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Information Security Indicators (ISI);
Key Performance Security Indicators (KPSI) for the evaluation
of maturity detection of security events

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Foreword

This Group Specification (GS) has been produced by ETSI Industry Specification Group (ISG) Information Security Indicators (ISI).

The present document is included in a series of 6 ISI specifications. These 6 specifications are the following (see figure 1 summarizing the various concepts involved in event detection and interactions between all specifications):

- GS ISI 001-1 [1]:addressing (together with its associated guide GS ISI 001-2 [2]) information security indicators, meant to measure application and effectiveness of preventative measures.
- GS ISI 002 [3]: addressing the underlying event classification model and the associated taxonomy.
- GS ISI 003: addressing the key issue of assessing an organisation's maturity level regarding overall event detection (technology/process/ people) and to evaluate event detection results.
- GS ISI 004 [4]: addressing demonstration through examples how to produce indicators and how to detect the related events with various means and methods (with a classification of the main categories of use cases/symptoms).
- GS ISI 005 [i.1]: addressing ways to produce security events and to test the effectiveness of existing detection means within an organisation. More detailed and more a case by case approach than the present document and therefore complementary.

Figure 1 summarizes the various concepts involved in event detection and the interactions between the specifications.




Figure 1: Positioning the 6 GS ISI against the 3 main security measures

Introduction

The present document addresses the event detection aspects of the information security processes in an organization. The maturity level assessed during event detection can be considered as a good approximation of the overall Cyber Defence and SIEM maturity level of an organization.

1 Scope

The present document defines and describes a set of Key Performance Security Indicators (KPSI) to be used for the evaluation of the performance, the maturity levels of the detection tools and processes used within organizations for security assurance. The response is not included in the scope of the present document.

In particular, the purpose of the present document is to enable organisations to:

- assess the overall maturity level of the security event detection;
- provide a reckoning formula to assess detection levels of major security events as summarized in GS ISI 001-1 [1];
- evaluate the results of measurements.

This work is mainly based on the US SANS CAG [5].

The target groups of the present document are Head of detection, reaction teams, Cyber defence team and head of security governance.

2 References

References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

Referenced documents which are not found to be publicly available in the expected location might be found at http://docbox.etsi.org/Reference.

NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity.

2.1 Normative references

| [1] | ETSI GS ISI 001-1: "Information Security Indicators (ISI); Indicators (INC); Part 1: A full set of operational indicators for organizations to use to benchmark their security posture". |
|-----|--|
| [2] | ETSI GS ISI 001-2: "Information Security Indicators (ISI); Indicators (INC); Part 2: Guide to select operational indicators based on the full set given in part 1". |
| [3] | ETSI GS ISI 002: "Information Security Indicators (ISI); Event Model A security event classification model and taxonomy". |
| [4] | ETSI GS ISI 004: "Information Security Indicators (ISI); Guidelines for event detection implementation". |

[5] SANS Consensus Audit Guidelines V4.0: "20 Critical Security Controls for Effective Cyber Defence".

[6] The Capability Maturity Model Integration (Software Engineering Institute, 2001).

[7] Portfolio, Programme and Project Management Maturity Model (OGC, 2008).

NOTE: See http://www.sans.org/critical-security-controls/ for an up-to-date version.

2.2 Informative references

The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area.

[i.1] ETSI GS ISI 005: "Information Security Indicators (ISI); Event Testing; Part 5: Event Testing".

3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations

3.1 Definitions

For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in GS ISI 001-2 [2] apply.

3.2 Symbols

For the purposes of the present document, the symbols given in GS ISI 001-2 [2] apply.

3.3 Abbreviations

For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in GS ISI 001-2 [2] and the following apply:

CAG Consensus Audit Guidelines

CC Critical Control

CMMI Capability Maturity Model Integration
CSIRT Computer Security Incident Response Team

KPI Key Performance Indicators

KPSI Key Performance Security Indicators MSSP Managed security service provider

SOC Security Operation Centre

4 Background

4.1 Key Performance Indicators

Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) are quantifiable variables which can measure the performance of an organisation, evaluate the success of specific activities and support decision making processes. KPIs are metrics that allow to measure progress and deficiency. The metrics have to be well-defined and quantifiable to be useful.

KPIs can be used to assess the performance of IT services. Examples of IT KPIs are the availability of IT systems and services, the Service Level Agreements (SLAs), the Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) and the Mean Time To Recover (MTTR), and Mean-Time-Between-System-Incidents (MTBSI).

The usage of KPI in the field of Information Assurance is at its early stage. Defining KPIs for the Security Assurance processes is difficult because of the complexity of regulations, certifications, technical and organizational issues, and budget constraints. Hence it is a complex task to quantify clear Security Assurance objectives and performance in terms of KPIs.

4.2 Key Performance Security Indicators

Key Performance Security Indicators (KPSIs) can measure the maturity level of the information security processes (detection and detection-related processes).

A Maturity Model to measure the performance in the Security Assurance field can be based on the five level maturity framework adapted from The Capability Maturity Model Integration (Software Engineering Institute, 2001) [6] and Portfolio, Programme and Project Management Maturity Model (OGC, 2008) [7]. Organizations using these models, can assess the maturity level of their performance management practices in the five dimensions of the model:

- 1) **Initial**: Processes are managed ad hoc. No measure of the performance is requested.
- 2) Managed: Processes characterized for projects and are often reactive.
- 3) **Defined**: Processes are tailored for the organisation and are proactive.
- 4) Quantitatively Managed: Processes are measured and controlled.
- 5) **Optimizing**: Continuous Process Improvement.

To adapt these models to security event detection and detection-related reactions, a simplified 3-level scale is proposed:

- The present document, level 1 corresponding to CMMI levels 1 and 2;
- The present document, level 2 corresponding to CMMI levels 3 and 4;
- The present document, level 3 corresponding to CMMI level 5.

The three levels can be defined as follows:




Figure 2: 3 majority levels in Cyber Defence and SIEM approaches

4.3 SANS CAG

The SANS Consensus Audit Guidelines [5] is a compliance standard that specifies 20 "control points" that have been identified through a consensus of security professionals from the federal and private industry. The aim is to begin the process of establishing a prioritized baseline of information security measures and controls that can be applied across organizations to help improving their defences.

The 20 Critical Controls subject to collection, measurement, and validation currently defined are:

- 1) Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Devices
- 2) Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Software

- 3) Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on Laptops, Workstations, and Servers
- 4) Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation
- 5) Malware Defenses
- 6) Application Software Security
- 7) Wireless Device Control
- 8) Data Recovery Capability (validated manually)
- 9) Security Skills Assessment and Appropriate Training to Fill Gaps (validated manually)
- 10) Secure Configurations for Network Devices such as Firewalls, Routers, and Switches
- 11) Limitation and Control of Network Ports, Protocols, and Services
- 12) Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges
- 13) Boundary Defense
- 14) Maintenance, Monitoring, and Analysis of Security Audit Logs
- 15) Controlled Access Based on the Need to Know
- 16) Account Monitoring and Control
- 17) Data Loss Prevention
- 18) Incident Response Capability (validated manually)
- 19) Secure Network Engineering (validated manually)
- 20) Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises (validated manually)

Each Critical Control (CC) is described in detail, is subject to continuous monitoring and checking and has gained a broad consensus as regards their relevancy and effectiveness.

The KPSIs defined within the present document are based on the CC list concerning detection, with adaptation and extension whenever needed to cover the scope of the ETSI ISG ISI series.

5 Key Performance Security Indicators

This clause describes the Key Performance Security Indicators (KPSI) defined for the detection mechanisms.

5.1 How to use KPSIs to assess the organisation's overall maturity level in security event detection and response posture

The first purpose of KPSIs is to assess the organisation's overall maturity level of security event detection and response posture. The way to do it is to reckon the average of all KPSIs in order to get the unique level for the whole organization, which can then be compared to the best in the industry.

5.2 How to use KPSIs as a first step to evaluate the detection levels of security events

The second purpose of KPSIs is to enable an organisation to assess the actual detection levels of security events as summarized in ISI 001-1 information security indicators [1] and to evaluate the results of the measurements.

The formula to reckon the actual detection level of events is by making an indicator from the following: state-of-the-art detection level (see GS ISI 001-1 [1]) x organisation KPSI/state-of-the-art KPSI.

To apply this formula, it is of course required to know which KPSI(s) is(are) applicable to the given indicator. This requirement is met below in clause 5.4 for each indicator (see the row "Core ISI 001 mapping" [1] for a minimal indicators mapping, and "Additional ISI 001 mapping" [1] for a full mapping of the indicators over the KPSIs). When an indicator has several KPSIs assigned, it is proposed to take the average of all of them to get a unique and finalized KPSI.

All data necessary to use the formula are given for each KPSI in clause 5.4 with a recap in annex A.

5.3 KPSIs description table

The table 1 skeleton defines the KPSIs covering major detection issues. Each KPSI has been described by using that table.

Full title/name of the KPSI Name Index number of the KPSI within this GS **KPSI Index** References to the CAG Critical Control(s) [5] CAG Critical Control(s) Description/rationale Extended description of the KPSI and/or rationale for this KPSI (Core) ISI 001 [1] Indicator Core mapping to the ISI 001 security indicators [1] and [3]. Minimal set of indicators to be mapped to this specific KPSI mapping Additional mapping to the ISI 001 indicators [1] and [3]. Full set of indicators to be Additional ISI 001 [1] Indicator mapping mapped to this specific KPSI State of the Art figure This field gives the state-of-the-art figure (which level for the best ones within the security community) related to this specific KPSI. The figures have been estimated by ETSI ISG ISI and the European network of R2GS clubs experts. Level 0 Level 1 (see note) Level 2 (see note) Level 3 (see note) This box contains the This box contains the This box contains the This box contains the description of the description of the description of the description of the organization's maturity organization's maturity organization's maturity organization's maturity level about detection level about detection level about detection level about detection mechanisms (tools, mechanisms (tools, mechanisms (tools, mechanisms (tools, people, processes) people, processes) people, processes) people, processes) corresponding to level 0, corresponding to level 1, corresponding to level 2, corresponding to level 3, which corresponds to no which is "basic and just which is "mature and which is "advanced and processes, tools, people compliance-oriented". integrated". business integrated". dedicated to detection.

Table 1

5.4 Description of the relevant KPSIs

See clause 4.2 for more explanations.

NOTE:

The list of relevant KPSIs has been identified amongst the list of the 20 CAG critical controls, which concerns detection and response issues.

| Name | Inventory of software or devices | | | | |
|---------------------------|--|---------------------------------------|---------------------------|--|--|
| KPSI Index | 1 | | | | |
| CAG Critical Control(s) | 1, 2 | | | | |
| Description/rationale | This KPSI reflects the conce | ept that asset inventory is at | the basis of every ISMS. | | |
| | 70 % of all incidents are not | registered or not managed of | devices. | | |
| Core ISI 001 [1] mapping | IWH_UNA.1, VTC_NRG.1 | | | | |
| Additional ISI 001 [1] | IWH_VNP.1 to 3, IWH_VCN | I.1, IWH_UNA.1, VTC_WFI. ² | I, VTC_NRG.1 | | |
| mapping | | | | | |
| State of the Art figure | 2 | | | | |
| Level 0 | Level 1 | Level 2 | Level 3 | | |
| No policy, no process, no | Processes characterized | Processes systematically | Processes continuously | | |
| tools | for the organization but | implemented. Tools usage | checked with the level of | | |
| | often reactive (reset after | | application and | | |
| | incidents). No tools effectiveness evaluat | | | | |
| | (indicators, with we | | | | |
| | defined periodic | | | | |
| | | | reporting processes | | |
| | | | toward upper levels) | | |

| Name | Configuration monitoring and remediation | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|--|---|---|--|--|--|
| KPSI Index | 2 | | | | | |
| CAG Critical Control(s) | 3,10 | | | | | |
| Description/rationale | The less tackled issue regarding all kinds of vulnerabilities (regarding mobile devices, laptops, workstations and servers). More mature IT security issue regarding network devices (such as firewalls, routers and switches). 30 % of all security incidents are made possible by exploitation of configuration vulnerability. | | | | | |
| Core ISI 001 mapping [1] | VOR_VNR.1, VCF_FWR.1, VBH_PSW.1 to 3, VBH_PR | VCF_ARN.1, VCF_TRF.1, \ C.5, IWH_VCN.1 | /BH_WTI.1 to 6, | | | |
| Additional ISI 001 mapping [1] | IWH_VCN.1, VOR_VNR.1, all VCF indicators, VBH_PRC.1 to 6, VBH_IAC.2, VBH_FTR.1 to 3, VBH_WTI.1 to 6, VBH_PSW.1 to 3, VBH_RGH.1, IWH_VCN.1, VTC_IDS.1, VTC_MOF.1, VTC_NRG.1, VTC_PHY.1 | | | | | |
| State of the Art figure | 2 | | | | | |
| Level 0 | Level 1 | Level 2 | Level 3 | | | |
| No process, no tools | Processes characterized for the organization but often reactive (reset after incidents). No tools | Processes systematically implemented. Tools used (to identify all deviations from technical policies) | Processes continuously checked with level of application and effectiveness evaluated (indicators, with well-defined periodic reporting processes toward upper levels) | | | |

| Name | Continuous software vulnerability assessment and remediation | | | | | |
|---------------------------------|---|---|---|--|--|--|
| KPSI Index | 3 | | | | | |
| Critical Control(s) | 4 | | | | | |
| Description/rationale | Another mandatory issue in detection and response, complementary to the previous KPSI (20 to 30 % of all security incidents are made possible by exploitation of software vulnerability). | | | | | |
| Core ISI 001 [1] mapping | IEX_MLW.3 to 4, IWH_VNF VOR_VNP.1 to 2 | P.1 to 3, VSW_WSR.1, VSW | _OSW.1, VSW_WBR.1, | | | |
| Additional ISI 001 [1] mapping | IEX_MLW.3 to 4, IWH_VNP.1 to 3, all VSW indicators, VOR_VNP.1 to 2 | | | | | |
| State of the Art figure | 2 | | | | | |
| Level 0 | Level 1 | Level 2 | Level 3 | | | |
| No policy, no process, no tools | Processes characterized for the organization but often reactive (reset after incidents). No tools. Possible external watch and alerts collection | Processes systematically implemented. Tools used (vulnerability scanning, risk ranking, patch management, workaround application) | Processes continuously checked with level of application and effectiveness evaluated (indicators, with well-defined periodic reporting processes toward upper levels) | | | |

| Name | User access and account monitoring | | | | |
|---|--|--|---|--|--|
| KPSI Index | 4 | | | | |
| Critical Control(s) | 12,16 | | | | |
| Description/rationale | As regards administrative p frequent paths to critical inc | rivileges, their unwanted use idents. | is one of the most | | |
| Core ISI 001 mapping [1] | | 1, IDB_RGH.1 to 7, IDB_IDB /CF_UAC.1 to 5, VTC_RAP. | | | |
| Additional ISI 001 mapping [1] | IEX_MLW.1 to 4, all IDB indicators, VBH_PRC.1, VBH_RGH.1, VCF_UAC.1 to 5, VTC_RAP.1 | | | | |
| State of the Art figure | 2 | | | | |
| Level 0 | Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 | | | | |
| No policy, no charter, no process, no tools | Processes characterized for the organization but often reactive (reset after incidents) | Processes systematically implemented. Tools used (to identify all deviations from technical policies and deviant behaviours - especially for administrators) | Processes continuously checked with level of application and effectiveness evaluated (indicators, with well-defined periodic reporting processes toward upper levels) | | |

| Name | Log collection, analysis and archiving | | | | | |
|----------------------------|--|---|-------------------------|--|--|--|
| KPSI Index | 5 | | | | | |
| Critical Control(s) | 14 | | | | | |
| Description/rationale | This issue is one of the main | n pieces at the heart of SIEM | approaches. | | | |
| Core ISI 001 mapping [1] | | I , IMF_TRF.1 to 3, IDB_UID. | | | | |
| | IDB_LOG.1, VBH_PRC.1 to | 6, VBH_IAC.1 to 2, VBH_F | FR.1 to 3, VBH_WTI.3 | | | |
| Additional ISI 001 | | _DOS.1, IEX_MLW.3 to 4, IM | | | | |
| mapping [1] | | _LOG.1, VBH_PRC.1 to 6, V | | | | |
| | | .3, VCF_ARN.1, VCF_UAC. | 3, VCF_UAC.5 | | | |
| State of the Art figure | 3 | | | | | |
| Level 0 | Level 1 | Level 2 | Level 3 | | | |
| No policy (log tracking, | Processes characterized | Processes systematically | Processes continuously | | | |
| collection and analysis), | for some IT areas only. | implemented | checked with level of | | | |
| no charter, no process, no | SIEM tools used with | (organisation-wide and | application and | | | |
| tools | technical focus (log | continuous monitoring). | effectiveness evaluated | | | |
| | collection only). Log | Knowledge sharing on | (indicators, with well- | | | |
| | collection and | security incident | defined periodic | | | |
| | centralisation tools used. Well-defined whole | monitoring best practices. | reporting processes | | | |
| | | Tools used (SIEM solutions with Use Cases | toward upper levels) | | | |
| | organisation structure for monitoring checking and | development through | | | | |
| | archiving (Possible | dedicated correlation rules | | | | |
| | dedicated SOC or MSSP | - Cf. genuine threat | | | | |
| | detection service) intelligence). Tools | | | | | |
| | capacity/performance | | | | | |
| | monitoring. Always | | | | | |
| | | dedicated SOC (more | | | | |
| | | rarely MSSP) | | | | |

| Name | Security Skills Assessment and Appropriate Training | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|--|---|---|--|--|--|
| KPSI Index | 6 | | | | | |
| Critical Control(s) | 9 | | | | | |
| Description/rationale | Security skills assessment and training are especially important in SOC and CSIRT to detect security incidents through technical symptoms that often need to be qualified by seasoned teams. This requirement also applies to incident response. | | | | | |
| Core ISI-001[1] mapping | All IEX indicators, all IDB in | dicators, all VBH indicators, | all VCF indicators | | | |
| Additional ISI-001 [1] mapping | All IEX indicators, IMF_LOM.1, IMF_TRF.1 to 3, all IDB indicators, IWH_VNP.1 to 3, IWH_VCN.1, IWH_UKN.1. all VBH indicators, all VSW indicators, all VCF indicators, VTC_PHY.1 | | | | | |
| State of the Art figure | 2 | | | | | |
| Level 0 | Level 1 | Level 2 | Level 3 | | | |
| No policy, no process | Processes characterized for the organization but often reactive (reset after incidents and poor incident management) | Processes systematically implemented (Skills assessment during employment, periodic and/or relevant training) | Processes continuously checked with level of application evaluated (indicators, with well-defined periodic reporting processes toward upper levels) | | | |

| Name | Cyber stress drills | | | | |
|--------------------------|--|--|---|--|--|
| KPSI Index | 7 | | | | |
| Critical Control(s) | 20 | | | | |
| Description/rationale | This issue complements the | previous KPSI and is impor | tant to get effective | | |
| | operational security teams. | | - | | |
| Core ISI 001 [1] mapping | All IEX indicators, all IDB in | dicators, all VBH indicators, | all VCF indicators | | |
| Additional ISI 001 [1] | All IEX indicators, all IDB in | dicators, IWH_UKN.1, all VB | H indicators, all VCF | | |
| mapping | indicators | | | | |
| State of the Art figure | 2 | | | | |
| Level 0 | Level 1 | Level 2 | Level 3 | | |
| No policy, no process | Processes characterized for some IT areas only | Processes systematically implemented (Periodic and/or relevant drills) | Processes continuously checked with level of application evaluated (indicators, with well-defined periodic reporting processes toward upper levels) | | |

| Name | Data loss prevention (real-time part, excluding initial implementation) | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|--|---|---|--|--|--|
| KPSI Index | 8 | | | | | |
| Critical Control(s) | 17 | | | | | |
| Description/rationale | In this document, the releva prevention. | nt issue is the real-time and | detection part of data loss | | | |
| Core ISI 001 [1] mapping | IEX_INT.2, IEX_MLW.1 to 4 IDB_IDB.1 | I, IMF_LOM.1, IDB_UID.1, I | DB_RGH.1 to 7, | | | |
| Additional ISI 001 [1] mapping | IEX_INT.2, IEX_MLW.1 to 4, IMF_LOM.1, IDB_UID.1, IDB_RGH.1 to 7, IDB_IDB.1, VBH_PRC.1 to 6 | | | | | |
| State of the Art figure | 2 | | | | | |
| Level 0 | Level 1 | Level 2 | Level 3 | | | |
| No policy, no process | Processes characterized for the organization but often reactive (reset after incidents). No tools | Processes systematically implemented. Tools used (to detect all critical leaks) | Processes continuously checked with level of application and effectiveness evaluated (indicators, with well-defined periodic reporting processes toward upper levels) | | | |

Annex A (normative): Recap of available KPSIs

Table A.1

| KPSI index | Name | CAG CC | Core ISI 001 Indicator | Additional ISI 001 | State-of-the-art |
|------------|---------------------|-------------------|--|-----------------------------------|------------------|
| 1 | Inventory of | references 1,2 | mapping IWH UNA.1, | Indicator mapping IWH_VNP.1 to 3, | 2 |
| ľ | software or devices | 1,2 | VTC_NRG.1 | IWH_VCN.1, | 2 |
| | Software of devices | | VIO_INICO.I | IWH UNA.1, | |
| | | | | VTC_WFI.1, | |
| | | | | VTC_NRG.1 | |
| 2 | Configuration | 3,10 | VOR_VNR.1, | IWH_VCN.1, | 2 |
| | monitoring and | | VCF_FWR.1, | VOR_VNR.1, all VCF | |
| | remediation | | VCF_ARN.1, | indicators, | |
| | | | VCF_TRF.1, | VBH_PRC.1 to 6, | |
| | | | VBH_WTI.1 to 6, | VBH_IAC.2, | |
| | | | VBH_PSW.1 to 3, | VBH_FTR.1 to 3, | |
| | | | VBH_PRC.5, | VBH_WTI.1 to 6, | |
| | | | IWH_VCN.1 | VBH_PSW.1 to 3, | |
| | | | | VBH_RGH.1, | |
| | | | | IWH_VCN.1, | |
| | | | | VTC_IDS.1, | |
| | | | | VTC_MOF.1, VTC_NRG.1, | |
| | | | | VTC_PHY.1 | |
| 3 | Continuous software | 4 | IEX MLW.3 to 4, | IEX MLW.3 to 4, | 2 |
| | vulnerability | · | IWH_VNP.1 to 3, | IWH_VNP.1 to 3, all | _ |
| | assessment and | | VSW_WSR.1, | VSW indicators, | |
| | remediation | | VSW_OSW.1, | VOR_VNP.1 to 2 | |
| | | | VSW_WBR.1, | | |
| | | | VOR_VNP.1 to 2 | | |
| 4 | User access and | 12,16 | IEX_MLW.1 to 4, | IEX_MLW.1 to 4, all | 2 |
| | account monitoring | | IDB_UID.1, IDB_RGH.1 | IDB indicators, | |
| | | | to 7, IDB_IDB.1, | VBH_PRC.1, | |
| | | | IDB_MIS.1, IDB_LOG.1, | VBH_RGH.1, | |
| | | | VBH_PRC.1, | VCF_UAC.1 to 5, | |
| | | | VCF_UAC.1 to 5, | VTC_RAP.1 | |
| 5 | Log collection, | 14 | VTC_RAP.1 | IEX_INT.2, | 3 |
| 5 | analysis and | 14 | IEX_INT.2, IEX_MLW.3 to 4, IMF_TRF.1 to 3, | IEX_IN1.2, IEX_MIS.1, | 3 |
| | archiving | | IDB_UID.1, IDB_IAC.1, | IEX_INIS.1, IEX_DOS.1, | |
| | archiving | | IDB_CID.1, IDB_IAC.1, | IEX_BUU.3 to 4, | |
| | | | VBH_PRC.1 to 6, | IMF_TRF.1 to 3, | |
| | | | VBH_IAC.1 to 2, | IDB_UID.1, | |
| | | | VBH_FTR.1 to 3, | IDB_IAC.1, | |
| | | | VBH_WTI.3 | IDB_LOG.1, | |
| | | | _ | VBH_PRC.1 to 6, | |
| | | | | VBH_IAC.1 to 2, | |
| | | | | VBH_FTR.1 to 3, | |
| | | | | VBH_WTI.3, | |
| | | | | VCF_ARN.1, | |
| | | | | VCF_UAC.3, | |
| | | | | VCF_UAC.5 | |

| KPSI index | Name | CAG CC references | Core ISI 001 Indicator mapping | Additional ISI 001 Indicator mapping | State-of-the-art |
|------------|--|-------------------|---|--|------------------|
| 6 | Security Skills Assessment and Appropriate Training | 9 | All IEX indicators, all IDB indicators, all VBH indicators, all VCF indicators | All IEX indicators, IMF_LOM.1, IMF_TRF.1 to 3, all IDB indicators, IWH_VNP.1 to 3, IWH_VCN.1, IWH_UKN.1. all VBH indicators, all VCF indicators, VTC_PHY.1 | 2 |
| 7 | Cyber stress drills | 20 | All IEX indicators, all IDB indicators, all VBH indicators, all VCF indicators | All IEX indicators, all IDB indicators, IWH_UKN.1, all VBH indicators, all VCF indicators | 2 |
| 8 | Data loss prevention (real-time part, excluding initial implementation) | 17 | IEX_INT.2, IEX_MLW.1 to 4, IMF_LOM.1, IDB_UID.1, IDB_RGH.1 to 7, IDB_IDB.1 | IEX_INT.2, IEX_MLW.1 to 4, IMF_LOM.1, IDB_UID.1, IDB_RGH.1 to 7, IDB_IDB.1, VBH_PRC.1 to 6 | 2 |

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