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Lawful Interception (LI);
Handover Interface and
Service-Specific Details (SSD) for IP delivery;
Part 4: Service-specific details for Layer 2 services

Reference

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Foreword

This Technical Specification (TS) has been produced by ETSI Technical Committee Lawful Interception (LI).

The present document is part 4 of a multi-part deliverable. Full details of the entire series can be found in part 1 [2].

The ASN.1 module is also available as an electronic attachment to the original document from the ETSI site (see for more details clause 8.1).

Modal verbs terminology

In the present document "shall", "shall not", "should", "should not", "may", "need not", "will", "will not", "can" and "cannot" are to be interpreted as described in clause 3.2 of the <u>ETSI Drafting Rules</u> (Verbal forms for the expression of provisions).

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Introduction

The present document focuses on layer 2 interception of IP-encoded information. It is to be used in conjunction with ETSI TS 102 232-1 [2], in which the handling of the intercepted information is described.

1 Scope

The present document specifies Lawful Interception for an Access Provider that has access to layer 2 session information and that is not required to have layer 3 information. In this case, the focus of Lawful Interception (LI) for IP Network Access is on the portion of the network, commonly referred to as "layer 2 interception", that facilitates subscriber access to the Public IP network.

The present document describes the LI at the interception domain of the access network.

The specification contains:

- a stage 1 description of the Lawful Interception service;
- a stage 2 description of the information flows between the functional entities (including the information elements involved) and triggering events; and
- a stage 3 description of the protocol and procedures to be used in mapping from stage 2 information flows and elements to Intercept Related Information (IRI) and Content of Communication (CC).

The present document is consistent with the definition of the Handover Interface, as described in ETSI TS 102 232-1 [2].

NOTE 1: Layer 3 interception is described in ETSI TS 102 232-3 [12].

NOTE 2: Layer 2 interception is not applicable to the PS domain of the GSM/UMTS networks (ETSI TS 123 060 [15]).

2 References

2.1 Normative references

References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

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| [1] | Void. |
|-----|---|
| [2] | ETSI TS 102 232-1: "Lawful Interception (LI); Handover Interface and Service-Specific Details (SSD) for IP delivery; Part 1: Handover specification for IP delivery". |
| [3] | IETF RFC 1122: "Requirements for Internet Hosts - Communication Layers". |
| [4] | IETF RFC 1570: "PPP LCP Extensions". |
| [5] | IETF RFC 3046: "DHCP Relay Agent Information Option". |
| [6] | Recommendation ITU-T X.680: "Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation". |
| [7] | Recommendation ITU-T E.164: "The international public telecommunication numbering plan". |
| [8] | IETF RFC 2341: "Cisco Layer Two Forwarding (Protocol) "L2F"". |
| [9] | IETF RFC 2637: "Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP)". |

| [10] | IETF RFC 2661: "Layer Two Tunneling Protocol "L2TP"". |
|------|--|
| [11] | IETF RFC 1661: "The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)". |
| [12] | ETSI TS 102 232-3: "Lawful Interception (LI); Handover Interface and Service-Specific Details (SSD) for IP delivery; Part 3: Service-specific details for internet access services". |
| [13] | ETSI TS 102 232-2: "Lawful Interception (LI); Handover Interface and Service-Specific Details (SSD) for IP delivery; Part 2: Service-specific details for messaging services". |
| [14] | ETSI TS 101 331: "Lawful Interception (LI); Requirements of Law Enforcement Agencies". |
| [15] | ETSI TS 123 060: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+) (GSM); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); Service description; Stage 2 (3GPP TS 23.060)". |
| [16] | IETF RFC 2684: "Multiprotocol Encapsulation over ATM Adaptation Layer 5". |
| [17] | Void. |
| [18] | IETF RFC 2427: "Multiprotocol Interconnect over Frame Relay". |

2.2 Informative references

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The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area.

| [i.1] | ETSI TR 102 503: "Lawful Interception (LI); ASN.1 Object Identifiers in Lawful Interception and Retained data handling Specifications". |
|-------|--|
| [i.2] | ETSI TS 101 909-20-1: "Digital Broadband Cable Access to the Public Telecommunications Network; IP Multimedia Time Critical Services; Part 20: Lawful Interception; Sub-part 1: CMS based Voice Telephony Services". |
| [i.3] | ETSI TS 101 909-20-2: "Digital Broadband Cable Access to the Public Telecommunications Network; IP Multimedia Time Critical Services; Part 20: Lawful Interception; Sub-part 2: Streamed multimedia services". |

3 Definitions and abbreviations

3.1 Definitions

For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in ETSI TS 102 232-1 [2], ETSI TS 102 232-3 [12] and the following apply:

Access Provider (AP): Communication Service Provider (CSP), providing access to networks

- NOTE 1: APs generally provide dial-up access through a modem and PPP connection, though companies that offer Internet access with other devices, such as cable modems or wireless connections, could also be considered APs.
- NOTE 2: In the context of the present document, the network access is defined as IP-based network access to the Internet.

access service: set of access methods provided to a user to access a service and/or a supplementary service

NOTE: In the context of the present document, the service to be accessed is defined as the Internet.

Application Service Provider (ASP): third-party entity that manages and distributes software-based services and solutions to customers across a wide area network from a central data centre

NOTE: In the context of the present document, a company that offers services that are accessible to users who have connectivity via the Internet.

interconnect network: network connecting the AP and the IAP, across which the layer 2 tunnel is established

Internet Access Provider (IAP): company that provides access to the Internet

NOTE: The IAP provides subscribers a username, password and an IP address that enables subscribers to log onto the Internet for virtual connectivity to Application Service Providers.

layer 2: link layer, as defined in IETF RFC 1122 [3]

layer 2 interception: lawful interception using technology that can access layer 2 information

Physical Line Termination Point (PLTP): point in the access provider's infrastructure where the physical line to the customer is terminated

EXAMPLE: xDSL-line termination point, Cable-line termination point, Ethernet-line termination point.

tunnel router: router that is an endpoint of a layer 2 tunnel; there are at least two tunnel routers for each layer 2 tunnel

3.2 Abbreviations

For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:

AAA Authentication, Authorization and Accounting

ADSL Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line

AP Access Provider

ASN.1 Abstract Syntax Notation 1
ASP Application Service Provider
ATM Asynchronous Transfer Mode
CC Content of Communication
CIN Communication Identity Number
CMTS Cable Modem Termination System
CPE Customer Premises Equipment

CR Change Request

CSP Communications Service Provider

DF Delivery Function

DHCP Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol

DSL Digital Subscriber Line

DSLAM Digital Subscriber Line Access Multiplexer

HI1 Handover Interface 1 (for Administrative Information)
HI2 Handover Interface 2 (for Intercept Related Information)
HI3 Handover Interface 3 (for Content of Communication)

IAP Internet Access Provider
IAS Internet Access Service
INI Internal Network Interface

IP Internet Protocol

IRI Intercept Related Information
ISDN Integrated Services Digital Network

L2F Layer 2 Forwarding
L2TP Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol

LAES Lawful Authorized Electronic Surveillance

LAN Local Area Network
LCP Link Control Protocol
LEA Law Enforcement Agency

LEMF Law Enforcement Monitoring Facility

LI Lawful Interception

LIID Lawful Interception IDentifier

MAC Media Access Control
MD Mediation Device
MF Mediation Function

MOC Mandatory/Optional/Conditional

NAS Network Access Server
OID Object IDentifier
PDU Protocol Data Unit

PLTP Physical Line Termination Point

PPP Point-to-Point Protocol

PPTP Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol

PS Packet Switched

PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial In User Service

RFC IETF Request For Comment

SP Service Provider
TC Technical Committee
VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol
WLAN Wireless Local Area Network
xDSL Digital Subscriber Line technologies

4 General

4.1 Access network

4.1.0 Overview

An access network provides layer 2 connectivity from the Physical Line Termination Point (PLTP) for end-users to an Application Service Provider (ASP) through an Internet Access Provider (IAP). The access provided may be via a telephone, cable, or wireless-network. The present document describes the LI at the access network.

The figures contained in the following clauses do not necessarily refer to physical configurations but identify the business roles associated with various scenarios to provide services. A provider can have one or more of following roles: Access Provider (AP), Internet Access Provider (IAP) and Application Provider.

Lawful interception of communications has to accommodate a multitude of scenarios for public telecommunications. Four representative scenarios are described below.

4.1.1 Scenario 1

This scenario reflects the situation in which the three identified provider roles are provisioned by independent providers.

For example, an ASP provides Call Control for VoIP service, and is using the transport facilities of an IAP for connectivity to the AP.

In this scenario, the specifications of the present document are relevant to the AP, while the IAP and ASP may be involved with interception according to the specifications of ETSI TS 102 232-2 [13] and ETSI TS 102 232-3 [12].




Figure 1: Scenario in which access, transport and application services are offered by three different providers

4.1.2 Scenario 2

This scenario reflects the situation in which a network operator is acting only as an AP, and not as an IAP or ASP.

In this scenario, the specifications of the present document are relevant to the AP, while the IAP/ASP may be involved with interception according to the specifications of ETSI TS 102 232-2 [13] and ETSI TS 102 232-3 [12].




Figure 2: Scenario in which access is offered by a provider separate from the one that is offering Internet transport and application service

4.1.3 Scenario 3

This scenario reflects the situation in which the AP and IAP roles are offered by a single provider.

In this scenario the Service Provider (SP), having roles as an AP and an IAP, may be involved with interception according to ETSI TS 102 232-3 [12] and layer 2 interception is not preferred.




Figure 3: Scenario in which access and Internet transport are offered by a single provider that does not offer application service

4.1.4 Scenario 4

This scenario reflects the situation in which the AP, IAP and ASP roles are offered by a single provider.

In this scenario the service provider, having roles as an AP, an IAP and an ASP, may be involved with interception according to ETSI TS 102 232-2 [13] and ETSI TS 102 232-3 [12], and layer 2 interception is not preferred.




Figure 4: Scenario in which access, transport and application services are offered by the same provider

4.2 Lawful Interception (LI) requirements

4.2.0 Introduction

Clause 4.2 lists the requirements for Lawful Interception (LI). These requirements are derived from higher-level requirements listed in ETSI TS 101 331 [14] and ETSI TS 102 232-1 [2] and are specific to Internet Access Services (IAS). These requirements focus on both the administrative part of Internet Access for delivery over HI2 as well as capturing traffic for delivery over HI3.

4.2.1 Target identity

Where the special properties of a given service, and the justified requirements of the LEAs, necessitate the use of various identifying characteristics for determination of the traffic to be intercepted, the provider (CSP) shall ensure that the traffic can be intercepted on the basis of these characteristics. The target identity known by the layer 2 mechanisms is not an application or network identity; therefore, layer 2 interception has to be registered against a known layer 2 identity. The access network shall identify targeted activity by other means, e.g. the termination point of the xDSL-line or the Cable-line.

In each case the characteristics shall be identifiable without unreasonable effort and shall be such that they allow clear determination of the traffic to be intercepted.

The target identity should uniquely identify the target in the provider's network. The target identity will be dependent on the access mechanism used and the parameters available with the AP. The target identity could be based on:

- a) MAC address or vMAC. For example, the MAC address of the cable modem which is identified by the CMTS can be requested to identify the target identity.
- b) xDSL-line termination point, including, e.g. the IP-address of the Network Access Server (NAS), and the NAS port; the NAS port is identified by the ATM virtual path, virtual channel and port number (slot, sub-slot and port).
- c) Cable-line termination point (including e.g. IP address, interface information of the CMTS).
- d) DHCP option 82, circuit Id and remote Id, as defined in IETF RFC 3046 [5].
- e) Calling party number (Recommendation ITU-T E.164 [7], Network-provided or User-provided, verified and passed).
- f) Other unique identifier agreed between AP and LEA.

4.2.2 Result of interception

The network operator shall provide Intercept Related Information (IRI), in relation to each target service:

- a) when an attempt is made by the target to utilize the network;
- b) when an attempt is made to reach the target from the network;
- c) when an access to the network is permitted;
- d) when an access to the network is not permitted;
- e) when an access to the network is terminated.

The IRI shall contain:

- a) identities used by or associated with the target identity;
- b) details of services used and their associated parameters;
- c) information relating to status;
- d) timestamps.

Content of Communication (CC) shall be provided for every layer 2 datagram sent through the access network that is addressed to, or sent from, the line termination point of the target.

The CC shall be a bit-exact copy of every intercepted layer 2 datagram.

4.2.3 Intercept related information messages

IRI shall be conveyed to the LEMF in IRI data records. Four types of IRI data records are defined:

- 1) IRI-BEGIN record at the first event of a communication attempt, opening the IRI transaction;
- 2) IRI-END record at the end of a communication attempt, closing the IRI transaction;
- 3) IRI-CONTINUE record at any time during a communication attempt within the IRI transaction;
- 4) IRI-REPORT record used in general for non-communication related events.

For a description of the use and purpose of the various IRI data records refer to ETSI TS 102 232-1 [2]. Which IRI events are available for the different IRI data record types is described in clause 6.1.

4.2.4 Time constraints

Intercept Related Information shall be transmitted without undue delay. This delay should only be caused by the access protocol handling and the automated forwarding of this information to the delivery function.

5 System model

5.1 Reference configuration

Figure 5 contains the reference configuration for the lawful interception.




Figure 5: Reference configuration for lawful interception

The reference configuration is only a logical representation of the entities involved in lawful interception and does not mandate separate physical entities. This allows for higher levels of integration.

The messages sent in an implementation-specific manner between the Administrative Function and the other Access Provider domain entities may contain:

- target identities;
- correlation information;
- information whether the CC shall be provided;
- the address of Mediation Function 2 for IRI;
- the address of Mediation Function 3 for the intercepted CC;
- the address for delivery of IRI (= LEMF address);
- the address of delivery for CC (= LEMF address);
- Lawful Interception Identifier (LIID).

The messages sent in an implementation-specific manner between the Interception Function and Mediation Function 2 contains the IRI.

The messages sent in an implementation-specific manner between the Interception Function and Mediation Function 3 contains the CC.

5.2 Reference states

5.2.1 Logon

If the xDSL-line or cable line is not owned by the party that provides the authentication server, then user identification takes place in the network of the AP and the user identity and access request are forwarded to the authentication server of the IAP. To exchange data between the user and IAP, a layer 2 tunnel is established, e.g. a L2TP tunnel per IETF RFC 2661 [10]. All data between the IAP and the user is transported via this tunnel. If access is granted, an IP address is provided by the IAP and communicated to the user via the layer 2 tunnel and then the user can communicate with the Internet via the layer 2 tunnel.

If a layer 2 tunnel to an IAP is established, other users may be using the same tunnel, as only one tunnel is established typically to each IAP.

5.2.2 Data transport

While having an active, virtual IP connection, the CPE can transmit IP datagrams towards any IP-enabled destination connected to the Internet. These datagrams may contain other, higher-level IP-based protocols. Similarly, the CPE can receive IP datagrams directed towards it from any IP-enabled source connected to the Internet.

It is possible that the CPE is connected to an Access Network that does not provide the Internet Access, e.g. if the AP and the IAP are different parties as demonstrated in clauses 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. The AP provides the xDSL-line and routes all datagrams that are destined to the IAP through a layer 2 tunnel via a gateway to the network of the IAP. Thus, all datagrams from the user CPE are encapsulated in a specific layer 2 protocol (e.g. L2TP IETF RFC 2661 [10]) and transmitted by the AP to the IAP.




Figure 6: Layer 2 tunnel shared by multiple users

Figure 6 shows the usage of a layer 2 tunnel. It is possible that only the traffic associated with one PLTP connected to the CPE of one target is intercepted, as represented by the white IP-stream in figure 6. The other connections through the tunnel are not intercepted. If the target session is terminated and the other connections are not terminated, the layer 2 tunnel stays online.

It is also possible that the communication of more than one target may be intercepted via the same layer 2 tunnel. Furthermore, it is possible that a single IP-stream may be the subject of multiple, simultaneous lawful interceptions; therefore, that single, intercepted IP-stream may be delivered to multiple LEMFs, or multiple copies of the stream may have to be delivered to the same LEMF (once for each interception authorization).

5.2.3 Logoff

When a user logs off, the client running on the CPE will negotiate the closure of the session with the NAS of the AP. For example, a PPP session may be closed through an exchange of LCP Terminate packets (see IETF RFC 1570 [4] for LCP and IETF RFC 1661 [11] for PPP). Next, the NAS informs the authentication server in the IAP of the session closure and may provide statistics on the session as well.

5.2.4 Unexpected connection loss


During an active data session, the virtual connection may terminate unexpectedly for reasons such as loss of carrier, link quality failure, or the expiration of an idle-period timer. In such cases there can be no user-provided logoff indication, and it is up to the NAS to detect the connection loss and to propagate the session closure towards the accounting server of the IAP.

6 Intercept Related Information

6.1 IRI events

The following IRI-Events are applicable, if the traffic to and from the target is through the network of the AP.

Figure 7 shows the life cycle of a generic internet access session.



NOTE: Depending on the signalling implementation, there may be duplicate events due to resends. Resends of events are be ignored as far as state-changes are concerned; this is not depicted in the diagram.

Figure 7: State diagram for an Internet session

Subject to agreement on a national level, it is acceptable to perform the CIN allocation on the *accessAccept* rather than the *accessAttempt*. If this option is chosen, the CSPs shall allocate a new CIN only on the IRI-BEGIN messages; and send *accessAttempt*, *accessReject* and *accessFailed* as standalone messages not associated with any other CC or IRI.

Figure 7 allows for a model where detailed information is available regarding the identification and authentication process as well as for a simple model where just a session start notification is available.

Table 1: IRI events (Layer 2)

| IRI Event | Description | IRI Record | | | |
|---|--|------------|--|--|--|
| accessAttempt | A target requests access to the Internet Access Service (IAS). | REPORT | | | |
| accessAccept | The network elements are triggered to erect a layer 2 tunnel between the user and the foreign IAP network. | BEGIN | | | |
| accessReject | The access is refused. | REPORT | | | |
| accessFailed | The accessAttempt timed-out or failed otherwise. | REPORT | | | |
| interimUpdate | Intermediate status report on service status or usage. | CONTINUE | | | |
| accessEnd | The communication between the user and the IAP network terminated. This may be for numerous reasons that are not visible to the AP (e.g. the user logs off or shortage of network capacity between the AP and the IAP) (see note). | END | | | |
| startOfInterceptionWithSessionActive | As sessions can be active over longer periods, it is not unlikely for an intercept to start after a user session has started already. Available information about the status of this session is sent to the LEA. | BEGIN | | | |
| endOfInterceptionWithSessionActive | As sessions can be active over longer periods, it is not unlikely for an intercept to end whilst a user session remains active. Available information about the status of this session is sent to the LEA. | REPORT | | | |
| NOTE: If there are other connections still using the same tunnel, the tunnel remains available. | | | | | |

When LI is activated during an already active internet session, which the IAP is aware of, it is recommended that an IRI-BEGIN message is generated to mark the start of interception and the specific event type of *startOfInterceptionWithSessionActive* shall be used.

When LI is deactivated during an already active internet session, which the IAP is aware of, as a national option the MF may choose to either generate an IRI-REPORT message to mark the end of interception and shall use the specific event type of *endOfInterceptionWithSessionActive*, or not to generate an IRI-REPORT message and only communicate the end of interception by other means (e.g. HI1 *liDeactivated* message).

6.2 HI2 attributes

The attributes of IRI information for layer 2 interception is dependent upon the type of access technology utilized. Annex A defines for each technology that is relevant to the present document in which of the IRI messages a parameter value has to be provided.

7 Content of Communication (CC)

CC is provided for every layer 2 datagram sent through the AP's network that is addressed to, or sent from, the line termination point of the target.

The CC payload contains a copy of the intercepted layer 2 datagram.

NOTE: The ASN.1 definition for CC is presented as the L2CC PDU in clause 8 ASN.1 for IRI and CC.

8 ASN.1 for IRI and CC

8.1 ASN.1 specification

The ASN.1 (Recommendation ITU-T X.680 [6]) module that represents the information in the present document and meets all stated requirements is shown below. ETSI TR 102 503 [i.1] gives an overview over the relevant Object Identifiers (OID) used in ASN.1 modules of the Lawful Intercept specifications and point to the specification where the modules can be found.

The ASN.1 definitions are in .txt file "L2AccessPDU,ver7.txt", contained in archive ts_10223204v030401p0.zip which accompanies the present document.

```
L2AccessPDU
```

```
12IRIObjid RELATIVE-OID ::= {li-ps(5) 12Access(4) version7(7) iRI(1)}
12CCObjid RELATIVE-OID ::= {li-ps(5) 12Access(4) version7(7) cC(2)}
12IRIOnlyObjid RELATIVE-OID ::= {li-ps(5) 12Access(4) version7(7) iRIOnly(3)}
-- all three definitions relative to {itu-t(0) identified-organization(4)}
-- etsi(0) securityDomain(2) lawfulintercept(2)}
```

```
-- L2 Communications Contents
```

```
L2CC
            ::= SEOUENCE
    12CCObjId
                            [0] RELATIVE-OID,
    12CCContents
                            [1] CHOICE
        12TP
                        [1] OCTET STRING,
            -- The L2TP protocol is used
                        [2] OCTET STRING,
            -- The L2F protocol is used
        qTqq
                        [3] OCTET STRING,
            -- The PPTP protocol is used
                        [4] OCTET STRING,
            -- The PPP protocol is used
                        [5] OCTET STRING.
        ethernet
            -- The ethernet protocol is used
        12ATM2684
                        [6] OCTET STRING,
           -- The protocol IETF RFC 2684, method "LLC Encapsulation for Bridged Protocols" [16] is
used
        12FR2427
                        [7] OCTET STRING
            -- The protocol IETF RFC 2427 "Multiprotocol Interconnect over Frame Relay" [18] is used
    }
```

```
-- Intercept-related information for general L2-Access
```

```
L2IRI ::= SEQUENCE
{
    12IRIObjId [0] RELATIVE-OID,
    12IRIContents [1] L2IRIContents,
    ...
}
```

```
L2IRIContents
                       ::= SEOUENCE
    accessEventType
                                [0] AccessEventType,
                               [2] InternetAccessType OPTIONAL,
    internetAccessType
    targetNetworkID
                               [5] UTF8String (SIZE (1..128)) OPTIONAL,
       -- Target network ID (e.g. MAC address, PSTN number, additional information from
        -- network elements)
                                [6] UTF8String (SIZE (1..128)) OPTIONAL,
    targetCPEID
       -- CPEID (e.g. Relay Agent info, computer name)
                               [7] UTF8String (SIZE (1..64))OPTIONAL,
    targetLocation
        -- <for further study>
                               [8] INTEGER (0..4294967295) OPTIONAL,
    nASPortNumber
        -- The NAS port number used by the target
                               [9] UTF8String (SIZE (1..20)) OPTIONAL,
    callBackNumber
        -- The number used to call-back the target
    startTime
                                [10] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
         - The start date-time of the session or lease
                               [11] GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
    endTime
           -- The end date-time of the session or lease
    endReason
                               [12] EndReason OPTIONAL,
        -- The reason for the session to end
    octetsReceived
                               [13] INTEGER (0..18446744073709551615) OPTIONAL,
       -- The number of octets the target received
    octetsTransmitted
                               [14] INTEGER (0..18446744073709551615) OPTIONAL,
        -- The number of octets the target transmitted
    rawAAAData
                               [15] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
       -- Content of the raw AAA record
    authenticationType
                                [16] AuthenticationType OPTIONAL
        -- Field used to identify the authentication type to assist with LEMF data validation
```

```
AccessEventType
                        ::= ENUMERATED
    accessAttempt(0),
        -- A target requests access to the IAS \,
    accessAccept(1),
          - IAS access is granted to the target, the session begins
    accessReject(2),
        -- IAS access is refused to the target
    accessFailed(3),
        -- The accessAttempt timed-out or failed otherwise
    sessionStart(4),
        -- A target starts using the IAS; not in use anymore from version 4(4)
    sessionEnd(5).
       -- A target stops using the IAS; not in use anymore from version 4(4)
    interimUpdate(6),
        -- Intermediate status report on service status or usage
    unknown(7),
    startOfInterceptionWithSessionActive(8),
       -- LI is started on a target who already has an active session
    accessEnd(9),
       -- A target stops using the IAS, the session ends
    {\tt endOfInterceptionWithSessionActive} \ (10)
        -- LI is ended on a target who still has an active session
```

```
InternetAccessType
                      ::= ENUMERATED
    undefined(0),
   dialUp(1),
       -- IAS via DialUp access
   xDSL(2),
       -- IAS via DSL access
    cableModem(3),
       -- IAS via Cable access
    lan(4),
      -- IAS via LAN access
   wirelessLAN(5),
       -- IAS via Wireless LAN access
    fTTx(6),
        -- IAS via Fiber access
    wIMAX-HIPERMAN(7),
        -- IAS via WIMAX/HIPERMAN (fixed access)
    satellite(8)
        -- IAS via Satellite access
        -- (when it is not covered by any 3GPP or ETSI mobile Lawful Interception specifications)
```

```
EndReason ::= ENUMERATED
{
    undefined(0),
    regularLogoff(1),
    -- The target logged off
    connectionLoss(2),
    -- The connection was lost
    connectionTimeout(3),
    -- The connection timed-out
    leaseExpired(4),
    -- The DHCP lease expired
    ...
}
```

```
-- Intercept-related information for IRI-Only intercepts
```

```
L2ProtocolInformation
                            ::= ENUMERATED
    12ProtocolL2tp(1),
       -- The L2TP protocol is used
    12ProtocolL2f(2),
       -- The L2F protocol is used
    12ProtocolPptp(3),
    -- The PPTP protocol is used 12ProtocolPpp(4),
       -- The PPP protocol is used
    ethernetProtocol(5),
        -- The ethernet protocol is used
    undefined(6),
    12ProtocolATM2684(7),
        -- The protocol IETF RFC 2684, method "LLC Encapsulation for Bridged Protocols" [16] is used
    12ProtocolFR2427(8)
        -- The protocol IETF RFC 2427 "Multiprotocol Interconnect over Frame Relay" [18] is used
```

END -- end of L2AccessPDU

Annex A (normative): Reference network topologies

A.0 Introduction

There are different possible network topologies, dependent upon the means of network access:

- a) xDSL access.
- b) Cable modem access.
- c) WLAN access.

A.1 xDSL access

A.1.0 Overview

Internet Access over the local loop by means of using specialized equipment for achieving a high bandwidth over copper wire is commonly referred to as xDSL Access. There is great variety of possible architectures and technologies that can be applied for realizing an xDSL network. Therefore, figure A.1 only shows the principal equipment involved in this kind of Internet Access.




Figure A.1: Example of xDSL access

In some cases, the services of an AP and IAP are offered by a single company and the PPP session of a user is terminated in a gateway to the Internet. In this case, the intercepted data may be provided from layer 3, as specified in ETSI TS 102 232-3 [12].

In other cases, the services of an AP and IAP are split between different companies. The datagrams of the tunnel routers are collected by a NAS that belongs to the AP. These datagrams are tunnelled through the network using a specific tunneling protocol (e.g. L2F as defined in IETF RFC 2341 [8], L2TP as defined in IETF RFC 2661 [10], PPTP as defined in IETF RFC 2637 [9]) to another tunnel router that is operated by the IAP. This second router represents the termination point of the user's PPP session and initiates authentication and authorization, e.g. through the AAA on the IAP's RADIUS-Server. Thus, on the AP side, only layer 2 information is available.

A.1.1 Events and information

This clause describes the information sent from the Delivery Function (DF) to the Law Enforcement Monitoring Facility (LEMF) to support Lawfully Authorized Electronic Surveillance (LAES). The information is described as records and the parameters carried by a record. This focus is on describing the information being transferred to the LEMF.

The value in the Mandatory/Optional/Conditional (MOC) column in the following tables indicates whether inclusion of the indicated parameter in the indicated record is Mandatory (M), Optional (O), or Conditional (C).

Each record described in this clause consists of a set of parameters. Each parameter is either:

- A *Mandatory (M)* value means that the sender of the message shall always include this parameter in the message.
- An *Optional* (O) value means that the sender of the message may include this parameter in the message at the discretion of the implementation.
- A *Conditional (C)* value means that the sender of the message shall include this parameter in the message when the conditions specified in the Description/Conditions column are met.

Table A.1: accessAttempt REPORT Record

| Attribute | MOC | Description/Conditions | HI2 ASN.1 parameter |
|-----------------|-----|---|---------------------|
| EventType | М | Type of IRI event: accessAttempt. | accessEventType |
| AccessType | С | The type of internet access (e.g. Ethernet, ADSL, Cable Modem, LAN Access); to be included if accessible by the provider. | internetAccessType |
| targetNetworkID | С | The MAC address of the target CPE for layer 2 access, additional information received from network elements involved in the authorization of the layer 2 access by the target, e.g. from a Network Access Server providing information about involved network elements, or the target PSTN/ISDN number for dial-up; to be included if accessible by the provider. | targetNetworkID |
| targetCPEID | С | Secondary identification of the target CPE (e.g. DHCP Relay Agent Information, computer name, etc.); to be included if accessible by the provider. | targetCPEID |
| targetLocation | С | Location information (to be defined); to be included if accessible by the provider. | targetLocation |
| nASPortNumber | С | The 32-bit NAS port number the target uses for dial-up access. The content and the structure are defined by the network access provider; to be included if accessible by the provider. | nASPortNumber |
| callBackNumber | С | The target PSTN/ISDN number used for call-back by the NAS; to be included if accessible by the provider. | callBackNumber |
| rawAAAData | С | An unformatted OCTET string that may contain the raw AAA records as they were intercepted; to be included if accessible by the provider. | rawAAAData |

Table A.2: accessAccept BEGIN Record

| Attribute | MOC | Description/Conditions | HI2 ASN.1 parameter |
|-----------------|-----|---|---------------------|
| EventType | M | Type of IRI event: accessAccept. | accessEventType |
| AccessType | С | The type of internet access (e.g. Ethernet, ADSL, Cable Modem, LAN Access); to be included if accessible by the provider. | internetAccessType |
| targetNetworkID | С | The MAC address of the target CPE for layer 2 access, additional information received from network elements involved in the authorization of the layer 2 access by the target, e.g. from a Network Access Server providing information about involved network elements, or the target PSTN/ISDN number for dial-up; to be included if accessible by the provider. | targetNetworkID |
| targetCPEID | С | Secondary identification of the target CPE (e.g. DHCP Relay Agent Information, computer name, etc.); to be included if accessible by the provider. | targetCPEID |
| targetLocation | С | Location information (to be defined); to be included if accessible by the provider. | targetLocation |
| nASPortNumber | С | The 32-bit NAS port number the target uses for dial-up access. The content and the structure are defined by the network access provider; to be included if accessible by the provider. | nASPortNumber |
| callBackNumber | С | The target PSTN/ISDN number used for call-back by the NAS; to be included if accessible by the provider. | callBackNumber |
| startTime | M | The date and time of the start of the session (or lease). | startTime |
| rawAAAData | С | An unformatted OCTET string that may contain the raw AAA records as they were intercepted; to be included if accessible by the provider. | rawAAAData |

Table A.3: accessReject REPORT Record

| Attribute | MOC | Description/Conditions | HI2 ASN.1 parameter |
|-----------------|-----|---|---------------------|
| EventType | М | Type of IRI event: accessReject. | accessEventType |
| AccessType | С | The type of internet access (e.g. Ethernet, ADSL, Cable Modem, LAN Access); to be included if accessible by the provider. | internetAccessType |
| targetNetworkID | С | The MAC address of the target CPE for layer 2 access, additional information received from network elements involved in the authorization of the layer 2 access by the target, e.g. from a Network Access Server providing information about involved network elements, or the target PSTN/ISDN number for dial-up; to be included if accessible by the provider. | targetNetworkID |
| targetCPEID | С | Secondary identification of the target CPE (e.g. DHCP Relay Agent Information, computer name, etc.); to be included if accessible by the provider. | targetCPEID |
| targetLocation | С | Location information (to be defined); to be included if accessible by the provider. | targetLocation |
| nASPortNumber | С | The 32-bit NAS port number the target uses for dial-up access. The content and the structure are defined by the network access provider; to be included if accessible by the provider. | nASPortNumber |
| callBackNumber | С | The target PSTN/ISDN number used for call-back by the NAS; to be included if accessible by the provider. | callBackNumber |
| endReason | М | The reason for the session to end (e.g. logoff, connection loss, lease expiration); to be included if accessible by the provider. | endReason |
| rawAAAData | С | An unformatted OCTET string that may contain the raw AAA records as they were intercepted; to be included if accessible by the provider. | rawAAAData |

Table A.4: accessFailed REPORT Record

| Attribute | MOC | Description/Conditions | HI2 ASN.1 parameter |
|-----------------|-----|---|---------------------|
| EventType | М | Type of IRI event: accessFailed. | accessEventType |
| AccessType | С | The type of internet access (e.g. Ethernet, ADSL, Cable Modem, LAN Access); to be included if accessible by the provider. | internetAccessType |
| targetNetworkID | С | The MAC address of the target CPE for layer 2 access, additional information received from network elements involved in the authorization of the layer 2 access by the target, e.g. from a Network Access Server providing information about involved network elements, or the target PSTN/ISDN number for dial-up; to be included if accessible by the provider. | targetNetworkID |
| targetCPEID | С | Secondary identification of the target CPE (e.g. DHCP Relay Agent Information, computer name, etc.); to be included if accessible by the provider. | targetCPEID |
| targetLocation | С | Location information (to be defined); to be included if accessible by the provider. | targetLocation |
| nASPortNumber | С | The 32-bit NAS port number the target uses for dial-up access. The content and the structure are defined by the network access provider; to be included if accessible by the provider. | nASPortNumber |
| callBackNumber | С | The target PSTN/ISDN number used for call-back by the NAS; to be included if accessible by the provider. | callBackNumber |
| endReason | М | The reason for the session to end (e.g. time out); to be included if accessible by the provider. | endReason |
| rawAAAData | С | An unformatted OCTET string that may contain the raw AAA records as they were intercepted; to be included if accessible by the provider. | rawAAAData |

Table A.5: Void

Table A.6: interimUpdate CONTINUE record

| Attribute | MOC | Description/Conditions | HI2 ASN.1 parameter |
|-----------------|-----|---|---------------------|
| EventType | M | Type of IRI event: interimUpdate. | accessEventType |
| AccessType | С | The type of internet access (e.g. Ethernet, ADSL, Cable Modem, LAN Access); to be included if accessible by the provider. | internetAccessType |
| targetNetworkID | С | The MAC address of the target CPE for layer 2 access, additional information received from network elements involved in the authorization of the layer 2 access by the target, e.g. from a Network Access Server providing information about involved network elements, or the target PSTN/ISDN number for dial-up; to be included if accessible by the provider. | targetNetworkID |
| targetCPEID | С | Secondary identification of the target CPE (e.g. DHCP Relay Agent Information, computer name, etc.); to be included if accessible by the provider. | targetCPEID |
| targetLocation | С | Location information (to be defined); to be included if accessible by the provider. | targetLocation |
| nASPortNumber | С | The 32-bit NAS port number the target uses for dial-up access. The content and the structure are defined by the network access provider; to be included if accessible by the provider. | nASPortNumber |
| callBackNumber | O | The target PSTN/ISDN number used for call-back by the NAS; to be included if accessible by the provider. | callBackNumber |
| startTime | М | The date and time of the Interim Update. | startTime |
| rawAAAData | С | An unformatted OCTET string that may contain the raw AAA records as they were intercepted; to be included if accessible by the provider. | rawAAAData |

Table A.7: accessEnd END record

| Attribute | MOC | Description/Conditions | HI2 ASN.1 parameter |
|-------------------|-----|---|---------------------|
| EventType | М | Type of IRI event: accessEnd. | accessEventType |
| AccessType | С | The type of internet access (e.g. Ethernet, ADSL, Cable Modem, LAN Access); to be included if accessible by the provider. | internetAccessType |
| targetNetworkID | С | The MAC address of the target CPE for layer 2 access, additional information received from network elements involved in the authorization of the layer 2 access by the target, e.g. from a Network Access Server providing information about involved network elements, or the target PSTN/ISDN number for dial-up; to be included if accessible by the provider. | targetNetworkID |
| targetCPEID | С | Secondary identification of the target CPE (e.g. DHCP Relay Agent Information, computer name, etc.); to be included if accessible by the provider. | targetCPEID |
| targetLocation | С | Location information (to be defined); to be included if accessible by the provider. | targetLocation |
| nASPortNumber | С | The 32-bit NAS port number the target uses for dial-up access. The content and the structure are defined by the network access provider; to be included if accessible by the provider. | nASPortNumber |
| callBackNumber | С | The target PSTN/ISDN number used for call-back by the NAS; to be included if accessible by the provider; to be included if accessible by the provider. | callBackNumber |
| endTime | M | The date and time of the end of the session (or lease). | endTime |
| endReason | С | The reason for the session to end (e.g. logoff, connection loss, time out, lease expiration); to be included if accessible by the provider. | endReason |
| octetsReceived | С | The number of octets the target received during the session; to be included if accessible by the provider. | octetsReceived |
| octetsTransmitted | С | The number of octets the target sent during the session; to be included if accessible by the provider. | octetsTransmitted |
| rawAAAData | С | An unformatted OCTET string that may contain the raw. AAA records as they were intercepted; to be included if accessible by the provider. | rawAAAData |

Table A.8: startOfInterceptionWithSessionActive BEGIN record

| Attribute | MOC | Description/Conditions | HI2 ASN.1 parameter |
|-----------------|-----|---|---------------------|
| EventType | М | Type of IRI event: startOfInterceptionWithSessionActive. | accessEventType |
| AccessType | С | The type of internet access (e.g. Ethernet, ADSL, Cable Modem, LAN Access); to be included if accessible by the provider. | internetAccessType |
| targetNetworkID | C | The MAC address of the target CPE for layer 2 access, additional information received from network elements involved in the authorization of the layer 2 access by the target, e.g. from a Network Access Server providing information about involved network elements, or the target PSTN/ISDN number for dial-up; to be included if accessible by the provider. | targetNetworkID |
| targetCPEID | C | Secondary identification of the target CPE (e.g. DHCP Relay Agent Information, computer name, etc.); to be included if accessible by the provider. | targetCPEID |
| targetLocation | С | Location information (to be defined); to be included if accessible by the provider. | targetLocation |
| nASPortNumber | С | The 32-bit NAS port number the target uses for dial-up access. The content and the structure are defined by the network access provider; to be included if accessible by the provider. | nASPortNumber |
| callBackNumber | С | The target PSTN/ISDN number used for call-back by the NAS; to be included if accessible by the provider. | callBackNumber |
| startTime | O | The date and time of the start of the session (or lease); to be included if accessible by the provider. | startTime |
| rawAAAData | С | An unformatted OCTET string that may contain the raw AAA records as they were intercepted; to be included if accessible by the provider. | rawAAAData |

Table A.9: endOfInterceptionWithSessionActive REPORT record

| Attribute | MOC | Description/Conditions | HI2 ASN.1 parameter |
|--------------------|-----------|---|---------------------|
| eventType | М | Type of IRI event: endOfInterceptionWithSessionActive. | accessEventType |
| accessType | С | The type of internet access (e.g. Ethernet, ADSL, Cable Modem, LAN Access); to be included if accessible by the provider. | internetAccessType |
| targetNetworkID | С | The MAC address of the target CPE for layer 2 access, additional information received from network elements involved in the authorization of the layer 2 access by the target, e.g. from a Network Access Server providing information about involved network elements, or the target PSTN/ISDN number for dial-up; to be included if accessible by the provider. | targetNetworkID |
| targetCPEID | С | Secondary identification of the target CPE (e.g. DHCP Relay Agent Information, computer name, etc.); to be included if accessible by the provider. | targetCPEID |
| targetLocation | С | Location information (to be defined); to be included if accessible by the provider. | targetLocation |
| nASPortNumber | С | The 32-bit NAS port number the target uses for dial-up access. The content and the structure are defined by the network access provider; to be included if accessible by the provider. | nASPortNumber |
| callBackNumber | С | The target PSTN/ISDN number used for call-back by the NAS; to be included if accessible by the provider. | callBackNumber |
| startTime | С | The date and time of the start of the session (or lease). | startTime |
| endReason | М | The reason for the session to end (e.g. logoff, connection loss, lease expiration); to be included if accessible by the provider. | endReason |
| endTime | M | The date and time of the end of the session (or lease). | endTime (see note) |
| octetsReceived | С | The number of octets the target received during the session; to be included if accessible by the provider. | octetsReceived |
| octetsTransmitted | С | The number of octets the target sent during the session; to be included if accessible by the provider. | octetsTransmitted |
| rawAAAData | С | An unformatted OCTET string that may contain the raw AAA records as they were intercepted; to be included if accessible by the provider. | rawAAAData |
| authenticationType | С | Field used to identify the authentication type to assist with LEMF data validation. | authenticationType |
| NOTE: This is gen- | erated by | the MF at the time the intercept is ended. | |

A.2 Cable modem access

The same scenarios for tunnelled sessions between the AP and the IAP, as described for xDSL access in clause A.1, could also apply for access to the internet via Cable Networks. When the AP and the IAP are two different companies, then a layer 2 tunnel could be used between them. When the target's traffic is intercepted by the AP, typically only layer 2 datagrams can be provided to the LEMF. Detailed information about interception of digital broadband cable access is provided in ETSI TS 101 909-20-1 [i.2] and ETSI TS 101 909-20-2 [i.3].

A.3 WLAN access

Layer 2 interception in the WLAN network is for further study.

Annex B (informative): Stage 1 - RADIUS characteristics

B.0 Introduction

This annex provides information on RADIUS, specific to layer 2 interception. For more general information on RADIUS interception the reader is referred to annex A of ETSI TS 102 232-3 [12].

B.1 Network topology

B.1.0 RADIUS deployment options

RADIUS can be deployed as one or more RADIUS servers acting on their own or in combination with a RADIUS proxy. This annex provides an overview of the use of a RADIUS proxy in a layer 2 environment.

B.1.1 RADIUS proxy

In case the Access Network provider is not the same party as the IAP, the Access Network provider will typically deploy a RADIUS proxy. This RADIUS proxy will receive the authentication and authorization request from the RADIUS client and forwards this to the actual RADIUS server. In case the AP provides its services to multiple IAPs, based on some attribute provided by the NAS, the appropriate RADIUS server of the appropriate IAP is selected. In the case of Dial-up access, for example, the PSTN number of the NAS the user has dialled can be used for this purpose.




Figure B.1: RADIUS proxy

The RADIUS server will verify the password and authorization for the service against a customer database. The assignment of the IP address can be performed by either the RADIUS server or the RADIUS proxy, depending on network architecture decisions. In the latter case, the RADIUS proxy will typically assign IP addresses from ranges each belonging to a particular IAP. Alternatively, as mentioned previously, the IP address may also be assigned from the NAS operated by the AP.

Network based interception of both assignment and deassignment of IP addresses is most likely performed between the RADIUS proxy and the RADIUS server, since traffic between the RADIUS Client and the RADIUS proxy lays outside the infrastructure of the IAP. Alternatively, the RADIUS server can be extended with a function that will forward IP address assignment information to the interception function.

NOTE: Another common element used to identify the final RADIUS server or IAP is a Network Access Identifier. If the Network Access Identifier "foo@example.com" indicates user "foo" at IAP "example.com", the RADIUS Proxy could forward the RADIUS requests to the RADIUS server for IAP "example.com".

If IP address assignment is done by the NAS operated by the AP, the interception of the IP address assignment and deassignment will most likely be performed between the RADIUS client and the IAP's RADIUS Accounting server.




Figure B.2: RADIUS proxy, authentication for tunnelled session

Figure B.2 shows the authentication and authorization in cases where the user's session is tunnelled through the access network to the IAP network. The RADIUS proxy of the AP authenticates the user and triggers the RADIUS client (normally a NAS) to send all communication for this xDSL-line or the Cable-line through a layer 2 tunnel to the foreign IAP. All further information between the CPE and the IAP is exchanged via the layer 2 tunnel. Depending on the implementation of the RADIUS-Client, information about the beginning and end of the single user sessions may be signalled to the RADIUS-Proxy. The RADIUS-client on the AP-site, e.g. the NAS, may be used for copying the intercepted data to the MD. The layer 3 target information is unknown at the AP-site.

Annex C (informative): Change Request History

| Status of the present document Service-specific details for Layer 2 Services | | | | |
|--|---------|---|--|--|
| TC LI approval date | Version | Remarks | | |
| June 2005 | 1.1.1 | First publication of the ETSI TS 102 815 after ETSI/TC LI#09 (28-30 June 2005, Rovaniemi) approval | | |
| October 2005 | 1.2.1 | Version 1.1.1 prepared by Wolfgang Schumacher (Deutsche Telekom) (rapporteur) Included Change Request: TS102815CR001r1 (category C) on Additional ASN.1 attributes This CR was approved by ETSI/TC LI#10 (4-6 October 2005; Sorrento) | | |
| February 2006 | 1.3.1 | Version 1.2.1 prepared by Wolfgang Schumacher (Deutsche Telekom) (rapporteur) Included Change Request: TS102815CR002 (category C) on Modification of ASN.1 description and IRI events This CR was approved by ETSI/TC LI#11 (31 Jan – 2 February 2006, Saint Martin) Version 1.3.1 prepared by Wolfgang Schumacher (Deutsche Telekom) (rapporteur) Last version of ETSI TS 102 815 | | |
| September 2006 | 2.1.1 | Included Change Request: TS102232-04CR003 (category C) on IRI Events This CR was approved by ETSI/TC LI#13 (6-8 September 2006, Stockholm) ETSI TS 102 815 is converted to part 04 of the multi part specification ETSI TS 102 232 Version 2.1.1 prepared by Wolfgang Schumacher (Deutsche Telekom) (rapporteur) | | |
| February 2010 | 2.2.1 | Included Change Requests TS102232-04CR005 (category F) on minor editorial change This CR was approved by ETSI/TC LI#22 (22-24 September 2009, Trouville) TS102232-04CR004 (cat C) on Modification of table A.2 according to table 1 "IRI events (Layer 2)" CR was approved by ETSI/TC LI#23 (9-11 February 2010, Rome) Version 2.2.1 prepared by Wolfgang Schumacher (Deutsche Telekom) (rapporteur) | | |
| June 2010 | 2.3.1 | Included Change Request TS102232-04CR007r1 (cat F) on Expand and align ASN.1 definitions with ETSI TS 102 232-3 This CR was approved by TC LI#24 (15-17 June 2010 in Aachen) Version 2.3.1 prepared by Peter van der Arend (Vodafone) (chairman TC LI) | | |
| January 2012 | 3.1.1 | Included Change Requests: TS102232-04CR009 (cat B) New L2IRIContents field to identify authentication type & profile TS102232-04CR010 (cat F) to make L2 protocol types consistent These CRs were approved by ETSI/TC LI#28 (13-15 September 2011, Otranto) TS102232-04CR008r4 (cat C) Expand the length of targetNetworkID This CR was approved by ETSI/TC LI#29 (24-26 January 2012, Dun Laoghaire) The ASN.1 definitions are contained in a .txt file (L2AccessPDU,ver6.txt) which accompanies the present document Version 3.1.1 prepared by Wolfgang Schumacher (Deutsche Telekom) (rapporteur) | | |

| Status of the present document Service-specific details for Layer 2 Services | | | |
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| January 2014 | 3.2.1 | Included Change Request: TS102232-4CR011 (cat B) Change to IRI-REPORT to signal end of intercept whilst session remains active This CR was approved by ETSI/TC LI#34 (24-26 September 2013, Edinburgh) The ASN.1 definitions are contained in a .txt file (L2AccessPDU,ver7.txt) which accompanies the present document Version 3.2.1 prepared by Martin Kissel (Telefónica) (rapporteur) | |
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| February 2017 | 3.3.1 | Included Change Request: CR012 (cat D) Improve state diagrams This CR was approved by TC LI#43 (19-21 September 2016, Sorrento) The ASN.1 definitions are contained in a .txt file (L2AccessPDU,ver7.txt) which accompanies the present document Version 3.3.1 prepared by Martin Kissel (Telefónica) (rapporteur) | |
| June 2017 | Included Change Request: CR013 (cat D) Improve state diagram This CR was approved by TC LI#45 (20-22 June 2017, Tallinn) | | |

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