDNMF in its HPLMN in order to be allowed to monitor for one or more Restricted ProSe Application User IDs.

For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, the 5G ProSe Remote UE plays the role of the Monitoring UE and sends a Relay Discovery Key Request instead of the Discovery Request. The Relay Discovery Key Request message includes the RSC and the 5G ProSe Remote UE's PC5 security capability. The Remote UE may provide a list of PLMNs in which the UE is authorized to use a 5G ProSe U2N Relay. in the Relay Discovery Key Request.

6. The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE sends an authorization request to the ProSe Application Server. If, based on the permission settings, the RPAUID is allowed to discover at least one of the Target RPAUIDs contained in the Application Level Container, the ProSe Application Server returns an authorization response.

For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, the 5G DDNMF of the Remote UE may check with the UDM whether the Remote UE is authorized to monitor UE-to-Network relay discovery.

7. If the Discovery Request is authorized, the 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE contacts the 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Announcing UE by sending a Monitor Request message, as specified in clause 6.3 of TS 23.304 [2], including the PC5 UE security capability received in step 5.

For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay Discovery, Relay Discovery Key Request and RSC are used instead of Discovery Request and RPAUID. The 5G DDNMF of the remote UE discovers 5G DDNMF(s) of the potential 5G ProSe UE-to-Network relay(s) supporting the RSC based on HPLMN(s) of the potential 5G ProSe UE-to-Network relay(s) mapping to the RSC.

NOTE 2a: 5G DDNMF may get the HPLMN(s) of the potential 5G ProSe UE-to-Network relays in different ways (e.g. from PCF, or based on local configuration).

8. The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Announcing UE may exchange authorization messages with the ProSe Application Server.

For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, this step is skipped.

9. If the PC5 UE security capability in step 5 includes the chosen PC5 ciphering algorithm, the 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Announcing UE responds to the 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE with a Monitor Response message including the ProSe Restricted Code, the corresponding Code-Receiving Security Parameters, an optional Discovery User Integrity Key (DUIK), and the chosen PC5 ciphering algorithm (based on the information/keys stored in step 4). The Code-Receiving Security Parameters provide the information needed by the Monitoring UE to undo the protection applied by the Announcing UE. The DUIK shall be included as a separate parameter if the Code-Receiving Security Parameters indicate that the Monitoring UE use Match Reports for MIC checking. The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE stores the ProSe Restricted Code and the Discovery User Integrity Key (if it received one outside of the Code-Receiving Security Parameters).

For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, a Relay Discovery Key Response is used instead of the Monitor Response, and the RSC is used instead of the ProSe Restricted Code.

The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Announcing UE may send the PC5 security policies associated with the ProSe Restricted Code to the 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE.

NOTE 3: For 5G ProSe Direct Discovery, there are two possible configurations for integrity checking, namely, MIC checked by the 5G DDNMF of the Monitoring UE, and MIC checked at the Monitoring UE side. Which configuration to use is decided by the 5G DDNMF, which assigns the monitored ProSe Restricted Code and signals the Monitoring UE in the Code-Receiving Security Parameters.

For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, MIC checking is performed only at the Remote UE and the 5G DDNMF of the Remote UE does not need to configure integrity checking for UE-to-Network Relay discovery.

NOTE 4: The chosen PC5 ciphering algorithm is associated with the ProSe Restricted Code.

10. The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE returns the Discovery Filter and the Code-Receiving Security Parameters, along with the CURRENT\_TIME and MAX\_OFFSET parameters and the chosen PC5 ciphering algorithm. The Monitoring UE takes the same actions with CURRENT\_TIME and MAX\_OFFSET as described for the Monitoring UE in step 9 of clause 6.1.3.1 of the present document. The UE stores the Discovery Filter, Code-Receiving Security Parameters, and the chosen PC5 ciphering algorithm together with the ProSe Restricted Code.

For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, a Relay Discovery Key Response is returned instead of the Discovery Response, and the RSC is included instead of the ProSe Restricted Code. The response message contains the discovery security materials as contained in step 9.

If the 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE receives the PC5 security policies associated with the ProSe Restricted Code in step 9, the Monitoring UE's 5G DDNMF forwards the PC5 security policies to the Monitoring UE.

For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, a Relay Discovery Key Response is used instead of the Discovery Response, and the RSC is used instead of the ProSe Restricted Code.

Steps 11 and 12 occur over PC5:

11. The UE starts announcing, if the UTC-based counter provided by the system associated with the discovery slot is within the MAX\_OFFSET of the Announcing UE's ProSe clock and if the Validity Timer has not expired. The UE forms the discovery message and protects it. The four least significant bits of UTC-based counter are transmitted along with the protected discovery message.

12. The Monitoring UE listens for a discovery message that satisfies its Discovery Filter if the UTC-based counter associated with that discovery slot is within the MAX\_OFFSET of the monitoring UE's ProSe clock. In order to find such a matching message, it processes the message. If the Monitoring UE was not asked to send Match Reports for MIC checking, it stops at this step from a security perspective. Otherwise, it proceeds to step 13.

NOTE 5: The UE checking the integrity of the discovery message on its own does not prevent the UE from sending a Match Report due to requirements in TS 23.304 [2]. If such a Match Report is sent, then there is no security functionality involved.


Steps 13-16 refer to a Monitoring UE that has encountered a match:

NOTE 6: For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, the steps 13-16 are skipped.

13. If the UE has either not had the 5G DDNMF check the MIC for the discovered ProSe Restricted Code previously or the 5G DDNMF has checked a MIC for the ProSe Restricted Code and the associated Match Report refresh timer (see step 15 for details of this timer) has expired, or as required based on the procedure specified in TS 23.304 [2], then the Monitoring UE sends a Match Report message to the 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE. The Match Report contains the UTC-based counter value with four least significant bits equal to four least significant bits received along with discovery message and nearest to the Monitoring UE's UTC-based counter associated with the discovery slot where it heard the announcement, and other discovery message parameters including the ProSe Restricted Code and MIC. The 5G DDNMF checks the MIC.
14. The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE may exchange an Auth Req/Auth Resp with the ProSe Application Server to ensure that Monitoring UE is authorized to discover the Announcing UE.
15. The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE returns to the Monitoring UE an acknowledgement that the integrity check passed. It also provides the CURRENT\_TIME parameter, by which the UE (re)sets its ProSe clock. The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE included the Match Report refresh timer in the message to the Monitoring UE. The Match Report refresh timer indicates how long the UE will wait before sending a new Match Report for the ProSe Restricted Code.
16. The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Monitoring UE may send a Match Report Info message to the 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Announcing UE.

#### 6.1.3.2.2.2 Restricted 5G ProSe Direct Discovery Model B

The security procedure for restricted 5G ProSe Direct Discovery Model B is described as follows.



**Figure 6.1.3.2.2-1: Security procedure for restricted 5G ProSe Direct Discovery Model B**

NOTE 1: When the user-plane based security procedure for the UE-to-Network Relay is used, the 5G PKMF takes the role of the 5G DDNMF as described in clause 6.3.3.2 of the present document.

Steps 1-4 refer to a Discoveree UE:

- Discoveree UE sends a Discovery Request message containing the RPAUID to the 5G DDNMF in its HPLMN in order to get Discovery Query Filter(s) to monitor a query, the ProSe Response Code to announce and associated security materials. The command indicates that this is for ProSe Response (Model B) operation, i.e. for a Discoveree UE. In addition, the Discoveree UE shall include its PC5 UE security capability that contains the list of supported ciphering algorithms by the UE in the Discovery Request message.

For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay plays the role of the Discoveree UE and sends a Relay Discovery Key Request instead of a Discovery Request. The Relay Discovery Key Request message includes the Relay Service Code (RSC) and the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay's PC5 security capabilities.

2. The 5G DDNMF may check for the announce authorization with the ProSe Application Server depending on 5G DDNMF configuration.

For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, the 5G DDNMF may check with the UDM whether the UE-to-Network relay is authorized to announce UE-to-Network relay discovery.

3. The 5G DDNMFs in the HPLMN and VPLMN of the Discoveree UE exchange Announce Auth. Messages. If the Discoveree UE is not roaming, these steps do not take place.
4. The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Discoveree UE returns the ProSe Response Code and the Code-Sending Security Parameters, Discovery Query Filter(s), Code-Receiving Security Parameters corresponding to each discovery filter along with the CURRENT\_TIME and MAX\_OFFSET parameters and the chosen PC5 ciphering algorithm. The Code-Sending Security Parameters provide the necessary information for the Discoveree UE to protect the transmission of the ProSe Response Code and are stored with the ProSe Response Code. The Code-Receiving Security Parameters provide the information needed by the Discoveree UE to undo the protection applied to the ProSe Query Code by the Discoverer UE. The Code-Receiving Security Parameters indicate a Match Report will not be used for MIC checking. The UE stores each Discovery Filter with its associated Code-Receiving Security Parameters. The Discoveree UE takes the same actions with CURRENT\_TIME and MAX\_OFFSET as described for the Announcing UE in step 4 of clause 6.1.3.1 of the present document. The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Discoveree UE shall include the chosen PC5 ciphering algorithm in the Discovery Response message. The 5G DDNMF determines the chosen PC5 ciphering algorithm based on the ProSe Response Code and the received PC5 UE security capability in step 1. The UE stores the chosen PC5 ciphering algorithm together with the ProSe Response Code.

In addition, the 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Discoveree UE may associate the ProSe Response Code with the PC5 security policies and include the PC5 security policies in the Discovery Response message.

For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, a Relay Discovery Key Response is used instead of the Discovery Response, and the RSC is used instead of ProSe Query Code and ProSe Response Code.

- NOTE 2: 5G DDNMF may get the PC5 security policies in different ways (e.g. from PCF, from ProSe Application Server, or based on local configuration).

Steps 5-10 refer to a Discoverer UE:

5. The Discoverer UE sends a Discovery Request message containing the RPAUID and its PC5 UE security capability to the 5G DDNMF in its HPLMN in order to be allowed to discover one or more Restricted ProSe Application User IDs.

For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, the 5G ProSe Remote UE plays the role of the Discoverer UE and sends a Relay Discovery Key Request instead of the Discovery Request. The Relay Discovery Key Request message includes the RSC and the 5G ProSe Remote UE's PC5 security capabilities. The Remote UE may provide a list of PLMNs in which the UE is authorized to use a 5G ProSe U2N Relay. in the Relay Discovery Key Request.

6. The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Discoverer UE sends an authorization request to the ProSe Application Server. If the RPAUID is allowed to discover at least one of the Target RPAUIDs contained in the Application Level Container, the ProSe Application Server returns an authorization response.

For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, the 5G DDNMF of the Remote UE may check with the UDM whether the Remote UE is authorized to monitor UE-to-Network relay discovery.

7. If the Discovery Request is authorized, the 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Discoverer UE contacts the 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Discoveree UE by sending a Discovery Request message, as specified in clause 6.3 of TS 23.304 [2], including the PC5 UE security capability in step 5.

For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay Discovery, Relay Discovery Key Request and RSC are used instead of Discovery Request and RPAUID. The 5G DDNMF of the remote UE discovers 5G DDNMF(s) of the potential 5G ProSe UE-to-Network relay(s) supporting the RSC based on HPLMNs of the potential 5G ProSe UE-to-Network relay(s) mapping to the RSC.



NOTE 2a: 5G DDNMF may get the HPLMNs of the potential 5G ProSe UE-to-Network relays in different ways (e.g. from PCF, or based on local configuration).

8. The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Discoveree UE may exchange authorization messages with the ProSe Application Server.

For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, this step is skipped.

9. If the PC5 UE security capability in step 5 includes the chosen PC5 ciphering algorithm, the 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Discoveree UE responds to the 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Discoverer UE with a Discovery Response message including the ProSe Query Code(s) and their associated Code-Sending Security Parameters, ProSe Response Code and its associated Code-Receiving Security Parameters, an optional Discovery User Integrity Key (DUIK) for the ProSe Response Code, and a chosen PC5 ciphering algorithm. The Code-Receiving Security Parameters provide the information needed by the Discoverer UE to undo the protection applied by the Discoveree UE. The DUIK shall be included as a separate parameter if the Code-Receiving Security Parameters indicate that the Discoverer UE use Match Reports for MIC checking. The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Discoverer UE stores the ProSe Response Code and the Discovery User Integrity Key (if it received one outside of the Code-Receiving Security Parameters). The Code-Sending Security Parameters provide the information needed by the Discoverer UE to protect the ProSe Query Code.

The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Discoveree UE may send the PC5 security policies associated with the ProSe Response Code to the 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Discoverer UE.

For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, a Relay Discovery Key Response is used instead of the Discovery Response, and the RSC is used instead of ProSe Query Code and ProSe Response Code.

NOTE 3: For 5G ProSe Direct Discovery, there are two possible configurations for integrity checking, namely, MIC checked by the 5G DDNMF of the Discoverer UE, and MIC checked at the Discoverer UE side; this is decided by the 5G DDNMF that assigns the ProSe Restricted Code, and signals the Discoverer UE in the Code-Receiving Security Parameters.

For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, MIC checking is performed only at the Remote UE and the 5G DDNMF of the Remote UE does not need to configure integrity checking for UE-to-Network Relay discovery.

NOTE 4: The chosen PC5 ciphering algorithm is associated with the ProSe Response Code.

10. The 5G DDNMFs in the HPLMN and VPLMN of the Discoverer UE exchange Announce Auth. messages. If the Discoverer UE is not roaming, these steps do not take place.
11. The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Discoverer UE returns the Discovery Response Filter and the Code-Receiving Security Parameters, the ProSe Query Code, the Code-Sending Security Parameters along with the CURRENT\_TIME and MAX\_OFFSET parameters and the chosen PC5 ciphering algorithm. The Discoverer UE takes the same actions with CURRENT\_TIME and MAX\_OFFSET as described for the Monitoring UE in step 9 of clause 6.1.3.1 of the present document. The UE stores the Discovery Response Filter and its Code-Receiving Security Parameters and the ProSe Query Code and its Code-Sending Security Parameters, and the chosen PC5 ciphering algorithm together with the ProSe Response Code.

If the 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Discoverer UE receives the PC5 security policies associated with the ProSe Response Code in step 9, the Discoverer UE's 5G DDNMF forwards the PC5 security policies to the Discoverer UE.

For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, a Relay Discovery Key Response is used instead of the Discovery Response, and the RSC is used instead of the ProSe Restricted Code.

Steps 12 to 15 occur over PC5:

12. The Discoverer UE sends the ProSe Query Code and also listens for a response message if the UTC-based counter provided by the system associated with the discovery slot is within the MAX\_OFFSET of the Discoverer UE's ProSe clock and if the Validity Timer has not expired. The Discoverer UE forms the discovery message and protects it. The four least significant bits of UTC-based counter are transmitted along with the protected discovery message.

13. The Discoveree UE listens for a discovery message that satisfies its Discovery Filter if the UTC-based counter associated with that discovery slot is within the MAX\_OFFSET of the Discoveree UE's ProSe clock. In order to find such a matching message, it processes the message.

NOTE 5: Match Reports are not used for the MIC checking of ProSe Query Codes.

14. The Discoveree UE sends the ProSe Response Code associated with the discovered ProSe Query Code. The Discoveree UE forms the discovery message and protects it. The four least significant bits of UTC-based counter are transmitted along with the protected discovery message.
15. The Discoverer UE listens for a discovery message that satisfies its Discovery Filter. In order to find such a matching message, it processes the message. If the Discoverer UE was not asked to send Match Reports for MIC checking, it stops at this step from a security perspective. Otherwise, it proceeds to step 16.

NOTE 6: The UE checking the integrity of the discovery message on its own does not prevent the UE from sending a Match Report due to requirements in TS 23.304 [2]. If such a Match Report is sent, then there is no security functionality involved.

NOTE 7: The security keys in the Code-Sending Security Parameters of Discoverer UE and the security keys in the Code-Sending Security Parameters of Discoveree UE need to be generated independently and randomly.

Steps 16-19 refer to a Discoverer UE that has encountered a match:

NOTE 8: For 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery, the steps 16-19 are skipped.

16. If the Discoverer UE has either not had the 5G DDNMF check the MIC for the discovered ProSe Response Code previously or the 5G DDNMF has checked a MIC for the ProSe Response Code and the associated Match Report refresh timer (see step 18 for details of this timer) has expired, or as required based on the procedure specified in TS 23.304 [2], then the Discoverer UE sends a Match Report message to the 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Discoverer UE. The Match Report contains the UTC-based counter value with four least significant bits equal to four least significant bits received along with discovery message and nearest to the Discoverer UE's UTC-based counter associated with the discovery slot where it heard the announcement, and other discovery message parameters including the ProSe Response Code and MIC. The 5G DDNMF checks the MIC.
17. The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Discoverer UE may exchange an Auth Req/Auth Resp with the ProSe Application Server to ensure that Discoverer UE is authorized to discover the Discoveree UE.
18. The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Discoverer UE returns to the Discoverer UE an acknowledgement that the integrity check passed. It also provides the CURRENT\_TIME parameter, by which the UE (re)sets its ProSe clock. The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Discoverer UE include the Match Report refresh timer in the message to the Discoverer UE. The Match Report refresh timer indicates how long the UE will wait before sending a new Match Report for the ProSe Response Code.
19. The 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Discoverer UE may send a Match Report Info message to the 5G DDNMF in the HPLMN of the Discoveree UE.

### 6.1.3.2.3 Protection of discovery messages over PC5 interface

There are three types of security that are used to protect the restricted 5G ProSe Direct Discovery messages over the PC5 interface: integrity protection, scrambling protection, and message-specific confidentiality which are defined in clause 6.1.3.4.3 in TS 33.303 [4]. The protection mechanisms specified in TS 33.303 [4] are reused with the following changes:

- Input parameters to integrity protection algorithm as specified in clause A.6 in the present document.
- Message-specific confidentiality mechanisms as specified in clause A.7 in the present document.
- In A.5 of TS 33.303 [4], the time-hash-bitsequence keystream is set to L least significant bits of the output of the KDF, where L is the bit length of the discovery message to be scrambled and set to Min (the length of discovery message - 16, 256).
- Step 3 of clause 6.1.3.4.3.5 of TS 33.303 [4] becomes:

XOR (0xFFFF || time-hash-bitsequence) with the most significant (L + 16) bits of discovery message.

NOTE 1: 16 is the size of Message Type and UTC-based counter LSB in bit length.

NOTE 2: The maximum length of the discovery message to be scrambled is limited to 256 bits.

- Step 2 of clause 6.1.3.4.3.2 of TS 33.303 [4] becomes:

Calculate MIC if a DUIK was provided, otherwise set MIC to a 32-bit random string. Then, set the MIC IE to the MIC.

- Step 4 of clause 6.1.3.4.3.2 of TS 33.303 [4] is not processed.

NOTE 3: Protection for the discovery messages between the ProSe UEs is provided at the ProSe layer.

## 6.2 Security for unicast mode 5G ProSe Direct Communication

### 6.2.1 General

The unicast mode 5G ProSe Direct Communication procedures are described in TS 23.304 [2]. Unicast mode 5G ProSe Direct Communication is used by two UEs that directly exchange traffic for the ProSe applications running between the peer UEs.

PC5 security policy provisioning by 5G DDNMF for unicast mode 5G ProSe Direct Communication during the restricted 5G ProSe Direct Discovery procedure is specified in clause 6.1.3.2.

PC5 direct communication security for relay services is specified in clause 6.3.

If the UE receives PC5 security policies from 5G DDNMF as specified in clause 6.1.3.2.2, the UE uses the PC5 security policies from 5G DDNMF to establish PC5 unicast communication security instead of the PC5 security policies provisioned by PCF or pre-configured in UE as defined in TS 23.304 [2].

### 6.2.2 Security requirements

The initiating UE shall establish a different security context for each peer UE during the PC5 unicast establishment if the security is activated. It shall be possible to establish security context also when either one or both the 5G ProSe-enabled UEs are out of coverage.

The mutual authentication between two 5G ProSe-enabled UEs during PC5 unicast shall be supported.

The PC5 unicast signalling shall support confidentiality protection, integrity protection and anti-replay protection.

The PC5 unicast user plane shall support confidentiality protection, integrity protection and anti-replay protection.

The PCF shall be able to provision the PC5 security policies to the UE per ProSe application during service authorization and information provisioning procedure as defined in TS 23.304 [2].

The 5G System shall support means for a secure refresh of the UE security context.

NOTE 1: The security context refresh may be triggered based on various options (e.g. validity time etc.).

The 5G System should provide means for mitigating trackability attacks on a UE during PC5 unicast communications.

The 5G System should provide means for mitigating link ability attacks on a UE during PC5 unicast communications.

NOTE 2: The 5G system provides means for mitigating trackability and link ability if security of the connection is activated.

### 6.2.3 Security procedures

The unicast mode security mechanism defined in clause 5.3 of TS 33.536 [6] is reused in 5G ProSe to provide unicast mode 5G ProSe Direct Communication security.

## 6.2.4 Identity privacy for the PC5 unicast link

The privacy protection procedures defined in clause 5.3.3.2 of TS 33.536 [6] are reused in 5G ProSe to provide unicast mode 5G ProSe Direct Communication security.

# 6.3 Security for 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay Communication

## 6.3.1 General

This clause describes the security requirements and the procedures that are specifically applied to 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay communication defined in TS 23.304 [2]. The security requirements for 5G ProSe Layer-3 UE-to-Network Relay and 5G ProSe Layer-2 UE-to-Network Relay are different and are defined in clause 6.3.3 and clause 6.3.4 respectively.

There are two security mechanism options for 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay: security procedure over User Plane as defined in clause 6.3.3.2 and security procedure over Control Plane as defined in clause 6.3.3.3. The 5G ProSe remote UE and 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay determine the security mechanism based on the Control Plane Security Indicator associated with the RSC, the Control Plane Security Indicator and the associated RSC are specified in clause 5.1.4.3.2 of TS 23.304 [2].

The functionality in this clause is supported by both 5G ProSe-enabled UEs for commercial services and public safety.

## 6.3.2 Security requirements

The following security requirements apply to both 5G ProSe Layer-3 UE-to-Network Relay and 5G ProSe Layer-2 UE-to-Network Relay:

- The 5G System shall support the authorization of the UE as a 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay in the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay scenario.
- The 5G System shall support the authorization of the UE as a 5G ProSe Remote UE in the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay scenario.
- For UE-to-Network Relay discovery, the security requirements in clause 6.1.2 apply.
- The 5G System shall support a secure means to establish a PC5 link between the 5G ProSe Remote UE and the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay.
- The 5G System shall support confidentiality protection, integrity protection and replay protection for secure communication between the 5G ProSe Remote UE and the network via 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relays.
- PC5 signalling integrity security policy is set to "REQUIRED" for the 5G ProSe Remote UE and the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay.
- The 5G ProSe Remote UE shall establish a different PC5 security context with each different 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay and for each different Relay Service Code. It shall also be possible to establish a PC5 security context when the 5G ProSe Remote UE is out of coverage.

## 6.3.3 Security for 5G ProSe Communication via 5G ProSe Layer-3 UE-to-Network Relay

### 6.3.3.1 Security requirements

Both user-plane (UP) based and control-plane (CP) based procedures can be used for 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay authorization and security establishment. The UP based procedure uses a UP connection to the 5G PKMF, while the CP based procedure uses the ProSe authentication for PC5 key establishment.

The following are the security requirements for 5G ProSe Layer-3 UE-to-Network Relay communication:

- For 5G ProSe Layer-3 UE-to-Network Relay security established over control plane, the PCF shall be able to provision the PC5 security policies to the 5G ProSe Remote UE and the UE-to-Network Relay respectively per 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay service, during service authorization and information provisioning procedure as defined in TS 23.304 [2].
- For 5G ProSe Layer-3 UE-to-Network Relay security established over user plane, the 5G PKMF shall be able to provision the PC5 security policies to the 5G ProSe Remote UE and the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay respectively per 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay service, during security materials provisioning procedure defined in clause 6.3.3.2.
- The PC5 UP security policies for protecting 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay communication shall be configured per 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay service based on the security requirements of the specific relay service.
- The activation of PC5 signalling security shall be based on PC5 CP security policies of the specific 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay service.
- The activation of PC5 user plane security shall be based on PC5 UP security policies of the specific 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay service.
- 5G PKMF shall be configured with the PC5 security policies associated with each 5G ProSe Layer-3 UE-to-Network Relay service.

### 6.3.3.2 Security procedure over User Plane

#### 6.3.3.2.1 General

This clause describes a mechanism to setup a PC5 link between a 5G ProSe Remote UE and 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay. The mechanism includes how a 5G ProSe Remote UE and 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay get authorized by the 5G ProSe Key Management Function (5G PKMF) and verify each other's roles.

6.3.3.2.2 PC5 security establishment for 5G ProSe UE-to-Network relay communication over User Plane




Figure 6.3.3.2.2-1: PC5 security establishment procedure for 5G ProSe UE-to-Network relay communication over User Plane

The 5G ProSe Remote UE is provisioned with the discovery security materials (see clause 6.1.3.2) and Prose Remote User Key (UP-PRUK) when it is in coverage. These security materials are associated with an expiration time, after which they become invalid. If the UE does not have valid discovery security materials, the 5G ProSe Remote UE needs to connect to the 5G PKMF and obtain fresh ones to use the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay services.

NOTE 1: The procedure is described for the scenario that the 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE is different from the 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay. If both the 5G ProSe Remote UE and the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay are served by a single 5G PKMF, the 5G PKMF takes the role of the 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE and the 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay and the inter-5G PKMF message exchanges are not needed.

NOTE 2: Steps 0a, 0b, 1a, 1b are performed when the 5G ProSe Remote UE is in coverage.

- 0a. The 5G ProSe Remote UE gets the 5G PKMF address from the 5G DDNMF of its HPLMN. Alternatively, the 5G ProSe Remote UE may be provisioned with the 5G PKMF address by PCF. If the 5G ProSe Remote UE is provisioned with the 5G PKMF address, the 5G ProSe Remote UE may access the 5G PKMF directly without requesting it from the 5G DDNMF. In case that the 5G ProSe Remote UE cannot access the 5G PKMF using the provisioned 5G PKMF address, the 5G ProSe Remote UE may request the 5G PKMF address to the 5G DDNMF.
- 0b. The 5G ProSe Remote UE shall establish a secure connection with the 5G PKMF via PC8 reference point. Security for PC8 interface relies on Ua security if GBA specified in TS 33.220 [8] is used (see clause 5.2.3.4) or Ua\* security if AKMA specified in TS 33.535 [5] is used (see clause 5.2.5.4). The 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE shall check whether the 5G ProSe Remote UE is authorized to receive UE-to-Network Relay service, and if the UE is authorized, the 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE provides the discovery security materials to the 5G ProSe Remote UE. If the 5G ProSe Remote UE provides a list of visited networks, the 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE shall request the discovery security materials from the 5G PKMFs of the potential 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relays from which the 5G ProSe Remote UE gets the relay services based on the visited networks from the remote UE. If authorized visited networks are not provided by the 5G ProSe Remote UE, the 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE shall request the discovery security materials from the 5G PKMFs of the potential 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relays based on the PLMNs of the potential 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relays. The 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay may include the PC5 security policies to the 5G ProSe Remote UE.

NOTE 3: The 5G PKMF may be locally configured with the UE's authorization information. Otherwise, the 5G PKMF interacts with the UDM of the UE to retrieve the UE's authorization information.

NOTE 4: The 5G ProSe Remote UE is provisioned by PCF with a list of the potential visited networks for the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay service (which is identified by RSC).

- 0c. The 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay gets the 5G PKMF address from its HPLMN in the same way as described in step 0a.
- 0d. The 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay shall establish a secure connection with the 5G PKMF via PC8 reference point as in step 0b. The 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay shall check whether the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay is authorized to provide 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay service, and if the UE is authorized, the 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay provides the discovery security materials to the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay. The 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay may include the PC5 security policies to the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay.
- 1a. The 5G ProSe Remote UE sends a UP-PRUK Request message to its 5G PKMF. The message indicates that the 5G ProSe Remote UE is requesting a UP-PRUK from the 5G PKMF. If the 5G ProSe Remote UE already has a UP-PRUK from this 5G PKMF, the message shall also contain the UP-PRUK ID of the UP-PRUK.
- UP-PRUK ID shall take the form of either the NAI format or the 64-bit string. If the UP-PRUK ID is in NAI format, i.e. username@realm, the realm part shall include Home Network Identifier (i.e. HPLMN ID). The username part shall include the 64-bit string.
- 1b. The 5G PKMF checks whether the 5G ProSe Remote UE is authorized to receive UE-to-Network Relay services. This is done by using the 5G ProSe Remote UE's identity associated with the key used to establish the secure connection between the 5G ProSe Remote UE and 5G PKMF in step 0b. If the 5G ProSe Remote UE is authorized to receive the service, the 5G PKMF sends a UP-PRUK and UP-PRUK ID to the 5G ProSe Remote UE. If a UP-PRUK and UP-PRUK ID are included, the 5G ProSe Remote UE shall store these and delete any previously stored ones for this 5G PKMF.
2. The discovery procedure is performed between the 5G ProSe Remote UE and the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay using the discovery parameters and discovery security material as described in clause 6.1.3.2.

3. The 5G ProSe Remote UE sends a Direct Communication Request (DCR) that contains the UP-PRUK ID or a SUCI if the Remote UE does not have a valid UP-PRUK, Relay Service Code (RSC) of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay service and  $K_{NRP}$  freshness parameter 1 to the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay. If the UP-PRUK ID is not in NAI format, the DCR message shall include the HPLMN ID of the 5G ProSe Remote UE. The PC5 security establishment procedure between the 5G ProSe Remote UE and the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay including security parameters and security policy negotiation and protection of messages hereafter shall follow the one-to-one security establishment described in clause 6.2.3 of the present document. Only additional parameters required for the 5G ProSe Layer-3 UE-to-Network Relay scenario are described in this clause. The privacy and integrity protection of DCR are described in clause 6.3.5.
- 4a. The 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay sends a Key Request message that contains UP-PRUK ID or SUCI, RSC and  $K_{NRP}$  freshness parameter 1 to its 5G PKMF. The Key Request message shall also include the HPLMN ID of the 5G ProSe Remote UE if it is included in the DCR.
- 4b. On receiving the Key Request message, the 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay shall check if the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay is authorized to provide relay service to the 5G ProSe Remote UE based on the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay's identity associated with the key used to establish the secure PC8 connection and the received RSC.

NOTE 4a: The 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay needs to do the authorization of RSC based on its implementation.

If the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay's authorization information is not locally available, the 5G PKMF shall request the authorization information from the UDM of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay (not shown in the figure) using Nudm\_SDM\_Get service as described in TS 23.502 [10]. If the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay is authorized to provide the relay service based on ProSe Subscription data as specified in TS 23.502 [10], the 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay sends the Key Request with the UP-PRUK ID or the SUCI to the 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE. The 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay identifies the 5G PKMF address of the 5G ProSe Remote UE based on the UP-PRUK ID or HPLMN ID or SUCI of the 5G ProSe Remote UE if it is included in the Key Request message.

NOTE 4b: The 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE needs to do the authorization of RSC based on its implementation.

- 4c. On receiving the Key Request message from the 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay, the 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE shall check if the 5G ProSe Remote UE is authorized to use the relay service. The relay service authorization check shall be based on the UP-PRUK ID and RSC included in the Key Request message or the SUPI of the Remote UE and the RSC included in the Key Request message. If a SUCI is included in the Key Request message, the 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE shall request the UDM of the 5G ProSe Remote UE to de-conceal the SUCI to gain the SUPI using Nudm\_UEIdentifier\_Deconceal service, and the UDM invokes SIDF to de-conceal SUCI to gain SUPI. If the 5G ProSe Remote UE's authorization information is not locally available, the 5G PKMF shall request the authorization information from the UDM of the 5G ProSe Remote UE (not shown in figure 6.3.3.2.2-1).

NOTE 5: Privacy issues need to be considered while determining whether the SUPI is to be sent to the PKMF. For a privacy control, the UDM can authorize the PKMF based on its NF type or the service provider domain.

If a new UP-PRUK is required, the 5G PKMF shall perform the one of the following procedures (as shown in the step 4c in figure 6.3.3.2.2-1):

- If the 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE supports the Zpn interface to the BSF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE, the 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE may request a GBA Push Info (GPI - see TS 33.223 [9]) for the 5G ProSe Remote UE from the BSF. When requesting the GPI, the 5G PKMF shall include a UP-PRUK ID in the P-TID field. On receiving the GPI, the 5G PKMF shall use Ks(\_ext)\_NAF as the UP-PRUK.
- If the 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE supports the SBI interface to the BSF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE, the 5G PKMF may request the GPI via SBI interface as described in TS 33.223 [9]. On receiving the GPI, the 5G PKMF shall use Ks(\_ext)\_NAF as the UP-PRUK.
- If the 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE supports the PC4a interface to the HSS of the UE, then the 5G PKMF of 5G ProSe Remote UE may request a GBA Authentication Vector (AV) for the 5G ProSe Remote UE from the HSS. On receiving the AV, the 5G PKMF locally forms the GPI including a UP-PRUK ID in the P-TID field. The 5G PKMF shall use Ks(\_ext)\_NAF as the UP-PRUK.



- If the 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE is co-located or integrated with BSF functionality and supports the SBI interface to the UDM/HSS of the 5G ProSe Remote UE, the 5G PKMF may request the GBA AV via SBI interface as described in TS 33.220 [8]. On receiving the AV, the 5G PKMF locally forms the GPI including a UP-PRUK ID in the P-TID field. The 5G PKMF shall use  $Ks\_(\text{ext})\_NAF$  as the UP-PRUK.

NOTE 6: GPI is supported only when GBA is used.

- 4d. The 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE shall generate  $K_{NRP}$  freshness parameter 2 and derive  $K_{NRP}$  using the UP-PRUK identified by UP-PRUK ID, RSC,  $K_{NRP}$  freshness parameter 1 and  $K_{NRP}$  freshness parameter 2 as specified in A.8. Then, the 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE sends a Key Response message that contains  $K_{NRP}$  and  $K_{NRP}$  freshness parameter 2 to the 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay. This message shall include GPI if generated. The 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE shall also include the Remote User ID of the 5G ProSe Remote UE in the Key Response message to the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay. UP-PRUK ID is used as a Remote User ID in the present document.
- 4e. The 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay sends the Key Response message to the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay, which includes Remote User ID,  $K_{NRP}$ ,  $K_{NRP}$  freshness parameter 2, the GPI if used to calculate a fresh UP-PRUK to the UE-to-Network Relay.
- 5a. The 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay shall derive the session key ( $K_{NRP-SESS}$ ) from  $K_{NRP}$  and then derive the confidentiality key (NRPEK) (if applicable) and integrity key (NRPIK) based on the PC5 security policies as specified in TS 33.536 [6]. The 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay shall store the Remote User ID received in step 4d. The 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay sends a Direct Security Mode Command message to the 5G ProSe Remote UE. This message shall also include the  $K_{NRP}$  Freshness Parameter 2 in addition to the parameters specified in TS 33.536 [6] and shall be protected as specified in TS 33.536 [6].
- 5b. If the 5G ProSe Remote UE receives the message containing the GPI, it processes the GPI as described in TS 33.223 [9]. The 5G ProSe Remote UE shall derive the UP-PRUK and obtain the UP-PRUK ID from the GPI.

The 5G ProSe Remote UE shall derive  $K_{NRP}$  from its UP-PRUK, RSC,  $K_{NRP}$  Freshness Parameter 1 and the received  $K_{NRP}$  Freshness Parameter 2 as specified in A.8. It shall then derive the session key ( $K_{NRP-SESS}$ ) and the confidentiality key (NRPEK) (if applicable) and integrity key (NRPIK) based on the PC5 security policies in the same manner as the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay and process the Direct Security Mode Command. Successful verification of the Direct Security Mode Command assures the 5G ProSe Remote UE that the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay is authorized to provide the relay service.

Handling of synchronization failure (for details of synchronization failures - see TS 33.102 [11]) when UE processes the authentication challenge in the GPI is performed similarly to clause 6.7.3.2.1.2 in TS 33.303 [4]. The 5G ProSe Remote UE shall send Direct Security Mode Failure message and include RAND and AUTS in the message. The 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay shall send the key request message to the 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE via the 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay upon receiving the Direct Security Mode Failure message from the 5G ProSe Remote UE. The key request message shall include the HPLMN ID of the 5G ProSe Remote UE, if provided in step 3, the UP-PRUK ID or the SUCI of the 5G ProSe Remote UE received in step 3, Relay Service Code and  $K_{NRP}$  freshness parameter 1 together with the RAND and the AUTS received from the 5G ProSe Remote UE. If the 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE decides to retry GBA Push procedure, the 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE shall request GPI as described in step 4c.

- 5c. The 5G ProSe Remote UE responds with a Direct Security Mode Complete message to the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay as specified in TS 33.536 [6].
- 5d. On receiving the Direct Security Mode Complete message, the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay shall verify the Direct Security Mode Complete message. Successful verification of the Direct Security Mode Complete message assures the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay that the 5G ProSe Remote UE is authorized to get the relay service.
- 5e. After successful verification, the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay responds a Direct Communication Accept message to the 5G ProSe Remote UE to complete the PC5 connection establishment procedure.
6. The 5G ProSe Remote UE and 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay continues the rest of procedure for the relay service over the secure PC5 link such as establishing a new PDU session or modifying an existing PDU session for relaying, if needed etc.

7. When the 5G ProSe Layer-3 UE-to-Network Relay sends a Remote UE Report to the SMF as specified in TS 23.304 [2], the 5G ProSe Layer-3 UE-to-Network Relay shall include Remote User ID stored in the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay in step 5a. If the UP-PRUK ID used as Remote User ID is not in NAI format, the 5G ProSe Layer-3 UE-to-Network Relay shall include the HPLMN ID of the 5G ProSe Remote UE in the Remote UE Report.
- 8a. If the mapping of the Remote User ID and the 5G ProSe Remote UE's SUPI is not available in the SMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay, the SMF shall send a Resolve Remote User ID request towards the PKMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay in Npkmf\_ResolveRemoteUserId\_Get Request message, including the Remote User ID of the 5G ProSe Remote UE and the HPLMN ID of the 5G ProSe Remote UE if UP-PRUK ID used as Remote User ID is not in NAI format in the message.
- 8b. The 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay forwards the Resolve Remote User ID request in Npkmf\_ResolveRemoteUserId\_Get Request message towards the 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE. The 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay identifies the 5G PKMF address of the 5G ProSe Remote UE based on the UP-PRUK ID or HPLMN ID of the 5G ProSe Remote UE.
- 8c. The 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE shall send a Resolve Remote User ID response to the 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay in Npkmf\_ResolveRemoteUserId\_Get Response message, including the SUPI of the 5G ProSe Remote UE in the message.
- 8d. The 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay forwards the Npkmf\_ResolveRemoteUserId\_Get Response message including the SUPI to the SMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay.

The SMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay shall store the Remote User ID, the SUPI of the 5G ProSe Remote UE and the Remote UE info in the 5G ProSe Layer-3 UE-to-Network Relay's SM context for this PDU Session associated with the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay. The SMF sends Remote UE Report Ack message to the 5G ProSe Layer-3 UE-to-Network Relay.

If the 5G ProSe Remote UE receives from the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay a Direct Connection Reject due to UP-PRUK ID not found in the network, the 5G ProSe Remote UE shall not attempt to reconnect with the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay using the UP-PRUK ID. The 5G ProSe Remote UE may attempt to connect with the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay using its SUCI.

NOTE: The UP-PRUK ID not being found condition is detected by the 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE if it does not find a valid UP-PRUK that corresponds to the received UP-PRUK ID. The 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay is informed of this condition via the 5G PKMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay.

### 6.3.3.2.3 PC5 Key Hierarchy over User Plane




Figure 6.3.3.2.3-1: PC5 Key Hierarchy for 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay security over User Plane

The different layers of keys (see figure 6.3.3.2.3-1) are the following:

- UP-PRUK: The root key of the PC5 unicast link.

- $K_{\text{NRP}}$ : The key is equivalent to  $K_{\text{NRP}}$  as specified in TS 33.536 [6]. This key is derived as specified in clause A.8.
- $K_{\text{NRP-SESS}}$ : This key is derived as specified in TS 33.536 [6].
- NRPEK, NRPIK: These keys are derived as specified in TS 33.536 [6].

### 6.3.3.3 Security procedure over Control Plane

#### 6.3.3.3.1 General

This clause describes the security mechanisms for the 5G ProSe Layer-3 UE-to-Network Relay authentication, authorization and key management using the 5G ProSe Remote UE specific authentication for PC5 keys establishment. EAP-AKA', as specified in IETF RFC 9048 [15] shall be used for 5G ProSe Remote UE authentication. The EAP-AKA' implementations shall comply with the EAP-AKA' profile specified in Annex F of of TS 33.501 [3]. Network entities AMF, AUSF and UDM are involved for key derivation and distribution of keys used for 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay communication. The UE shall be provisioned with necessary policies and parameters to use 5G ProSe services, as part of the UE ProSe Policy information as defined in clause 4.2.2 of TS 23.503 [7]. PCF shall provision the authorization policy and parameters for 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay discovery and communication as specified in clause 5.1.4 of TS 23.304 [2].

#### 6.3.3.3.2 PC5 security establishment for 5G ProSe UE-to-Network relay communication over Control Plane

This clause describes the procedure for establishing a PC5 link between the 5G ProSe Remote UE and the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay. The procedure includes how the 5G ProSe Remote UE is authenticated by the AUSF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE via the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay and the AMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay during 5G ProSe PC5 establishment. This mechanism can be used when the 5G ProSe Remote UE is out of coverage.




Figure 6.3.3.2-1: PC5 security establishment procedure for 5G ProSe UE-to-Network relay communication over Control Plane

0. The 5G ProSe Remote UE and the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay shall be registered with the network. The 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay shall be authenticated and authorized by the network to provide UE-to-Network Relay service. The 5G ProSe Remote UE shall be authenticated and authorized by the network to receive UE-to-Network Relay service. PC5 security policies are provisioned to the 5G ProSe Remote UE and the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay respectively during this authorization and information provisioning procedure.
1. The 5G ProSe Remote UE or Relay UE shall initiate discovery procedure using any of Model A or Model B method as specified in clause 6.3.1.2 or 6.3.1.3 of TS 23.304 [2] respectively.

If the Remote UE receives NCGI from the Relay UE, it temporarily stores the NCGI.

2. After the discovery of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay, the 5G ProSe Remote UE shall send a Direct Communication Request to the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay for establishing secure PC5 unicast link. The 5G ProSe Remote UE shall include its security capabilities and PC5 signalling security policy in the DCR message as specified in TS 33.536 [6]. The message shall also include Relay Service Code, Nonce\_1.

If the 5G ProSe Remote UE does not have a valid 5G ProSe Remote User Key (CP-PRUK), the 5G ProSe Remote UE shall include SUCI in the DCR to trigger 5G ProSe Remote UE specific authentication and establish a CP-PRUK.

If the 5G ProSe Remote UE already has a valid CP-PRUK for Relay Service Code, the 5G ProSe Remote UE shall include associated the CP-PRUK ID in the DCR to indicate that the 5G ProSe Remote UE wants to get relay connectivity using the CP-PRUK. The privacy and integrity protection of DCR are described in clause 6.3.5

3. Upon receiving the DCR message, the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay shall send the Relay Key Request to the AMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay, including SUCI or CP-PRUK ID, RSC and Nonce\_1 received in the DCR message. The 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay shall also include in the message a transaction identifier that identifies the 5G ProSe Remote UE for the subsequent messages over 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay's NAS messages.
4. The AMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay shall verify with the UDM whether the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay is authorized to provide the UE-to-Network Relay service.
5. The AMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay shall select an AUSF based on SUCI or CP-PRUK ID and forward the parameters received in Relay Key Request to the AUSF in Nausf\_UEAuthentication\_ProseAuthenticate Request message. The Nausf\_UEAuthentication\_ProseAuthenticate Request message shall contain the 5G ProSe Remote UE's SUCI or CP-PRUK ID, Relay Service Code, Nonce\_1 and serving network name of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay. If CP-PRUK ID is received from AMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay, the AUSF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE temporarily stores Nonce\_1 and skips steps 6-9. If the 5G ProSe Remote UE's SUCI is received from AMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay, the AUSF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE temporarily stores Nonce\_1 and Relay Service Code and skips step 10.

NOTE: The AUSF gets the 5G ProSe Remote UE's Routing Indicator from the 5G ProSe Remote UE's SUCI or CP-PRUK ID and temporarily stores the Routing Indicator.

6. The AUSF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE shall initiate a 5G ProSe Remote UE specific authentication using the ProSe specific parameters received (i.e. RSC, etc.). The serving network name handling is the same as defined in TS 33.501 [3].

The AUSF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE shall retrieve the Authentication Vectors from the UDM via Nudm\_UEAuthentication\_GetProseAv Request message. The AUSF includes the serving network name of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay in the Nudm\_UEAuthentication\_GetProseAV request message. Upon reception of the Nudm\_UEAuthentication\_GetProseAv Request, the UDM shall invoke SIDF de-conceal SUCI to gain SUPI before UDM can process the request. The UDM checks whether the UE is authorized to use a ProSe UE-to-Network Relay service based on authorization information in UE's Subscription data. If the UE is authorized, the UDM shall choose the EAP-AKA' authentication method based on the received Nudm\_UEAuthentication\_GetProseAv Request. Then the UDM generates EAP-AKA' Authentication Vector for ProSe as specified in clause 6.1.3.1 of TS 33.501 [3] and sends Nudm\_UEAuthentication\_GetProseAv Response with the Authentication Vector and SUPI to the AUSF.

- 7a. The AUSF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE shall temporarily store XRES and SUPI. The AUSF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE shall trigger authentication of the 5G ProSe Remote UE based on EAP-AKA'. The AUSF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE generates the EAP-Request/AKA'-Challenge message defined in clause 6.1.3.1 of TS 33.501 [3] and send EAP-Request/AKA'-Challenge message to the AMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay in a Nausf\_UEAuthentication\_ProSeAuthenticate Response message.
- 7b. The AMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay shall forward the Relay Authentication Request (including the EAP-Request/AKA'-Challenge) to the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay over NAS message, including transaction identifier of the 5G ProSe Remote UE in the message. The NAS message is protected using the NAS security context created for the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay.
- 7c. Based on the transaction identifier, the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay shall forwards the EAP-Request/AKA'-Challenge to the 5G ProSe Remote UE over PC5 messages.

The USIM in the 5G ProSe Remote UE verifies the freshness of the received values by checking whether AUTN can be accepted as described in TS 33.102 [11].

For EAP-AKA', the USIM computes a response RES. The USIM shall return RES, CK, IK to the ME. The ME shall derive CK' and IK' according to clause A.3 in TS 33.501 [3].

If the Remote UE requires network name verification (i.e. discrepancy comparison as specified in RFC 9048 [15]) and receives NCGI from the Relay UE in step 1, the Remote UE verifies using the SNN information received in the EAP-Request/AKA'-Challenge and the SN ID information in the NCGI. If necessary, the Remote UE aborts the authentication if verification fails. The Remote UE skips the network name verification if the Remote UE does not receive NCGI from the Relay.

- 7d. The 5G ProSe Remote UE shall return EAP-Response/AKA'-Challenge to the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay over PC5 messages.
- 7e. The 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay forwards the EAP-Response/AKA'-Challenge together with the transaction identifier of the 5G ProSe Remote UE to the AMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay in a NAS message Relay Authentication Response.
- 7f. The AMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay forwards EAP-Response/AKA'-Challenge to the AUSF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE via Nausf\_UEAuthentication\_ProSeAuthenticate Request.

The AUSF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE performs the UE authentication by verifying the received information as described in TS 33.501 [3].

For EAP-AKA', the AUSF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE and the 5G ProSe Remote UE may exchange EAP-Request/AKA'-Notification and EAP-Response /AKA'-Notification messages via the AMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay and the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay. After the exchanges, the AUSF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE and the 5G ProSe Remote UE shall use the most significant 256 bits of EMSK as the  $K_{AUSF\_P}$  in the same way as  $K_{AUSF}$  is obtained for EAP-AKA' in clause 6.1.3.1 in TS 33.501 [3].

8. On successful authentication, the AUSF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE and the 5G ProSe Remote UE shall generate CP-PRUK as specified in clause A.2 and CP-PRUK ID.

The CP-PRUK ID is in NAI format as specified in clause 2.2 of IETF RFC 7542 [14], i.e. username@realm. The username part includes the Routing Indicator from step 5 and the CP-PRUK ID\*, and the realm part includes Home Network Identifier. The CP-PRUK ID\* is specified in clause A.3.

- 9a. The AUSF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE shall select the PAnF (Prose Anchor Function) based on CP-PRUK ID and send the SUPI, RSC, CP-PRUK and CP-PRUK ID in Npanf\_ProseKey\_Register Request message to the PAnF.

NOTE 1: The PAnF is selected based on the Routing Indicator in the CP-PRUK ID.

- 9b. The PAnF shall store the Prose context info (i.e. SUPI, RSC, CP-PRUK, CP-PRUK ID) for the 5G ProSe Remote UE and send Npanf\_ProseKey\_Register Response message to the AUSF.

- 10a. The AUSF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE shall select the PAnF based on CP-PRUK ID and send received CP-PRUK ID and RSC in Npanf\_ProseKey\_get Request message.

NOTE 2: The PAnF is selected based on the Routing Indicator in the CP-PRUK ID.

- 10b. The PAnF retrieves CP-PRUK based on the CP-PRUK ID and checks whether the 5G ProSe Remote UE is authorized to use the UE-to-Network Relay service based on received RSC, i.e. the PAnF uses Nudm\_SDM operation defined in TS 23.502 [10] to check with the UDM whether the Remote UE is authorized to use ProSe UE-to-Network Relay service by using the SUPI. If the 5G ProSe Remote UE is authorized and the retrieved CP-PRUK is valid, the PAnF sends Npanf\_ProseKey\_get Response message with CP-PRUK to the AUSF.

If the CP-PRUK is stale, the PAnF treats it as invalid based on local policy. When receiving a Npanf\_ProseKey\_get request in such case, the PAnF responds with CP-PRUK not found.

11. The AUSF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE shall generate Nonce\_2 and derive the  $K_{NR\_ProSe}$  key using CP-PRUK, Nonce\_1 and Nonce\_2 as defined in clause A.4.
12. The AUSF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE shall send the  $K_{NR\_ProSe}$ , Nonce\_2 in Nausf\_UEAuthentication\_ProseAuthenticate Response message to the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay via the AMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay. EAP Success message shall be included if step 7 is performed successfully. The AUSF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE shall also include the CP-PRUK ID in the message.
13. When receiving a  $K_{NR\_ProSe}$  from the AUSF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE via the AMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay, the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay derives PC5 session key  $K_{relay\_sess}$  and confidentiality key  $K_{relay\_enc}$  (if applicable) and integrity key  $K_{relay\_int}$  from  $K_{NR\_ProSe}$ , as defined in clause 6.3.3.3.3 of the present document.  $K_{NR\_ProSe}$  ID and  $K_{relay\_sess}$  ID are established in the same way as  $K_{NRP}$  ID and  $K_{NRP\_sess}$  ID in TS 33.536 [6]. The CP-PRUK ID is sent from the AMF of the 5G ProSe UE to-Network Relay to UE-to-Network Relay. The EAP Success message is also sent from the AMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay to UE-to-Network Relay if received from AUSF.
14. The 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay shall send the received Nonce\_2 and 5G ProSe Remote UE's PC5 signalling security policy to the 5G ProSe Remote UE in Direct Security mode command message, which is integrity protected using  $K_{relay\_int}$ . EAP Success message shall be included if received from the AMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay.
15. The 5G ProSe Remote UE shall generate the  $K_{NR\_ProSe}$  key to be used for remote access via the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay in the same way as defined in step 11. The 5G ProSe Remote UE shall derive PC5 session key  $K_{relay\_sess}$  and confidentiality and integrity keys from  $K_{NR\_ProSe}$  in the same way as defined in step 13.

The 5G ProSe Remote UE shall verify the Direct Security Mode Command message. Successful verification of the Direct Security Mode Command message assures the 5G ProSe Remote UE that the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay is authorized to provide the relay service.

16. The 5G ProSe Remote UE shall send the Direct Security Mode Complete message containing its PC5 user plane security policies to the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network relay, which is protected by  $K_{relay\_int}$  or/and  $K_{relay\_enc}$  derived from  $K_{relay\_sess}$  according to the negotiated PC5 signalling policies between the 5G ProSe Remote UE and the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay.
17. On receiving the Direct Security Mode Complete message, the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay shall verify the Direct Security Mode Complete message. Successful verification of the Direct Security Mode Complete message assures the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay that the 5G ProSe Remote UE is authorized to get the relay service.

After the successful verification of the Direct Security Mode complete message, the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay responds a Direct Communication Accept message to the 5G ProSe Remote UE to finish the PC5 connection establishment procedures and store the CP-PRUK ID in the security context associated to the PC5 link with the 5G ProSe Remote UE.

18. When the conditions to send a Remote UE Report reach as specified in TS 23.304 [2], the 5G ProSe Layer-3 UE-to-Network Relay shall send a Remote UE Report (Remote User ID, Remote UE info) message to the SMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay. The 5G ProSe Layer-3 UE-to-Network Relay shall include Remote User ID (i.e. the CP-PRUK ID received in step 13) in the message
19. If the mapping of the Remote User ID and the 5G ProSe Remote UE's SUPI is not available in the SMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay, the SMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay shall discover the PAnF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE based on the Remote User ID (i.e. the CP-PRUK ID) and sends a Resolve Remote User

ID request towards the PANf in Npanf\_ResolveRemoteUserId\_Get Request message, including the Remote User ID of the 5G ProSe Remote UE in the message.

The PANf of the 5G ProSe Remote UE shall send a Resolve Remote User ID response to the SMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay in Npanf\_ResolveRemoteUserId\_Get Response message, including the SUPI of the 5G ProSe Remote UE in the message.


The SMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay shall store the Remote User ID, the SUPI of the 5G ProSe Remote UE and the Remote UE info in the 5G ProSe Layer-3 UE-to-Network Relay's SM context for this PDU Session associated with the Relay. The SMF sends Remote UE Report Ack message to the 5G ProSe Layer-3 UE-to-Network Relay.

Further communication between the 5G ProSe Remote UE and the Network takes place securely via the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay.

If the 5G ProSe Remote UE receives from the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay a Direct Connection Reject due to CP-PRUK ID not found in the network, the 5G ProSe Remote UE shall not attempt to reconnect with the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay using the CP-PRUK ID. The 5G ProSe Remote UE may attempt to connect with the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay using its SUCI.

**NOTE:** The CP-PRUK ID not being found condition is detected by the PANf if it does not find a ProSe context info for the 5G ProSe Remote UE that corresponds to the received CP-PRUK ID. The 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay is informed of this condition via the AUSF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE and AMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay.

### 6.3.3.3.3 PC5 Key Hierarchy over Control Plane



**Figure 6.3.3.3.3-1: PC5 Key Hierarchy for 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay security over Control Plane**

The different layers of keys (see figure 6.3.3.3.3-1) are the following:

- $K_{AUSF\_P}$ : A key derived based on 5G ProSe Remote UE specific authentication, only used to derive CP-PRUK.
- CP-PRUK: The root credential derived from  $K_{AUSF\_P}$  that is the root of security of the PC5 unicast link used for 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay service.
- $K_{NR\_ProSe}$ : This is a 256-bit root key that is established between the two entities that communicating using NR PC5 unicast link.
- $K_{relay-sess}$ : This is the 256-bit key that is derived by UE from  $K_{NR\_ProSe}$  and is used derive keys that to protect the transfer of data between the UEs. The  $K_{relay-sess}$  is derived per unicast link same as  $K_{NRP-sess}$  specified in TS 33.536 [6]. During activated unicast communication session between the UEs, the  $K_{relay-sess}$  may be refreshed by running the rekeying procedure. The keys for confidentiality and integrity algorithms are derived directly from  $K_{relay-sess}$ . The 16-bit  $K_{relay-sess}$  ID identifies the  $K_{relay-sess}$ .



- $K_{\text{relay-int}}$ ,  $K_{\text{relay-enc}}$ : The  $K_{\text{relay-int}}$  and  $K_{\text{relay-enc}}$  are used in the chosen confidentiality and integrity algorithms respectively for protecting PC5-S signalling, PC5 RRC signalling, and PC5 user plane data. These keys are equivalent to NRPIK and NRPEK as specified in TS 33.536 [6]. They are derived from  $K_{\text{relay-sess}}$  and are refreshed automatically every time  $K_{\text{relay-sess}}$  is changed.

#### 6.3.3.3.4 Void

### 6.3.3.4 Security for 5G ProSe Communication via Layer-3 UE-to-Network Relay with N3IWF support

The 5G ProSe Layer-3 Remote UE selects N3IWF as specified in TS 23.304 [2].

The 5G ProSe Remote UE and the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay shall establish security for PC5 connection using either User Plane based solution as specified in clause 6.3.3.2 or Control Plane based solution as specified in clause 6.3.3.3. Then, the 5G ProSe Layer-3 Remote UE performs the security procedures as specified in clause 7.2.1 of TS 33.501 [3].

### 6.3.4 Security for 5G ProSe Communication via 5G ProSe Layer-2 UE-to-Network Relay

Connection establishment for 5G ProSe Communication via 5G ProSe Layer-2 UE-to-Network Relay is specified in clause 6.5.2.2 of TS 23.304 [2]. During the connection establishment, the 5G ProSe Remote UE and NG-RAN node shall establish AS security as specified in TS 33.501 [3].

The 5G ProSe Remote UE and the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay shall establish security for PC5 connection using either User Plane based solution as specified in clause 6.3.3.2 or Control Plane based solution as specified in clause 6.3.3.3.2. The requirements on security policies for PC5 connection between the 5G ProSe Remote UE and the Layer-2 UE-to-Network Relay are as follows:

- The PCF shall be able to provision the PC5 security policies to the 5G ProSe Remote UE and Layer-2 UE-to-Network Relay respectively per ProSe relay service during their service authorization and information provisioning procedures as defined in TS 23.304 [2].

NOTE: If PC5 UP security policies are included in the PC5 security policies, they are negotiated but not enforced by the 5G ProSe Layer-2 UE-to-Network Relay.

### 6.3.5 Direct Communication Request in 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay Communication

#### 6.3.5.1 General

This clause describes the mechanism to protect the privacy of the UP-PRUK ID/CP-PRUK-ID and RSC in Direct Communication Request (DCR) message when restricted discovery is used for the UE-to-Network Relay service. This clause also describes a mechanism to integrity protect the DCR message when DUIK is provisioned for discovery.

NOTE: Protection of Direct Communication Request (DCR) is provided at the ProSe layer.

#### 6.3.5.2 Privacy protection of UP-PRUK ID and RSC in DCR

The 5G ProSe Remote UE encrypts the UP-PRUK ID/CP-PRUK ID and RSC using the code-receiving security parameters used for discovery. The 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay, on receiving the DCR message, decrypts the encrypted UP-PRUK ID/CP-PRUK ID and RSC using the code-sending security parameters used for discovery and verifies if the RSC matches with the one that it sent in the discovery message. If the RSC does not match, the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay shall abort the PC5 direct link establishment procedure.

The 5G ProSe Remote UE shall encrypt the UP-PRUK ID/CP-PRUK ID and RSC as follows:

- 1) If the UE is configured with Discovery User Confidentiality Key (DUCK), the DCR ciphering key  $K_{\text{DCR}}$  is set to DUCK. If the UE is configured with Discovery User Scrambling Key (DUSK) but not DUCK,  $K_{\text{DCR}}$  is set to

DUSK. If the UE is neither configured with DUCK nor DUSK, the DCR message is not protected, and Steps 2-3 are skipped.

- 2) Set Keystream to DCR confidentiality keystream calculated using  $K_{DCR}$ , UTC-based counter and RSC as described in clause A.5.
- 3) XOR the first L bits of the Keystream with the RSC where L is the length of the RSC, and XOR the remaining bits of the Keystream with the UP-PRUK ID/CP-PRUK ID.

NOTE 1: If UP-PRUK ID/CP-PRUK ID is in NAI format, encryption of the UP-PRUK ID/CP-PRUK ID is performed on the username part of the UP-PRUK ID/CP-PRUK ID.

The 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay shall decrypt the encrypted UP-PRUK ID/CP-PRUK ID and RSC as follows:

- 1) If the UE is configured with DUCK, the DCR ciphering key  $K_{DCR}$  is set to DUCK. If the UE is configured with DUSK but not DUCK,  $K_{DCR}$  is set to DUSK. If the UE is neither configured with DUCK nor DUSK, the DCR message is not protected, and steps 2-3 are skipped.
- 2) Set Keystream to DCR confidentiality keystream calculated using  $K_{DCR}$ , UTC-based counter and RSC as described in clause A.5.
- 3) XOR the first L bits of Keystream with the encrypted RSC where L is the length of the encrypted RSC, and XOR the remaining bits of Keystream with the encrypted UP-PRUK ID/CP-PRUK ID.

NOTE 2: If UP-PRUK ID/CP-PRUK ID is in NAI format, decryption of the UP-PRUK ID//CP-PRUK ID is performed on the username part of the UP-PRUK ID/CP-PRUK ID.

### 6.3.5.3 Integrity protection of DCR

The 5G ProSe Remote UE integrity protects the DCR message using the code-receiving security parameters used for discovery. The integrity protection of the DCR message is performed after the privacy protection of UP-PRUK ID/CP-PRUK ID and RSC.

The 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay, on receiving the DCR message, verifies the integrity of the received DCR message using the code-sending security parameters used for discovery. If the integrity verification of the DCR fails, the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay shall abort the PC5 direct link establishment procedure.

The 5G ProSe Remote UE shall integrity protect the DCR as follows:

1. If the UE is configured with DUIK, the DCR integrity key  $K_{INT}$  is set to DUIK. Otherwise, the DCR message is not integrity protected, and steps 2-3 are skipped.
2. Calculate Message Integrity Check (MIC) using  $K_{INT}$ , UTC-based counter and the DCR message as described in clause A.9.
3. Set the MIC IE to the calculated MIC.

The 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay shall verify the integrity of the received DCR message as follows:

1. If the UE is configured with DUIK, the DCR integrity key  $K_{INT}$  is set to DUIK. Otherwise, the DCR message is not integrity protected, and step 2 is skipped.
2. Calculate a MIC using  $K_{INT}$ , UTC-based counter and the received DCR message as described in clause A.9 and compare the calculated MIC with the MIC included in the DCR message. If they mismatch, the integrity check fails.

## 6.4 Security for broadcast mode 5G ProSe Direct Communication

### 6.4.1 General

This clause specifies the security requirements and the procedures of the broadcast mode 5G ProSe Direct Communication.

### 6.4.2 Security requirements

There are no requirements for securing the broadcast mode 5G ProSe Direct Communication.

The 5G System shall protect against linkability and trackability attacks on Layer-2 ID and IP address for broadcast mode.

### 6.4.3 Security procedures

There are no particular procedures defined for securing the broadcast mode 5G ProSe Direct Communication.

The broadcast mode security mechanism to randomise the UE's source Layer-2 ID and source IP address including IP prefix (if used), as defined in clause 5.5 of TS 33.536 [6], is reused in 5G ProSe to provide broadcast mode 5G ProSe Direct Communication security.

## 6.5 Security for groupcast mode 5G ProSe Direct Communication

### 6.5.1 General

This clause specifies the security requirements and the procedures of the groupcast mode 5G ProSe Direct Communication.

### 6.5.2 Security requirements

There are no requirements for securing the groupcast mode 5G ProSe Direct Communication.

The 5G System shall protect against linkability and trackability attacks on Layer-2 ID and IP address for groupcast mode.

### 6.5.3 Security procedures

There are no particular procedures defined for securing the groupcast mode 5G ProSe Direct Communication.

The groupcast mode security mechanism to randomise the UE's source Layer-2 ID and source IP address including IP prefix (if used), as defined in clause 5.5 of TS 33.536 [6], is reused in 5G ProSe to provide groupcast mode 5G ProSe Direct Communication security.

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## 7 5G ProSe services

### 7.1 General

This clause provides the present document of the SBA services defined for 5G ProSe.

## 7.2 5G PKMF Services

### 7.2.1 General

The 5G PKMF supports the key request from another 5G PKMF in another PLMN via the new service operation Npkmf\_PKMFKeyRequest\_ProseKey. The 5G PKMF also provides Remote User ID of a 5G ProSe Remote UE to be used in Remote UE Report and supports resolving Remote User ID to SUPI.

Table 7.2.1-1 shows the services exposed by 5G PKMF supporting 5G ProSe.

**Table 7.2.1-1: 5G ProSe Services provided by 5G PKMF**

Service	Service Operations	Operation Semantics	Example Consumer(s)
Npkmf_PKMFKeyRequest	ProseKey	Request/Response	5G PKMF
Npkmf_ResolveRemoteUse rId	Npkmf_ResolveRemoteUserI d_Get	Request/Response	SMF, 5G PKMF

### 7.2.2 Npkmf\_PKMFKeyRequest service

#### 7.2.2.1 Npkmf\_PKMFKeyRequest\_ProseKey service operation

**Service operation name:** Npkmf\_PKMFKeyRequest\_ProseKey.

**Description:** Provides ProSe related keying material.

**Input, Required:** Relay Service Code,  $K_{NRP}$  freshness parameter 1:

- 1) In the initial Key Request: SUCI of the 5G ProSe Remote UE or UP-PRUK ID.
- 2) In the subsequent Key Requests for Synchronization Failure handling: RAND, AUTS.

**Input, Optional:** None.

**Output, Required:**  $K_{NRP}$ ,  $K_{NRP}$  freshness parameter 2.

**Output, Optional:** GPI.

### 7.2.3 Npkmf\_ResolveRemoteUserId service

#### 7.2.3.1 Npkmf\_ResolveRemoteUserId\_Get service operation

**Service operation name:** Npkmf\_ResolveRemoteUserId\_Get

**Description:** The NF consumer requests the PKMF to resolve the Remote User ID.

**Input, Required:** Remote User ID (UP-PRUK ID).

**Input, Optional:** HPLMN ID.

**Output, Required:** SUPI.

**Output, Optional:** None.

## 7.3 AUSF services

### 7.3.1 General

The AUSF of the 5G ProSe Remote UE supports the 5G ProSe Remote UE specific authentication of a 5G ProSe Remote UE via the AMF of the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay and 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay via the new service operation Nausf\_UEAuthentication\_ProseAuthenticate for the existing Nausf\_UEAuthentication service.

Table 7.3.1-1 shows the services exposed by AUSF supporting 5G ProSe.

**Table 7.3.1-1: 5G ProSe Services provided by AUSF**

Service	Service Operations	Operation Semantics	Example Consumer(s)
Nausf_UEAuthentication	ProseAuthenticate	Request/Response	(Relay) AMF

### 7.3.2 Nausf\_UEAuthentication service

#### 7.3.2.1 Nausf\_UEAuthentication\_ProseAuthenticate service operation

**Service operation name:** Nausf\_UEAuthentication\_ProseAuthenticate.

**Description:** Authenticate the 5G ProSe Remote UE and provides Prose related keying material.

**Input, Required:** One of the options below:

- 1) In the initial authentication request: SUCI or CP-PRUK ID of the 5G ProSe Remote UE, Relay Service Code, Nonce\_1, UE-to-Network Relay's serving network name.
- 2) In the subsequent authentication requests: EAP message.

**Input, Optional:** None.

**Output, Required:** One of the options below:

- 1) EAP message,
- 2) Authentication result and if success  $K_{NR\_ProSe}$ , Nonce\_2 and CP-PRUK ID.

**Output, Optional:** None.

#### 7.3.2.2 Void

## 7.4 UDM Services

### 7.4.1 General

A UDM supports providing the authentication vector for 5G ProSe Remote UE specific authentication via the new service operation Nudm\_UEAuthentication\_GetProseAv service operation of the existing Nudm\_UEAuthentication service.

Table 7.4.1-1 shows the services exposed by UDM supporting 5G ProSe.

**Table 7.4.1-1: 5G ProSe Services provided by UDM**

Service	Service Operations	Operation Semantics	Example Consumer(s)
Nudm_UEAuthentication	GetProseAv	Request/Response	AUSF
Nudm_UEIdentifier	Deconceal	Request/Resonse	PKMF

## 7.4.2 Nudm\_UEAuthentication Service

### 7.4.2.1 Nudm\_UEAuthentication\_GetProseAv service operation

**Service operation name:** Nudm\_UEAuthentication\_GetProseAv.

**Description:** Requester NF gets the authentication data for ProSe from UDM.

**Inputs, Required:** SUCI, Relay Service Code, Serving network name.

**Inputs, Optional:** Synchronization Failure indication and related information (i.e. RAND/AUTS).

**Outputs, Required:** Authentication Vector for Prose, SUPI.

**Outputs, Optional:** None.

## 7.4.3 Nudm\_UEIdentifier Service

### 7.4.3.1 Nudm\_UEIdentifier\_Deconceal service operation

**Service operation name:** Nudm\_UEIdentifier\_Deconceal.

**Description:** Requester NF gets the SUPI from the UDM.

**Inputs, Required:** SUCI.

**Inputs, Optional:** None.

**Outputs, Required:** SUPI.

**Outputs, Optional:** None.

## 7.5 Prose Anchor Function Services

### 7.5.1 General

The Prose Anchor Function (PANF) supports providing storage for the Prose context info (i.e. SUPI, CP-PRUK, CP-PRUK ID, RSC) for a 5G ProSe Remote UE. The PANF also provides Remote User ID of a 5G ProSe Remote UE to be used in Remote UE Report and supports resolving Remote User ID to SUPI.

Table 7.5.1-1 shows the PANF Service and the PANF Service Operations.

**Table 7.5.1-1: List of PANF Services**

Service Name	Service Operations	Operation Semantics	Example Consumer(s)
Npanf_ProseKey	Npanf_ProseKey_Register	Request/Response	AUSF
	Npanf_ProseKey_Get	Request/Response	AUSF
Npanf_ResolveRemote UserId	Npanf_ResolveRemoteUser Id_Get	Request/Response	SMF

### 7.5.2 Npanf\_ProseKey service

#### 7.5.2.1 Npanf\_ProseKey\_Register service operation

**Service operation name:** Npanf\_ProseKey\_Register.

**Description:** The NF consumer requests the PANF to store the Prose context info (i.e. SUPI, CP-PRUK, CP-PRUK ID, RSC).

**Input, Required:** SUPI, CP-PRUK ID, CP-PRUK, Relay Service Code.

**Input, Optional:** None.

**Output, Required:** None.

**Output, Optional:** None.

### 7.5.2.2 Npanf\_ProseKey\_Get service operation

**Service operation name:** Npanf\_ProseKey\_Get.

**Description:** The NF consumer requests CP-PRUK from the PAnF.

**Input, Required:** CP-PRUK ID, Relay Service Code.

**Input, Optional:** None.

**Output, Required:** CP-PRUK.

**Output, Optional:** None.

### 7.5.3 Void

### 7.5.4 Npanf\_ResolveRemoteUserId service

#### 7.5.4.1 Npanf\_ResolveRemoteUserId\_Get service operation

**Service operation name:** Npanf\_ResolveRemoteUserId\_Get

**Description:** The NF consumer requests the PAnF to resolve the Remote User ID.

**Input, Required:** Remote User ID (CP-PRUK ID).

**Input, Optional:** None.

**Output, Required:** SUPI.

**Output, Optional:** None.

---

## Annex A (normative): Key derivation functions

### A.1 KDF interface and input parameter construction

#### A.1.1 General

All key derivations for 5G ProSe shall be performed using the Key Derivation Function (KDF) specified in clause B.2.2 of TS 33.220 [8].

This clause specifies how to construct the input string,  $S$ , and the input key,  $KEY$ , for each distinct use of the KDF. Note that "KEY" is denoted "Key" in TS 33.220 [8].

#### A.1.2 FC value allocations

The FC number space used is controlled by TS 33.220 [8], FC values allocated for the present document are: 0x85, 0x86, 0x87, 0x88, 0x89, 0x8A, 0x8B.

---

### A.2 CP-PRUK derivation function

When deriving a CP-PRUK from  $K_{AUSF,P}$ , the following parameters shall be used to form the input  $S$  to the KDF:

- FC = 0x85;
- P0 = SUPI;
- L0 = length of SUPI;
- P1 = relay service code;
- L1 = length of relay service code.

The input key  $KEY$  is  $K_{AUSF,P}$ .

SUPI shall have the same value as parameter P0 in clause A.7.0 of TS 33.501 [3].

---

### A.3 Derivation of CP-PRUK ID\*

When deriving the CP-PRUK ID from  $K_{AUSF,P}$ , the following parameters are used to form the input  $S$  to the KDF:

- FC = 0x86;
- P0 = "PRUK-ID";
- L0 = length of "PRUK-ID";
- P1 = relay service code;
- L1 = length of relay service code;
- P2 = SUPI;
- L2 = length of SUPI.

The input key  $KEY$  is  $K_{AUSF,P}$ .



---

## A.4 $K_{NR\_ProSe}$ derivation function

When deriving the  $K_{NR\_ProSe}$  from CP-PRUK key, the following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the KDF:

- FC = 0x87;
- P0 = Nonce\_2;
- L0 = length of Nonce\_2;
- P1 = Nonce\_1;
- L1 = length of Nonce\_1.

The input key KEY shall be CP-PRUK key.

---

## A.5 Calculation of DCR confidentiality keystream

When calculating the message-specific confidentiality keystream, the following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the KDF that is specified in Annex B of TS 33.220 [8]:

- FC = 0x88
- P0 = UTC-based counter
- L0 = length of UTC-based counter (i.e. 0x00 0x04)
- P1 = RSC
- L1 = length of RSC (i.e. 0x00 0x03).

The input key shall be the 256-bit selected key in Step 1 of clause 6.3.5.2.

The DCR confidentiality keystream is set to L least significant bits of the output of the KDF, where L = the length of the RSC + the length of the UP-PRUK ID.

NOTE: If UP-PRUK ID is in NAI format, the length of the UP-PRUK ID is determined by the username part of the UP-PRUK ID.

---

## A.6 Calculation of MIC value for discovery message

When calculating a MIC using the Discovery Key for open discovery or the DUIK for restricted discovery, the following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the KDF that is specified in Annex B of TS 33.220 [8]:

- FC = 0x89.
- P0 = UTC-based counter associated with the discovery slot.
- L0 = length of above (i.e. 0x00 0x04).
- P1 = discovery message with the MIC value field set to all zeros.
- L1 = length of above.

The MIC is set to the 32 least significant bits of the output of the KDF.

The Discovery Key, DUIK, Time parameter and discovery message follow the encoding also specified in Annex B of TS 33.220 [8].

---

## A.7 Message-specific confidentiality mechanisms for discovery

Message-specific confidentiality protection is provided by ProSe layer between ProSe UEs.

The use and mode of operation of the ciphering algorithms are specified in Annex D in TS 33.501 [3].

The input parameters to the ciphering algorithms as described in Annex D in TS 33.501 [3] are:

- KEY: 128 least significant bits of the output of the KDF (DUCK, UTC-based counter, MIC)
- COUNT: UTC-based counter
- BEARER: 0x00
- DIRECTION: 0x00
- LENGTH:  $\text{LEN}(\text{discovery message}) - (\text{LEN}(\text{Message Type}) + \text{LEN}(\text{UTC-based counter LSB}) + \text{LEN}(\text{MIC}))$ , where  $\text{LEN}(x)$  is the length of  $x$  in number of bits

KEY is set to as such to generate message-specific keystream as in TS 33.303 [4].

The output keystream of the ciphering algorithm ( $\text{output\_keystream}$ ) is then masked with the  $\text{Encrypted\_bits\_mask}$  to produce the final keystream for the message-specific confidentiality protection (KEYSTREAM):

$\text{KEYSTREAM} = \text{output\_keystream AND } (\text{Encrypted\_bits\_mask} \parallel 0\text{xFF..FF})$

The KEYSTREAM is XORed with the discovery message for message-specific confidentiality protection.

---

## A.8 Calculation of $K_{\text{NRP}}$ for UE-to-Network relays

When calculating  $K_{\text{NRP}}$  from UP-PRUK, the following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the KDF that is specified in Annex B of TS 33.220 [8]:

- FC = 0x8A
- P0 = Relay Service Code
- L0 = length of Relay Service Code (i.e. 0x00 0x03)
- P1 =  $K_{\text{NRP}}$  freshness parameter 1
- L1 = length of  $K_{\text{NRP}}$  freshness parameter 1 (i.e. 0x00 0x10)
- P2 =  $K_{\text{NRP}}$  freshness parameter 2
- L2 = length of  $K_{\text{NRP}}$  freshness parameter 2 (i.e. 0x00 0x10)

The input key shall be the 256-bit UP-PRUK.

---

## A.9 Calculation of MIC value for Direct Communication Request

When calculating a MIC using the DUIK to integrity protect Direct Communication Request (DCR) message, the following parameters shall be used to form the input S to the KDF that is specified in Annex B of TS 33.220 [8]:

- FC = 0x8B.
- P0 = UTC-based counter.

- L0 = length of above (i.e. 0x00 0x04).
- P1 = DCR message with the MIC value field set to all zeros.
- L1 = length of above.

The MIC is set to the 32 least significant bits of the output of the KDF.

The DUIK, UTC-based counter and DCR message follow the encoding also specified in Annex B of TS 33.220 [8].

---

## Annex B (informative): Source authenticity of discovery messages

To achieve source authenticity of discovery messages, the third security requirement in clause 6.1.2, a UE receiving a discovery message can verify the source authenticity of the received discovery message by using the provisioned DUIK under the assumption that the UEs provisioned with the same DUIK are trusted.

Alternatively, if receiving UEs are not provisioned with the DUIK, the network can verify the source authenticity of discovery messages via match report procedure.

## Annex C (informative): Change history

Change history							
Date	Meeting	TDoc	CR	Rev	Cat	Subject/Comment	New version
2022-06	SA#96	SP-220541				Presented for information and approval	1.0.0
2022-06	SA#96					Upgrade to change control version	17.0.0
2022-06	SA#96					EditHelp review	17.0.1
2022-06	SA#97e	SP-220876	0001	-	F	Clarification on NAI format for PRUK ID	17.1.0
2022-06	SA#97e	SP-220876	0002		F	HPLMN ID of Remote UE in Remote UE Report message	17.1.0
2022-06	SA#97e	SP-220876	0003	1	F	Implementation correction of S3-221294	17.1.0
2022-06	SA#97e	SP-220876	0006	-	F	Updates on Open 5G ProSe Direct Discovery	17.1.0
2022-06	SA#97e	SP-220876	0010	1	F	Correction to authorization based on RSC	17.1.0
2022-06	SA#97e	SP-220876	0011	1	F	Clarifications of general description to Restricted 5G ProSe Direct Discovery	17.1.0
2022-06	SA#97e	SP-220876	0012	1	F	Rename 5GPRUK ID and 5GPRUK in CP based solution and rename PRUK and PRUK ID in UP based solution	17.1.0
2022-06	SA#97e	SP-220876	0013		F	Clarification for ProSe UE-to-Network Relay security procedure over Control Plane	17.1.0
2022-06	SA#97e	SP-220876	0014		F	Correction figure in 5G ProSe discovery in TS33.503	17.1.0
2022-06	SA#97e	SP-220876	0015	1	F	Correction figure in ProSe UE-to-Network Relay security procedure over Control Plane in TS33.503 --> not implemented due to clash with 0012r1 (MCC) in the figure.	17.1.0
2022-06	SA#97e	SP-220876	0017	-	F	Clean up clause 6.1.3.2.2	17.1.0
2022-06	SA#97e	SP-220876	0019	-	F	Define reference point for PAnF	17.1.0
2022-06	SA#97e	SP-220876	0020	-1	F	Remove secondary authentication related content	17.1.0
2022-06	SA#97e	SP-220876	0021	-	F	Update Abbreviations	17.1.0
2022-06	SA#97e	SP-220876	0023	1	F	Resolution of the issue of authentication mechanism selection	17.1.0
2022-06	SA#97e	SP-220876	0025	1	F	Clarification on 5G ProSe Remote UE specific authentication mechanism	17.1.0
2022-06	SA#97e	SP-220876	0026	1	F	Remote UE Report when security procedure over Control Plane is performed	17.1.0
2022-06	SA#97e	SP-220876	0028		F	Add clause of Broadcast mode 5G ProSe Direct Communication	17.1.0
2022-06	SA#97e	SP-220876	0029		F	Add clause of Groupcast mode 5G ProSe Direct Communication	17.1.0
2022-06	SA#97e	SP-220876	0030	-	F	Correction to Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate service	17.1.0
2022-06	SA#97e	SP-220876	0033	-	F	Modify clause and figure titles for U2N relay clauses	17.1.0
2022-06	SA#97e	SP-220876	0034	1	F	Updates to U2N Relay Discovery Security Procedure	17.1.0
2022-06	SA#97e	SP-220876	0041	1	F	Corrections in TS 33.503	17.1.0
2022-12	SA#98e	SP-221152	0042	1	F	Alignment of Link Identifier Update (LIU) procedure	17.2.0
2022-12	SA#98e	SP-221152	0043	-	F	Handling of PRUK desynchronization issue with 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay	17.2.0
2022-12	SA#98e	SP-221152	0046	1	F	Corrections in privacy protection of 5G ProSe UE-to-Network relay procedure	17.2.0
2022-12	SA#98e	SP-221152	0049	1	F	Add functionality description of PAnF	17.2.0
2022-12	SA#98e	SP-221152	0050	1	F	Clarification of subscription information in PAnF	17.2.0
2022-12	SA#98e	SP-221152	0051	-	F	Add FC Value in 33.503	17.2.0
2022-12	SA#98e	SP-221152	0058	1	F	Correction to security mechanism selection	17.2.0
2022-12	SA#98e	SP-221152	0059	1	F	Renaming 5GPRUK, 5GPRUK ID, PRUK and PRUK ID	17.2.0
2022-12	SA#98e	SP-221152	0060	1	F	Correcting the handling of synchronisation error	17.2.0
2022-12	SA#98e	SP-221152	0062		F	CP-PRUK refresh	17.2.0
2022-12	SA#98e	SP-221152	0064	1	F	Match Report in U2N Relay Discovery Security Procedure	17.2.0
2023-03	SA#99	SP-230146	0072	-	F	Correction in 5.2.4.2	17.3.0
2023-03	SA#99	SP-230146	0073	-	F	Correction in 6.1.1	17.3.0
2023-03	SA#99	SP-230146	0074	-	F	Correction in 6.1.3.2.2.2	17.3.0
2023-03	SA#99	SP-230146	0075	-	F	Correction in 6.2.1 and 6.2.2	17.3.0
2023-03	SA#99	SP-230146	0076	-	F	Correction in 6.3.3.3.2	17.3.0
2023-03	SA#99	SP-230146	0078	1	F	Correction to ProSe Authentication Vector obtaining process	17.3.0
2023-03	SA#99	SP-230146	0079	-	F	Correction on SUPI in Nudm_UEAuthentication_GetProSeAv service	17.3.0
2023-03	SA#99	SP-230146	0083	1	F	Clarify Kauf_p generation	17.3.0
2023-03	SA#99	SP-230146	0085	1	F	Remote UE Report in UP based solution for 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay	17.3.0
2023-03	SA#99	SP-230146	0086	1	F	Remote UE Report in CP based solution for 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay	17.3.0
2023-03	SA#99	SP-230144	0087	1	F	Use relay UE SNN to generate AV for ProSe authentication	17.3.0
2023-03	SA#99	SP-230144	0092	-	F	clarify protocol layer for discovery message protection	17.3.0
2023-03	SA#99	SP-230146	0093	-	F	Editorial changes	17.3.0
2023-06	SA#100	SP-230600	0099	-	F	Correction in 5G ProSe Direct Discovery	17.4.0
2023-06	SA#100	SP-230600	0102	1	F	Fix the restricted discovery procedures in 5G ProSe	17.4.0
2023-06	SA#100	SP-230600	0103	-	F	Editorial changes	17.4.0

Change history							
Date	Meeting	TDoc	CR	Re v	Cat	Subject/Comment	New version
2023-06	SA#100	SP-230600	0104	-	F	Define missing reference points	17.4.0
2023-06	SA#100	SP-230598	0105	1	F	Locate target DDNMF in U2N discovery security procedure	17.4.0

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# History

<b>Document history</b>		
V17.0.1	July 2022	Publication
V17.1.0	September 2022	Publication
V17.2.0	January 2023	Publication
V17.3.0	April 2023	Publication
V17.4.0	July 2023	Publication