



EUROPEAN
TELECOMMUNICATION
STANDARD

ETS 300 506

September 1994

Source: ETSI TC-SMG

Reference: GSM 02.09

ICS: 33.060.30

Key words: European digital cellular telecommunications system, Global system for Mobile communications (GSM)

**European digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2);
Security aspects
(GSM 02.09)**

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Contents

Foreword	5
1 Introduction.....	7
1.1 Scope.....	7
1.2 Normative references	7
1.3 Definitions and abbreviations.....	7
2 General.....	7
3 Security features provided in a GSM PLMN.....	8
3.1 Subscriber identity confidentiality.....	8
3.1.1 Definition	8
3.1.2 Purpose	8
3.1.3 Functional requirements.....	8
3.2 Subscriber identity authentication	9
3.2.1 Definition	9
3.2.2 Purpose	9
3.2.3 Functional requirements.....	9
3.2.4 Authentication during a malfunction of the network	9
3.3 User data confidentiality on physical connections (Voice and Non-voice).....	9
3.3.1 Definition	9
3.3.2 Purpose	10
3.3.3 Functional requirements.....	10
3.4 Connectionless user data confidentiality.....	10
3.4.1 Definition	10
3.4.2 Purpose	10
3.4.3 Functional requirements.....	10
3.5 Signalling information element confidentiality	10
3.5.1 Definition	10
3.5.2 Purpose	10
3.5.3 Functional requirements.....	10
History.....	12

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Foreword

This European Telecommunication Standard (ETS) has been produced by the Special Mobile Group (SMG) Technical Committee (TC) of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI).

This ETS defines security features used within the European digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2) and corresponds to GSM technical specification GSM 02.09 version 4.2.4.

The specification from which this ETS has been derived was originally based on CEPT documentation, hence the presentation of this ETS may not be entirely in accordance with the ETSI/PNE rules.

Reference is made within this ETS to GSM-TSs (NOTE).

NOTE: TC-SMG has produced documents which give the technical specifications for the implementation of the European digital cellular telecommunications system. Historically, these documents have been identified as GSM Technical Specifications (GSM-TSs). These TSs may have subsequently become I-ETTs (Phase 1), or ETSS (Phase 2), whilst others may become ETSI Technical Reports (ETRs). GSM-TSs are, for editorial reasons, still referred to in GSM ETSS.

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1 Introduction

1.1 Scope

Bearer and Teleservices, as respectively defined in TS GSM 02.02 and 02.03, are the objects which the GSM PLMN operators offer to their customers. Besides these basic telecommunications services, features which aim at up-grading these basic services need also to be offered. Due to the use of radiocommunications in a PLMN, which are of a special nature compared to classical distribution transmission techniques used in the fixed networks, such a category of features is related to security aspects.

In a GSM PLMN, both the users and the network operator have to be protected against undesirable intrusion of third parties. However, measures should be provided for in order to insure maximum protection of the rights of the individuals concerns. As a consequence, a security feature is either a supplementary service to Tele or Bearer services, which can be selected by the subscriber, or a network function involved in the provision of one or several telecommunication services.

The purpose of this Specification is to define the security features which are to be available in a GSM PLMN, together with the associated levels of protection. This Specification is only concerned with those security features which aim at the up-grading of the security in a GSM PLMN. In particular, end-to-end security is outside the scope of this Specification.

The implementation aspects of security features are described in TS GSM 03.20.

1.2 Normative references

This ETS incorporates by dated and undated reference, provisions from other publications. These normative references are cited at the appropriate places in the text and the publications are listed hereafter. For dated references, subsequent amendments to or revisions of any of these publications apply to this ETS only when incorporated in it by amendment or revision. For undated references, the latest edition of the publication referred to applies.

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| [1] | GSM 01.04 (ETR 100): "European digital cellular telecommunication system (Phase 2); Definitions, abbreviations and acronyms". |
| [2] | GSM 02.02 (ETS 300 501): "European digital cellular telecommunication system (Phase 2); Bearer Services (BS) supported by a GSM Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN)". |
| [3] | GSM 02.03 (ETS 300 502): "European digital cellular telecommunication system (Phase 2); Teleservices supported by a GSM Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN)". |
| [4] | GSM 03.20 (ETS 300 534): "European digital cellular telecommunication system (Phase 2); Security related network functions". |

1.3 Definitions and abbreviations

Definitions and abbreviations used in this specification are listed in GSM 01.04.

2 General

The use of radiocommunications for transmission to the mobile subscribers makes PLMNs particularly sensitive to:

- misuse of their resources by unauthorized persons using manipulated Mobile Stations, who try to impersonate authorized Subscribers; and
- eavesdropping of the various informations which are exchanged on the radiopath.

It can be seen that PLMNs intrinsically do not provide the same level of protection to their operators and subscribers as the traditional telecommunication networks provide. This fact leads to the need to implement security features in a GSM PLMN in order to protect:

- i) the access to the mobile services;
- ii) any relevant item from being disclosed at the radiopath, mainly in order to ensure the privacy of user- related information.

Two levels of protection are therefore assumed:

- where security features are provided, as defined in Section 3, the level of protection at the radiopath of the corresponding items is as good as the level of protection provided in the fixed networks;
- where no special provision is made, the level of protection at the radiopath is null. All items which are not dealt with in Section 3 are therefore considered to need no protection.

3 Security features provided in a GSM PLMN

The following security features are considered:

- subscriber identity (IMSI) confidentiality;
- subscriber identity (IMSI) authentication;
- user data confidentiality on physical connections;
- connectionless user data confidentiality;
- signalling information element confidentiality.

The implementation of these five security features is mandatory on both the fixed infrastructure side and the MS side. This means that all GSM PLMNs and all MSs shall be able to support every security feature. Use of these five security features is at the discretion of the operator for its own subscribers while on the HPLMN. For roaming subscribers, use of these five security features is mandatory unless otherwise agreed by all the affected PLMN operators. (See also 3.3.3).

3.1 Subscriber identity confidentiality

3.1.1 Definition

The subscriber identity confidentiality feature is the property that the IMSI is not made available or disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities or processes.

3.1.2 Purpose

This feature provides for the privacy of the identities of the subscribers who are using GSM PLMN resources (e.g. a traffic channel or any signalling means). It allows for the improvement of all other security features (e.g. user data confidentiality) and provides for the protection against tracing the location of a mobile subscriber by listening to the signalling exchanges on the radio path.

3.1.3 Functional requirements

This feature necessitates the confidentiality of the subscriber identity (IMSI) when it is transferred in signalling messages (see Section 3.5) together with specific measures to preclude the possibility to derive it indirectly from listening to specific informations, such as addresses, at the radiopath.

The means used to identify a mobile subscriber on the radiopath consists of a local number called TMSI (Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity), described in TS GSM 03.20.

When used, the subscriber identity confidentiality feature shall apply for all signalling sequences on the radiopath. However, in the case of location register failure, or in case the MS has no TMSI available, open identification is allowed on the radiopath.

3.2 Subscriber identity authentication

3.2.1 Definition

Subscriber identity (IMSI) authentication is the corroboration by the land-based part of the system that the subscriber identity (IMSI or TMSI), transferred by the mobile subscriber within the identification procedure at the radiopath, is the one claimed.

3.2.2 Purpose

The purpose of this authentication security feature is to protect the network against unauthorized use. It enables also the protection of the GSM PLMN subscribers by denying the possibility for intruders to impersonate authorized users.

3.2.3 Functional requirements

The authentication of the GSM PLMN subscriber identity may be triggered by the network when the subscriber applies for:

- a change of subscriber-related information element in the VLR or HLR (including some or all of: location up-dating involving change of VLR, registration or erasure of a supplementary service); or
- an access to a service (including some or all of: set-up of mobile originating or terminated calls, activation or deactivation of a supplementary service); or
- first network access after restart of MSC/VLR;

or in the event of cipher key sequence number mismatch.

Physical security means must be provided to preclude the possibility to obtain sufficient information to impersonate or duplicate a subscriber in a GSM PLMN, in particular by deriving sensitive information from the mobile station equipment.

If, on an access request to the GSM PLMN, the subscriber identity authentication procedure fails and this failure is not due to network malfunction, then the access to the GSM PLMN shall be denied to the requesting party.

3.2.4 Authentication during a malfunction of the network

If an MS is registered and has been successfully authenticated, whether active or not active on a call, calls are permitted (including continuation and hand-over).

If an MS has already been registered (and therefore been already authenticated) and can not be successfully reauthenticated due to the network malfunction (e.g. the HPLMN was not able to provide authentication pairs RAND, SRES), calls are permitted.

If an MS attempts to register and can not be successfully authenticated due to the network malfunction, calls are not permitted.

If the MS is not registered, or ceases to be registered, a new registration need to be performed, and the preceding cases apply.

3.3 User data confidentiality on physical connections (Voice and Non-voice)

3.3.1 Definition

The user data confidentiality feature on physical connections is the property that the user information exchanged on traffic channels is not made available or disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities or processes.

3.3.2 Purpose

The purpose of this feature is to ensure the privacy of the user information on traffic channels.

3.3.3 Functional requirements

Encryption will normally be applied to all voice and non-voice communications. Although a standard algorithm will normally be employed, it is permissible for the mobile station and/or PLMN infrastructure to support more than one algorithm. In this case, the infrastructure is responsible for deciding which algorithm to use (including the possibility not to use encryption, in which case confidentiality is not applied).

When necessary, the MS shall signal to the network indicating which of up to seven encryption, plus one transparent, algorithms it supports. (NOTE: The effect of the "transparent algorithm" being selected is the same as not being encrypted.) The serving network then selects one of these that it can support (based on an order of priority preset in the network), and signals this to the MS. The selected algorithm is then used by the MS and network.

3.4 Connectionless user data confidentiality

3.4.1 Definition

The connectionless user data confidentiality feature is the property that the user information which is transferred in a connectionless packet mode over a signalling channel is not made available or disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities or processes.

3.4.2 Purpose

The purpose of this feature is to ensure the privacy of the user information on signalling channels (e.g. short messages).

3.4.3 Functional requirements

NOTE: Protection of connectionless user data is not applicable to SMS Cell Broadcast.

3.5 Signalling information element confidentiality

3.5.1 Definition

The signalling information element confidentiality feature is the property that a given piece of signalling information which is exchanged between mobile stations and base stations is not made available or disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities or processes.

3.5.2 Purpose

The purpose of this feature is to ensure the privacy of users related signalling elements.

3.5.3 Functional requirements

When used, this feature applies on selected fields of signalling messages which are exchanged between mobile stations and base stations.

The signalling information elements included in the message used to establish the connection (protocol discriminator, connection reference, message type and mobile station identity (IMSI, TMSI or IMEI according to the circumstance)) are not protected.

The following signalling information elements related to the user are protected whenever used after connection establishment:

- International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI);
- International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI);
- Calling subscriber directory number (mobile terminating calls);

- Called subscriber directory number (mobile originated calls).

The IMEI requires physical protection against being removed, replaced or its contents being changed by unauthorised individuals. The IMSI is stored securely within the SIM.

History

Document history	
September 1994	First Edition
October 1995	Converted into Adobe Acrobat Portable Document Format (PDF)