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CYBER;
Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of Things:
Baseline Requirements

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Foreword

This draft European Standard (EN) has been produced by ETSI Technical Committee Cyber Security (CYBER), and is now submitted for the combined Public Enquiry and Vote phase of the ETSI EN Approval Procedure.

Proposed national transposition dates	
Date of latest announcement of this EN (doa):	3 months after ETSI publication
Date of latest publication of new National Standard or endorsement of this EN (dop/e):	6 months after doa
Date of withdrawal of any conflicting National Standard (dow):	6 months after doa

Modal verbs terminology

In the present document "**shall**", "**shall not**", "**should**", "**should not**", "**may**", "**need not**", "**will**", "**will not**", "**can**" and "**cannot**" are to be interpreted as described in clause 3.2 of the [ETSI Drafting Rules](#) (Verbal forms for the expression of provisions).

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Introduction

As more devices in the home connect to the Internet, the cyber security and data protection of the Internet of Things (IoT) becomes a growing concern. People entrust their personal data to an increasing number of online devices and services. Products and appliances that have traditionally been offline are now connected and need to be designed to withstand cyber threats.

The present document brings together widely considered good practices in security for Internet-connected consumer devices in a set of high-level outcome-focused provisions. The objective of the present document is to support all parties involved in the development and manufacturing of consumer IoT with guidance on securing their products.

The provisions are primarily outcome-focused, rather than prescriptive, giving organizations the flexibility to innovate and implement security and data protection solutions appropriate for their products.

The present document is not intended to solve all security, data protection and privacy challenges associated with consumer IoT. It also does not focus on protecting against attacks that are prolonged/sophisticated or that require sustained physical access to the device. Rather, the focus is on the technical controls and organizational policies that matter most in addressing the most significant and widespread security shortcomings. Overall, a baseline level of security and data protection is considered; this is intended to protect against elementary attacks on fundamental design weaknesses (such as the use of easily guessable passwords).

The present document provides a set of baseline provisions applicable to all consumer IoT devices. It is intended to be complemented by other standards defining more specific provisions and fully testable and/or verifiable requirements for specific devices which, together with the present document, will facilitate the development of assurance schemes.

A clause in the present document in some cases begins with general information about the context of the following provisions. A provision is followed by explanatory text describing, where appropriate, the intent of the provision and how the provision might be implemented. Further information on implementation examples is given in ETSI TR 103 621 [i.31].

Many consumer IoT devices and their associated services process and store personal data, the present document can help in ensuring that these are compliant with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [i.7]. Security by design is an important principle that is endorsed by the present document.

ETSI TS 103 701 [i.19] provides guidance on how to assess and assure IoT products against provisions within the present document.

The provisions in the present document have been developed following a review of published standards, recommendations and guidance on IoT security and privacy, including: ETSI TR 103 305-3 [i.1], ETSI TR 103 309 [i.2], ENISA Baseline Security Recommendations [i.8], UK Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) Secure by Design Report [i.9], IoT Security Foundation Compliance Framework [i.10], GSMA IoT Security Guidelines and Assessment [i.11], ETSI TR 103 533 [i.12], DIN SPEC 27072 [i.20] and OWASP Internet of Things [i.23].

NOTE: Mappings of the landscape of IoT security standards, recommendations and guidance are available in ENISA Baseline Security Recommendations for IoT - Interactive Tool [i.15] and in Copper Horse Mapping Security & Privacy in the Internet of Things [i.14].

As consumer IoT products become increasingly secure, it is envisioned that future revisions of the present document will mandate provisions that are currently recommendations in the present document.

1 Scope

The present document specifies high-level security and data protection provisions for consumer IoT devices that are connected to network infrastructure (such as the Internet or home network) and their interactions with associated services. A non-exhaustive list of examples of consumer IoT devices includes:

- connected children's toys and baby monitors;
- connected smoke detectors, door locks and window sensors;
- IoT gateways, base stations and hubs to which multiple devices connect;
- smart cameras, smart speakers and smart TVs together with their remote controls;
- wearable health trackers;
- connected home automation and alarm systems, especially their gateways and hubs;
- connected appliances, such as washing machines and fridges; and
- smart home assistants.

Moreover, the present document addresses security considerations specific to constraints in device resources.

EXAMPLE: Typical device resources that might constrain the security capabilities are energy supply, communication bandwidth, processing power or (non-)volatile memory capacity.

The present document provides basic guidance through examples and explanatory text for organizations involved in the development and manufacturing of consumer IoT on how to implement those provisions. Table B.1 provides a schema for the reader to give information about the implementation of the provisions.

Devices that are not consumer IoT devices, for example those that are primarily intended to be used in manufacturing, healthcare or other industrial applications, are not in scope of the present document.

The present document has been developed primarily to help protect consumers, however, other users of consumer IoT equally benefit from the implementation of the provisions set out here.

Annex A (informative) of the present document has been included to provide context to clauses 4, 5 and 6 (normative). Annex A contains examples of device and reference architectures and an example model of device states including data storage for each state.

2 References

2.1 Normative references

References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

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NOTE: While any hyperlinks included in this clause were valid at the time of publication, ETSI cannot guarantee their long term validity.

The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area.

- [i.1] ETSI TR 103 305-3: "Cyber Security (CYBER); Critical Security Controls for Effective Cyber Defence; Part 3: Internet of Things Sector".
- [i.2] ETSI TR 103 309: "CYBER; Secure by Default - platform security technology".
- [i.3] [NIST Special Publication 800-63B](#): "Digital Identity Guidelines - Authentication and Lifecycle Management".
- [i.4] [ISO/IEC 29147](#): "Information technology - Security techniques - Vulnerability Disclosure".
- [i.5] OASIS: "[CSAF Common Vulnerability Reporting Framework \(CVRF\)](#)".
- [i.6] ETSI TR 103 331: "Cyber Security (CYBER); Structured threat information sharing".
- [i.7] [Regulation \(EU\) 2016/679](#) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).
- [i.8] ENISA: "[Baseline Security Recommendations for IoT in the context of Critical Information Infrastructures](#)", November 2017, ISBN: 978-92-9204-236-3, doi: 10.2824/03228.
- [i.9] UK Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport: "[Secure by Design: Improving the cyber security of consumer Internet of Things Report](#)", March 2018.
- [i.10] IoT Security Foundation: "[IoT Security Assurance Framework](#)", Release 3.0, November 2021.
- [i.11] GSMA: "[GSMA IoT Security Guidelines and Assessment](#)".
- [i.12] ETSI TR 103 533: "SmartM2M; Security; Standards Landscape and best practices".
- [i.13] Commission Notice [2016/C 272/01](#): "The "Blue Guide" on the implementation of EU products rules 2016" (Text with EEA relevance).
- [i.14] Copper Horse: "[Mapping Security & Privacy in the Internet of Things](#)".
- [i.15] ENISA: "[Baseline Security Recommendations for IoT - Interactive Tool](#)".
- [i.16] IoT Security Foundation: "[Understanding the Contemporary Use of Vulnerability Disclosure in Consumer Internet of Things Product Companies](#)".
- [i.17] F-Secure: "[IoT threats: Explosion of 'smart' devices filling up homes leads to increasing risks](#)".
- [i.18] W3C®: "[Web of Things at W3C](#)".
- [i.19] ETSI TS 103 701: "CYBER; Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of Things: Conformance Assessment of Baseline Requirements".
- [i.20] DIN SPEC 27072: "Information Technology - IoT capable devices - Minimum requirements for Information security".
- [i.21] GSMA™: "[Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure \(CVD\) Programme](#)".
- [i.22] IoT Security Foundation: "[Vulnerability Disclosure - Best Practice Guidelines](#)".
- [i.23] [OWASP Internet of Things \(IoT\) Top 10 2018](#).

- [i.24] [IEEE 802.15.4-2015™/Cor 1-2018](#): "IEEE Standard for Low-Rate Wireless Networks, Corrigendum 1".
- [i.25] ETSI TS 102 221: "Smart Cards; UICC-Terminal interface; Physical and logical characteristics".
- [i.26] GSMA™: "SGP.22 Technical Specification v2.2.1".
- [i.27] [ISO/IEC 27005:2022](#): "Information technology - Security techniques - Information security risk management".
- [i.28] Microsoft® Corporation: "[The STRIDE Threat Model](#)".
- [i.29] ETSI TR 121 905: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+) (GSM); Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS); LTE; 5G; Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications (3GPP TR 21.905)".
- [i.30] ETSI TR 103 838: "Cyber Security; Guide to Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure".
- [i.31] ETSI TR 103 621: " Guide to Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of Things".
- [i.32] FIRST: "[Guidelines and Practices for Multi-Party Vulnerability Coordination and Disclosure](#)".
- [i.33] ISO/IEC TR 5895: "Cybersecurity - Multi-party coordinated vulnerability disclosure and handling".
- [i.34] ISO/IEC 16500-6:1999: "Information technology Generic digital audio-visual systems".

3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations

3.1 Terms

For the purposes of the present document, the following terms apply:

administrator: user who has the highest-privilege level possible for a user of the device, which can mean they are able to change any configuration related to the intended functionality

associated services: digital services that, together with the device, are part of the overall consumer IoT product and that are typically required to provide the product's intended functionality

EXAMPLE 1: Associated services can include mobile applications, cloud computing/storage and third party Application Programming Interfaces (APIs).

EXAMPLE 2: A device transmits telemetry data to a third-party service chosen by the device manufacturer. This service is an associated service.

authentication mechanism: method used to prove the authenticity of an entity

NOTE: An "entity" can be either a user or machine.

EXAMPLE: An authentication mechanism can be the requesting of a password, scanning a QR code, or use of a biometric fingerprint scanner.

authentication value: individual value of an attribute used by an authentication mechanism

EXAMPLE: When the authentication mechanism is to request a password, the authentication value can be a character string. When the authentication mechanism is a biometric fingerprint recognition, the authentication value can be the index fingerprint of the left hand.

best practice: measures that have been shown to provide appropriate security for the corresponding use case

NOTE 1: Appropriate security for the corresponding use case also considers properties of the technology, operating environment and risk.

NOTE 2: Multiple organizations, such as SDOs and public authorities, maintain guides and catalogues of measures that can be used to identify best practice.

EXAMPLE: Applying a security configuration for a specific functionality that takes into account common attacks and is endorsed by multiple organizations such as SDOs and public authorities.

best practice cryptography: cryptography that is suitable for the corresponding use case and has no indications of a feasible attack with current readily available techniques

NOTE 1: This does not refer only to the cryptographic primitives used, but also implementation, key generation and handling of keys.

NOTE 2: Multiple organizations, such as SDOs and public authorities, maintain guides and catalogues of cryptographic methods that can be used.

EXAMPLE: The device manufacturer uses a communication protocol and cryptographic library provided with the IoT platform and where that library and protocol have been assessed against feasible attacks, such as replay.

consumer: natural person who is acting for purposes that are outside her/his trade, business, craft or profession

NOTE: Organizations, including businesses of any size, use consumer IoT. For example, Smart TVs are frequently deployed in meeting rooms, and home security kits can protect the premises of small businesses.

consumer IoT device: network-connected (and network-connectable) device that has relationships to associated services and are used by the consumer typically in the home or as electronic wearables

NOTE 1: Consumer IoT devices are commonly also used in business contexts. These devices remain classified as consumer IoT devices.

NOTE 2: Consumer IoT devices are often available for the consumer to purchase in retail environments. Consumer IoT devices can also be commissioned and/or installed professionally.

critical security parameter: security-related confidential information whose disclosure or modification can compromise the security of the device

EXAMPLE: Secret cryptographic keys, authentication values such as passwords, PINs, private components of certificates.

debug interface: physical interface used by the manufacturer to communicate with the device during development or to perform triage of issues with the device and that is not used as part of the consumer-facing functionality

EXAMPLE: Test points, UART, SWD, JTAG.

defined support period: minimum length of time, expressed as a period or by an end-date, for which a manufacturer will provide security updates

NOTE: This definition focuses on security aspects and not other aspects related to product support such as warranty.

device manufacturer: entity that creates an assembled final consumer IoT product, which is likely to contain the products and components of many other suppliers

factory default: state of the device after factory reset or after final production/assembly

NOTE: This includes the physical device and software (including firmware) that is present on it after assembly.

initialization: process that activates the network connectivity of the device for operation and optionally sets authentication features for a user or for network access

initialized state: state of the device after initialization

IoT product: consumer IoT device and its associated services

isolable: able to be removed from the network it is connected to, where any functionality loss caused is related only to that connectivity and not to its main function; alternatively, able to be placed in a self-contained environment with other devices if and only if the integrity of devices within that environment can be ensured

EXAMPLE: A Smart Fridge has a touchscreen-based interface that is network-connected. This interface can be removed without stopping the fridge from keeping the contents chilled.

logical interface: virtual interface used to communicate with the device at a logical layer

NOTE 1: Typically, the semantic, syntactic, and symbolic attributes of information flows for logical interfaces are specified. There are alternative definitions for logical interfaces e.g. in ISO/IEC 16500-6:1999 [i.34] that utilize this property.

NOTE 2: A logical interface may utilize a network interface to exchange information with remote endpoints.

manufacturer: relevant economic operator in the supply chain (including the device manufacturer)

NOTE: This definition acknowledges the variety of actors involved in the consumer IoT ecosystem and the complex ways by which they can share responsibilities. Beyond the device manufacturer, such entities can also be, for example and depending on a specific case at hand: importers, distributors, integrators, component and platform providers, software providers, IT and telecommunications service providers, managed service providers and providers of associated services.

network interface: physical interface that can be used to access the functionality of consumer IoT via a network

owner: user who owns or who purchased the device

personal data: any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person

NOTE: This term is used to align with well-known terminology but has no legal meaning within the present document.

physical interface: physical port or air interface (such as radio, audio or optical) used to communicate with the device at the physical layer

EXAMPLE: Radios, ethernet ports, serial interfaces such as USB, and those used for debugging.

public security parameter: security-related public information whose modification can compromise the security of the device

EXAMPLE 1: A public key to verify the authenticity/integrity of software updates.

EXAMPLE 2: Public components of certificates.

remotely accessible: intended to be accessible from outside the local network

security module: set of hardware, software, and/or firmware that implements security functions

EXAMPLE: A device contains a hardware root of trust, a cryptographic software library that operates within a trusted execution environment, and software within the operating system that enforces security such as user separation and the update mechanism. These all make up the security module.

security update: software update that addresses security vulnerabilities either discovered by or reported to the manufacturer

NOTE: Software updates can be purely security updates if the severity of the vulnerability requires a higher priority fix.

sensitive security parameters: critical security parameters and public security parameters

software service: software component of a device that is used to support functionality

EXAMPLE: A runtime for the programming language used within the device software or a daemon that exposes an API used by the device software, e.g. a cryptographic module's API.

telemetry data: data from a device that provide information related to the usage of that device which could help the manufacturer to identify security-related issues

EXAMPLE: A consumer IoT device reports software malfunctions to the manufacturer enabling them to identify and remedy the cause.

NOTE 1: Telemetry data cover usage data, performance data, but also sensor data which facilitate the monitoring of the device's physical and environmental conditions. Therefore, telemetry data do not only help to identify security-related issues, but also help to improve the device's performance and user experience.

NOTE 2: Depending on the content of the telemetry data, telemetry data such as usage data may be considered as personal data.

unique per device: unique for each individual device of a given product class or type

user: natural person or organization

user interface: user facing interface of the consumer IoT device

EXAMPLE: Buttons, screens, speaker, audio/video recorder as part of the consumer IoT device or user facing logical interfaces such as frontends of services provided by the consumer IoT device.

vulnerability management process: course of action in which an organization addresses and remediates a disclosed vulnerability

3.2 Symbols

Void.

3.3 Abbreviations

For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:

API	Application Programming Interface
ASLR	Address Space Layout Randomization
CVD	Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure
CVRF	Common Vulnerability Reporting Framework
DDoS	Distributed Denial of Service
DSC	Dedicated Security Components
ENISA	European Union Agency for Network and Information Security
EU	European Union
GDPR	General Data Protection Regulation
GSM	Global System for Mobile communications
GSMA	GSM Association
IEEE	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IoT	Internet of Things
IP	Internet Protocol
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
JTAG	Joint Test Action Group
LAN	Local Area Network
LoRaWAN	Long Range Wide Area Network
MAC	Media Access Control
MPCVD	Multi-Party Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
NX	No eXecute
OTP	One-Time Password
OWASP	Open Web Application Security Project
QR	Quick Response
SBOM	Software Bill of Materials
SDO	Standards Development Organization
SE	Secure Elements
SSID	Service Set Identifier

STRIDE	Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of service, Elevation of privilege
SWD	Serial Wire Debug
TEE	Trusted Execution Environment
TS	Technical Specification
UART	Universal Asynchronous Receiver-Transmitter
UI	User Interface
UK	United Kingdom
USB	Universal Serial Bus
WAN	Wide Area Network

4 Implementation of the standard

The implementation of provisions in the present document is informed by risk assessment and threat modelling (such as ISO/IEC 27005:2022 [i.27] and STRIDE Threat Model [i.28]) and data protection and privacy impact assessments; that are performed by the device manufacturer and/or other relevant entities and are out of scope of the present document. For certain use cases and following risk assessment, it can be appropriate to apply additional provisions as well as those contained within the present document. In all cases, security, data protection and privacy by design and by default should be used to inform the product development process, following risk assessment, but that is out of scope of the present document.

The present document sets a security and data protection baseline; however, due to the broad landscape of consumer IoT it is recognized that the applicability of provisions is dependent on each device. The present document provides a degree of flexibility through the use of non-mandatory "should" provisions (recommendations).

The present document defines the security requirements for the device, it does not define a testing or certification method to assess the requirements against. Some methods of fulfilling the requirements in the present document can impact testing and certification making it very difficult, or even impossible, to demonstrate compliance in certain test regimes.

Testing and certification involving third party assessment is likely to require documentation, including architectural design documentation, security requirements capture and analysis, threat models and environmental assumptions, policy documentation for lifecycle management (including supply chain management), assessment certificates for any components that are used to implement functionality required in the present document. These documentation requirements will be defined by the testing regime and are out of scope of the present document. A way to assess conformance to the present document is specified in ETSI TS 103 701 [i.19].

5 Cyber security provisions for consumer IoT

5.0 Reporting implementation

Provision 5.0-1 A justification shall be recorded for each recommendation in the present document that is considered to be not applicable for or not fulfilled by the consumer IoT device.

It is recommended that the manufacturer conducts a threat modelling to identify, analyse and mitigate threats to the device.

Table B.1 provides a schema to record these justifications in a structured manner. This is to allow other stakeholders (e.g. assurance assessors, members of the supply chain, security researchers or retailers) to determine whether provisions have been applied correctly and appropriately.

EXAMPLE 1: The manufacturer publishes a completed version of table B.1 alongside the product description on their website.

EXAMPLE 2: The manufacturer completes table B.1 for internal record keeping. Sometime later, an external assurance organization assesses a product against the present document and requests information relating to the product's security design. The manufacturer can easily provide this information as it is contained within table B.1.

Cases where a provision is not applicable or not fulfilled by the consumer IoT device can include:

- when the use case of a device determines constraints in resources that prevent the implementation of certain security measures or certain security measures are not appropriate to the identified risk (security or privacy);
- where the functionality described in the provision is not included (e.g. a device that only presents data without requiring authentication);
- when the use case for the device requires compliance with additional industry or regulatory requirements that preclude compliance with the provision.

EXAMPLE 3: The consumer IoT device and associated service processes payments and is therefore required to comply with the payment card industry specifications and for transaction processing and industry and regulatory requirements for fraud monitoring. Fraud monitoring can conflict with provision 5.11-2 that recommends allowing users to be able to delete all personal data on the associated service, potentially including the records necessary to detect fraudulent activity.

5.1 No universal default passwords

Provision 5.1-1 Where passwords are used to authenticate users against the device or for machine-to-machine authentication, and in any state other than the factory default, all consumer IoT device passwords shall be unique per device or defined by the user.

NOTE 1: There are many mechanisms used for performing authentication, and passwords are not the only mechanism for authenticating a user to a device. However if they are used, following best practice on passwords is encouraged according to NIST Special Publication 800-63B [i.3].

NOTE 2: Standard pairing codes are not considered as passwords used for machine-to-machine authentication.

Many consumer IoT devices are sold with universal default usernames and passwords (such as "admin, admin") for user interfaces through to network protocols. Continued usage of universal default values has been the source of many security issues in IoT [i.17] and the practice needs to be discontinued. The above provision can be achieved by the use of pre-installed passwords that are unique per device and/or by requiring the user to choose a password that follows best practice as part of initialization, or by some other method that does not use passwords.

EXAMPLE 1: During initialization a consumer IoT device generates certificates that are used to authenticate a user to the consumer IoT device via an associated service like a mobile application.

To increase security, multi-factor authentication, such as use of a password plus OTP procedure, can be used to better protect the consumer IoT device or an associated service. Consumer IoT device security can further be strengthened by having unique and immutable identities.

Provision 5.1-2 Where pre-installed unique per device passwords are used to authenticate users against the device or for machine-to-machine authentication, these shall be generated with a mechanism that reduces the risk of automated attacks against a class or type of consumer IoT device.

EXAMPLE 2: Pre-installed passwords are sufficiently randomized.

As a counter-example, passwords with incremental counters (such as "password1", "password2" and so on) are easily guessable. Further, using a password that is related in an obvious way to public information (sent over the air or within a network), such as MAC address or Wi-Fi® SSID, can allow for password retrieval using automated means.

Provision 5.1-2A Passwords should not be used for machine-to-machine authentication.

Using human-memorable passwords for machine-to-machine authentication is generally not appropriate, but pre-shared keys can be appropriate when their use follows best practice.

Provision 5.1-3 Authentication mechanisms used to authenticate users against the consumer IoT device or used for machine-to-machine authentication shall use best practice cryptography, appropriate to the properties of the technology, operating environment, risk and usage.

Provision 5.1-4 Where a user can authenticate against a consumer IoT device, the consumer IoT device shall provide to the user or an administrator a simple mechanism to change the authentication value used.

EXAMPLE 3: For biometric authentication values the device manufacturer allows this change in authentication value through retraining against a new biometric.

EXAMPLE 4: A parent in a household creates an account on the consumer IoT device for their child and selects and manages the PIN or password that the child uses. The parent is an administrator on the consumer IoT device and can restrict the child from changing the PIN or password.

EXAMPLE 5: To make it simple for the user to change a password, the manufacturer designs the password change process in a way that it requires a minimal number of steps. The manufacturer explains the process in a user manual and in a video tutorial.

An authentication mechanism used for authenticating users, whether it be a fingerprint, password or other token, needs to have its value changeable. This is easier when this mechanism is part of the normal usage flow of the consumer IoT device.

Provision 5.1-5 The consumer IoT device shall have a mechanism available which makes successful brute-force attacks on authentication mechanisms via network interfaces impracticable unless the device has a resource constraint determined by the use case that prevents the implementation.

EXAMPLE 6: A consumer IoT device has a limitation on the number of authentication attempts within a certain time interval. It also uses increasing time intervals between attempts.

EXAMPLE 7: The client application is able to lock an account or to delay additional authentication attempts after a limited number of failed authentication attempts.

This provision addresses attacks that perform "credential stuffing" or exhaust an entire key-space. It is important that these types of attacks are detected by the consumer IoT device and defended against, whilst guarding against a related threat of "resource exhaustion" and denial of service attacks.

5.2 Implement a means to manage reports of vulnerabilities

Manufacturers that provide IoT products have a duty of care to consumers and third parties who can be harmed by their failure to have a CVD programme in place. Additionally, companies that share this information through industry bodies can assist others who can be suffering from the same problem.

Disclosures can comprise different approaches depending on the circumstances:

- Vulnerabilities related to single products or services: the problem is expected to be reported directly to the affected stakeholder (usually the device manufacturer, IoT service provider or mobile application developer). The source of these reports can be security researchers or industry peers.
- Systemic vulnerabilities: a stakeholder, such as a device manufacturer, can discover a problem that is potentially systemic. Whilst fixing it in the device manufacturer's own product is crucial, there is significant benefit to industry and consumers from sharing this information. Similarly, security researchers can also seek to report such systemic vulnerabilities. For systemic vulnerabilities, a relevant competent industry body can coordinate a wider scale response.

NOTE 1: The Common Vulnerability Reporting Framework (CVRF) [i.5] can also be useful to exchange information on security vulnerabilities.

Cyber security threat information sharing can support organizations in developing and producing secure products according to ETSI TR 103 331 [i.6].

Provision 5.2-1 The manufacturer shall make a vulnerability disclosure policy publicly available. This policy shall include, at a minimum:

- contact information for the reporting of issues; and
- timelines for initial acknowledgement of receipt of a vulnerability report; and

- timelines for when the person who reported the issue will receive status updates until the resolution of the reported issues.

NOTE 2: Different notations are possible to describe time values in the timetable (e.g. "7 days", "quickly", etc.). ETSI TR 103 838 [i.30] contains an example for a vulnerability disclosure policy including timelines for initial acknowledgement of receipt and a proposal for information on timelines for status updates until the resolution of the reported issues. The time needed to find a solution can vary depending e.g. on the criticality of the disclosed vulnerability.

A vulnerability disclosure policy clearly specifies the process through which security researchers and others are able to report issues. Such policy can be updated as necessary to further ensure transparency and clarity in the dealings of the manufacturer with security researchers, and vice versa.

Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (CVD) is a set of processes for dealing with disclosures about potential security vulnerabilities and to support the remediation of these vulnerabilities. CVD is standardized by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) in the ISO/IEC 29147 [i.4] on vulnerability disclosure. Moreover, a guide to CVD is given in ETSI TR 103 838 [i.30]. CVD has been proven to be successful in some large software companies around the world. Multi-Party Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure (MPCVD) refers to the application of CVD in a multi-stakeholder scenario, for example when products from multiple manufacturers are affected by the same vulnerability. Manufacturers can refer to the guidelines from ISO/IEC TR 5895 [i.33] and FIRST [i.32] to adapt their CVD processes accordingly.

In the IoT industry, CVD is currently not well-established [i.16] as some companies are reticent about dealing with security researchers. Here, CVD provides companies a framework to manage this process. This gives security researchers an avenue to inform companies of security issues, puts companies ahead of the threat of malicious exploitation and gives companies an opportunity to respond to and resolve vulnerabilities in advance of a public disclosure.

Provision 5.2-2 Disclosed vulnerabilities should be acted on in a timely manner.

A "timely manner" for acting on vulnerabilities varies considerably and is incident-specific; however, conventionally, the vulnerability management process is following a properly documented process including clear responsibilities and completed within 90 days for a software solution, including availability of patches and notification of the issue. A hardware fix can take considerably longer to address than a software fix. Additionally, a fix that has to be deployed to devices can take time to roll out compared with a server software fix.

Provision 5.2-3 Manufacturers should continually monitor for, identify and rectify security vulnerabilities within consumer IoT products they sell, produce, have produced and associated services they operate during the defined support period.

NOTE 3: Manufacturers are expected to exercise due care for all software and hardware components used in the product, this includes due care related to the selected third parties that provide associated services to support the functions of the product.

Software solutions often contain open source and third party software components. Creating and maintaining list of all software components and their sub-components is a pre-requisite to be able to monitor for product vulnerabilities. Various tools exist to scan source code and binaries and build a so-called Software Bill Of Materials (SBOM), which identifies third party components and the versions used in the product. This information is then used to monitor for the associated security and licensing risks of each identified software component.

Vulnerabilities are expected to be reported directly to the affected stakeholders in the first instance. If that is not possible, vulnerabilities can be reported to national authorities. Manufacturers are also encouraged to share information with competent industry bodies, such as the GSMA [i.21] and the IoT Security Foundation. Guidance on Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure is available from the IoT Security Foundation [i.22] which references ISO/IEC 29147 [i.4].

The management of vulnerabilities is expected to be performed for devices within their defined support period. However, manufacturers can continue this outside that period and release security updates to rectify vulnerabilities.

5.3 Keep software updated

Developing and deploying security updates in a timely manner is one of the most important actions a manufacturer can take to protect its customers and the wider technical ecosystem. It is good practice that all software is kept updated and well maintained.

In many cases, publishing software updates involves multiple dependencies on other organizations such as manufacturers that produce sub-components; however, this is not a reason to withhold updates. It can be useful for the manufacturer to consider the entire software supply chain in the development and deployment of security updates.

It is often advisable not to bundle security updates with more complex software updates, such as feature updates. A feature update that introduces new functionality can trigger additional requirements and delay delivery or user's acceptance of the update to consumer IoT devices.

From a user's perspective it is desirable to generally separate security from feature updates.

EXAMPLE 1: Under the EU Product Legislation, a feature update could change the intended use of a device and thus turn it into a new product, requiring a new conformity assessment to be conducted. However, a software update with limited impact could be considered a maintenance update which would not require a new conformity assessment. More information on the impact of software updates in the context of the EU Product Legislation can be found in the Blue Guide [i.13].

Each provision from 5.3-3 to 5.3-12 is dependent upon an update mechanism being implemented.

Provision 5.3-1 All software components in consumer IoT devices that are not immutable due to security reasons should be securely updateable.

NOTE 1: Managing software updates successfully generally relies on communication of version information for software components between the consumer IoT device and the manufacturer.

NOTE 2: For most devices the operating system, applications and network protocol stacks cannot be considered as immutable due to security reasons.

EXAMPLE 2: The first stage boot loader on a consumer IoT device is written once to device storage and from then on is immutable.

EXAMPLE 3: On consumer IoT devices with several microcontrollers (e.g. one for communication and one for the application) some of them might not be updateable.

Provision 5.3-2 The consumer IoT device shall have a secure update mechanism unless the device has a resource constraint determined by the use case that prevents the implementation.

NOTE 3: There are cases where provision 5.3-1 applies even where 5.3-2 does not.

NOTE 4: Use case determined resource constraints are technical constraints of a consumer IoT device that are the result of appropriate design decisions that are necessary to implement the use case of the consumer IoT device and cannot solely be justified by potential economic reasons to avoid the implementation of a secure update mechanism.

NOTE 5: Typical resource constraints that can prevent the implementation of a secure update mechanism are minimal communication bandwidth or energy supply.

EXAMPLE 4: A battery driven sensor designed to wirelessly communicate measurements with a low frequency over a for a long period of time might have use case determined resource constraints in communication bandwidth or energy supply that prevent the implementation of a secure update mechanism.

EXAMPLE 5: Design decisions for a consumer IoT device do not result in limited resources solely to avoid the costs associated with the implementation of a secure update mechanism but instead result in sufficient resources and the implementation of a secure update mechanism.

"Securely updateable" and "secure update mechanism" means that there are adequate measures to prevent an attacker misusing the update mechanism.

EXAMPLE 6: Measures can include the use of authentic software update servers, integrity protected communications channels, verifying the authenticity and integrity of software updates. It is recognized that there are great variances in software update mechanisms and what constitutes "installation".

EXAMPLE 7: An anti-rollback policy based on version checking can be used to prevent downgrade attacks.

Update mechanisms can range from the consumer IoT device downloading the update directly from a remote server, transmitted from a mobile application or transferred over a USB or other physical interface. If an attacker compromises this mechanism, it allows for a malicious version of the software to be installed on the consumer IoT device.

Provision 5.3-3 An update shall be simple for the user to apply.

The degree of simplicity depends on the design and intended usage of the consumer IoT device. Some examples can be given as follows, but are not exhaustive. An update that is simple to apply will be automatically applied, initiated using an associated service (such as a mobile application), or via a web interface on the consumer IoT device. If an update is difficult to apply, then that increases the chance that a user will repeatedly defer updating the consumer IoT device, leaving it in a vulnerable state.

Provision 5.3-4 Void.

Provision 5.3-4A One secure update mechanism should be configurable to be automated.

NOTE 6: An automated update mechanism obtains information on available updates without user interaction when having suitable network access and either installs updates without user interaction or processes available updates after user's consent with minimal user interaction.

Provision 5.3-4B During initialization the consumer IoT device should activate an automatic secure update mechanism after user's consent.

If an automatic update fails, then a user can, in some circumstances, no longer be able to use a device. Detection mechanisms such as watchdogs and the use of dual-bank flash or recovery partitions can ensure that the consumer IoT device returns to either a known good version or the factory state.

Security updates can be provided for consumer IoT devices in a preventative manner, as part of automatic updates, which can remove security vulnerabilities before they are exploited. Managing this can be complex, especially if there are parallel associated service updates, consumer IoT device updates and other service updates to deal with. Therefore, a clear management and deployment plan is beneficial to the manufacturer, as is transparency to consumers about the current state of update support.

Provision 5.3-5 The consumer IoT device or an associated service should check after initialization whether security updates are available.

EXAMPLE 8: The user could be shown the existence of updates via the interface with which the consumer IoT device is initialized.

For some products, it can be more appropriate for the associated service, rather than the consumer IoT device, to perform such checks.

Provision 5.3-6 Void.

Provision 5.3-6A If the consumer IoT device supports automated updates, the user should be able to enable and disable the automatic update mechanism and postpone the installation of updates provided via an automatic update mechanism.

Provision 5.3-6B If the consumer IoT device supports update notifications, the user should be able to enable and disable the update notifications.

It is important from a consumer rights and ownership perspective that the user is in control of whether or not they receive updates. There are good reasons why a user may choose not to update, including security. In addition, if an update is deployed and subsequently found to cause issues, manufacturers can ask users to not upgrade their software in order that those consumer IoT devices are not affected.

Provision 5.3-7 The consumer IoT device shall use best practice cryptography to facilitate secure update mechanisms.

Provision 5.3-8 Security updates shall be timely.

"Timely" in the context of security updates can vary, depending on the particular issue and fix, as well as other factors such as the ability to reach a device or considerations based on other device resource constraints. It is important that a security update that fixes a critical vulnerability (i.e. one with potentially adverse effects of a large scale) is handled with appropriate priority by the manufacturer. Once a fix is made available, users can be notified through a bulletin process or other appropriate means. Due to the complex structure of modern software and the ubiquity of communication platforms, multiple stakeholders can be involved in a security update.

EXAMPLE 9: A particular software update involves a third party vendor of software libraries, an IoT device manufacturer, and an IoT service platform operator. Collaboration between these stakeholders ensures appropriate timeliness of the software update.

Provision 5.3-9 The consumer IoT device should verify the authenticity and integrity of software updates.

A common approach for confirming that an update is valid is to verify its integrity and authenticity. This can be done on the consumer IoT device.

Provision 5.3-10 Where updates are delivered over a network interface, the consumer IoT device shall verify the authenticity and integrity of each update via a trust relationship.

NOTE 7: Valid trust relationships include: authenticated communication channels, presence on a network that requires the consumer IoT device to possess a critical security parameter or password to join, digital signature based verification of the update, or confirmation by the user.

NOTE 8: The validation of the trust relationship is essential to ensure that a non-authorized entity (e.g. consumer IoT device management platform or consumer IoT device) cannot install malicious code.

Consumer IoT devices can have power limitations that make performing cryptographic operations costly. In such cases, verification can be performed by another device that is trusted to perform this verification. The verified update would then be sent over a secure channel to the consumer IoT device. Performing verification of updates at a hub and then on the consumer IoT device, can reduce the risk of compromise.

It is good practice for a consumer IoT device to act upon the detection of an invalid and potentially malicious update. Beyond rejecting the update, and without limitation, it can report the incident to an appropriate service and/or inform the user. In addition, mitigating controls can be put in place to prevent an attacker from bypassing or misusing an update mechanism. Giving the attacker as little information as possible as part of the update mechanism reduces their ability to exploit it.

EXAMPLE 10: When a consumer IoT device detects that an update could not be delivered or applied successfully (by failing integrity or authentication checks), the consumer IoT device can mitigate information leakage by not providing any information about the failure to the initiator of the update process. However, the consumer IoT device can generate a log entry and deliver notification of the log entry to a trusted peer (e.g. a device administrator) over a secure channel, so that the occurrence of the incident is known and the owner or administrator of the consumer IoT device can make an appropriate response.

Provision 5.3-11 The user should be informed in a recognizable and apparent manner that a security update is required together with information on the risks mitigated by that update.

EXAMPLE 11: The manufacturer informs the user that an update is required via a notification on a user interface or via an email.

Provision 5.3-12 The user should be notified when the application of a software update will disrupt the basic functioning of the consumer IoT device.

This notification can include extra detail, such as the approximate expected duration for which the consumer IoT device will be offline.

EXAMPLE 12: A notification includes information about the urgency and approximate expected duration of downtime.

It can be critical for users that a consumer IoT device continues to operate during an update. This is why the provision above recommends to notify the user when an update will disrupt functionality where possible. Particularly, consumer IoT devices that fulfil a safety-relevant function are expected not to turn completely off in the case of an update; some minimal system functional capability is expected. Disruption to functionality can become a critical safety issue for some types of consumer IoT devices and systems if not considered or managed correctly.

EXAMPLE 13: During an update, a watch will continue to display the time, a home thermostat will continue to maintain a reasonable temperature and a Smart Lock will continue to lock and unlock a door.

Provision 5.3-13 The manufacturer shall publish, in an accessible way that is clear and transparent to the user, the defined support period.

When purchasing a product and throughout its lifecycle, the consumer expects this period of software update support to be made clear, e.g. publicize on the official website, etc.

Provision 5.3-14 For consumer IoT devices that cannot have their software updated, the rationale for the absence of software updates, the period and method of hardware replacement support should be published by the manufacturer in an accessible way that is clear and transparent to the user.

Provision 5.3-15 Void.

Provision 5.3-15A For devices that cannot have their software updated, the consumer IoT device should be isolable.

Provision 5.3-15B For devices that cannot have their software updated, the consumer IoT device hardware should be replaceable.

NOTE 9: Hardware is considered as replaceable when there are defined procedures to replace the hardware or hardware components esp. when critical vulnerabilities are discovered.

There are some situations where consumer IoT devices cannot be patched. For such consumer IoT devices a replacement plan needs to be in place and be clearly communicated to the consumer. This plan would typically detail a schedule for when technologies will need to be replaced and, where applicable, when support for hardware and software ends.

Provision 5.3-16 The model designation of the consumer IoT device shall be clearly recognizable, either by labelling on the consumer IoT device or via a user interface.

This is often performed by communicating with a consumer IoT device over a logical interface.

EXAMPLE 14: A consumer IoT device has a HTTP (or HTTPS when appropriate) API that reports the model designation (after user authentication).

Knowledge of the specific designation of the consumer IoT device is often required to check the defined support period of software updates or the availability of software updates.

Being able to identify devices can assist with update management. Where devices can be offline, or updates fail, tracking the update status of user devices through the associated services can assist the user in maintaining device health across all the devices they own. It is recommended that the IoT device is to be clearly recognizable by having both a model designation and a unique privacy preserving per device identifier, either by labelling on the device or via a physical and logical interface. A unique privacy preserving per device identifier could be generated by the manufacturer or could be an identifier the end user sets. and may not be accessible to anyone but the user of the device and associated services. To preserve privacy, the availability and usage of the unique identifier needs to prevent remote services unauthorized parties from either identifying or tracking the device or its users. Being able to identify devices can assist with update management.

EXAMPLE 15: A consumer IoT device is identified in a user update dashboard by a user-chosen identifier ("KitchenUnit") that describes the device's location in a way that is unique to the user, although unlikely to be unique globally, and would allow the user to identify the device from the name. This identifier is deleted when the device is reset to factory settings.

EXAMPLE 16: A consumer IoT device is identified to the update service by a serial number set by the manufacturer only. As is the only identifying information that the update service receives, there is no method by which the transfer of the device between users can be tracked or the identity of the user of the device known and tracked. This serial number is not re-used as a device identifier for any other purpose.

5.4 Securely store sensitive security parameters

Provision 5.4-1 Sensitive security parameters in persistent storage shall be stored securely by the consumer IoT device.

NOTE 1: Stored critical security parameters need adequate measures to prevent both modification and disclosure while stored public security parameters only need adequate measures to prevent modification.

Secure storage mechanisms can be used to secure sensitive security parameters. Appropriate mechanisms include those provided by a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), encrypted storage associated with the hardware, Secure Elements (SE) or Dedicated Security Components (DSC), and processing capabilities of software running on a UICC, according to ETSI TR 121 905 [i.29], ETSI TS 102 221 [i.25], embedded UICC according to GSMA SGP.22 Technical Specification v2.2.1 [i.26].

NOTE 2: This provision applies to persistent storage, but manufacturers can also implement similar approaches for sensitive security parameters in memory.

EXAMPLE 1: The root keys involved in authorization and access to licensed radio frequencies (e.g. LTE-m cellular access) are stored in a UICC.

EXAMPLE 2: A remote controlled door-lock using a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to store and access the sensitive security parameters.

EXAMPLE 3: A wireless thermostat stores the credentials for the wireless network in a tamper protected microcontroller rather than in external flash storage.

Provision 5.4-2 Where a hard-coded unique per device identity is used in a consumer IoT device for security purposes, it shall be implemented in such a way that it resists tampering by means such as physical, electrical or software.

EXAMPLE 4: A master key used for network access that is unique to the consumer IoT device is stored in UICC which is compliant to relevant ETSI standards (for example ETSI TS 102 221 [i.25]).

Provision 5.4-3 Hard-coded critical security parameters in consumer IoT device software source code shall not be used.

Reverse engineering of consumer IoT devices and applications can easily discover credentials such as hard-coded usernames and passwords in software. These credentials can also be API keys that allow usage of security-sensitive functions in a remote service, or private keys used in the security of protocols that the consumer IoT device uses to communicate. Such credentials will often be found within source-code, which is well-known bad practice. Simple obfuscation methods also used to obscure or encrypt this hard-coded information can be trivially broken.

Provision 5.4-4 Any critical security parameters used for integrity and authenticity checks of software updates and for protection of communication with associated services in consumer IoT device software shall be unique per device and shall be produced with a mechanism that reduces the risk of automated attacks against classes of consumer IoT devices.

EXAMPLE 5: A different symmetric key is deployed on every consumer IoT device of the same product class for generating and verifying message authentication codes for software updates.

EXAMPLE 6: The consumer IoT device uses the manufacturer's public key to verify a software update. This is not a critical security parameter and does not need to be unique per device.

Provisioning a consumer IoT device with unique critical security parameters helps to protect the integrity and authenticity of software updates as well as the communication of the consumer IoT device with associated services. If global critical security parameters are used, their disclosure can enable wide-scale attacks on other IoT devices such as to enable the creation of botnets.

5.5 Communicate securely

Provision 5.5-1 The consumer IoT device shall use best practice cryptography to communicate securely.

Appropriateness of security controls and the use of best practice cryptography is dependent on many factors including the properties of technology, operating environment, risk and usage context. As security is ever-evolving it is difficult to give prescriptive advice about cryptography or other security measures without the risk of such advice quickly becoming obsolete.

Provision 5.5-2 The consumer IoT device should use reviewed or evaluated implementations to deliver network and security functionalities, particularly in the field of cryptography.

Reviews and evaluations can involve an independent internal or external entity.

EXAMPLE 1: Distributed software libraries within the development and test community, certified software modules, and hardware equipment crypto-service providers (such as the Secure Element and Trust Execution Environment) are all reviewed or evaluated.

Provision 5.5-3 Cryptographic algorithms and primitives should be replaceable.

NOTE 1: This is a building block for "cryptoagility".

NOTE 2: Changing cryptographic algorithms and primitives in configuration is a security relevant change.

For devices that cannot be updated, it is important that the intended lifetime of the device does not exceed the recommended usage lifetime of cryptographic algorithms used by the device (including key sizes).

The concept of cryptoagility may cover different aspects such as hardware resources of the consumer IoT device including cryptographic hardware accelerators, background infrastructures such as PKIs and development or design processes that anticipate the lifetime of cryptographic algorithms and primitives.

Provision 5.5-4 Access to consumer IoT device functionality via a network interface in the initialized state should only be possible after authentication on that interface.

NOTE 3: Functionality can vary significantly on the use case and can encompass a range of things, including access to personal data and device actuators.

There are consumer IoT devices that provide public, open data for example in the Web of Things [i.18]. These consumer IoT devices are accessible without authentication to provide open access to all.

There are consumer IoT devices that include the ability to make data or services publicly available within a restricted network. These devices will often make assumptions about the network connectivity and/or the sensitivity of the data which is being made publicly available as part of their expected use.

EXAMPLE 2: Smart TV's, expecting to be in a user's home network, can make recorded media publicly available without user authentication but access restricted to the home network only via services such as DLNA.

The consumer IoT device can be compromised via vulnerabilities in network services. A suitable authentication mechanism can protect against unauthorized access and can contribute to defence-in-depth in the consumer IoT device.

Provision 5.5-5 Consumer IoT device functionality that allows security-relevant changes in configuration via a network interface shall only be accessible after authentication. The exception is for network service protocols that are relied upon by the consumer IoT device and where the manufacturer cannot guarantee what configuration will be required for the consumer IoT device to operate.

NOTE 4: Protocols that are an exception include ARP, DHCP, DNS, ICMP, and NTP.

EXAMPLE 3: Security-relevant changes include permission management, configuration of network keys and password changes.

Provision 5.5-6 Critical security parameters should be encrypted in transit, with such encryption appropriate to the properties of the technology, risk and usage.

Provision 5.5-7 The consumer IoT device shall protect the confidentiality of critical security parameters that are communicated via remotely accessible network interfaces.

Many different methods exist for enrolment and authentication. Some authentication values are provided by out-of-band authentication mechanisms, such as a QR code, and some are human-readable, such as a password.

Where an authentication mechanism uses unique values per authentication attempt (e.g. in a challenge-response mechanism or when using one time passwords as a second factor), the response is not the authentication value itself. However, it is still good practice to apply confidentiality protection to those values.

Confidentiality protection can be achieved using an encrypted communication channel or payload encryption. This is often done using protocols or algorithms at least as strong as the key material transmitted, however other mitigations, such as the need for close proximity, are available.

NOTE 5: Confidentiality protection often includes integrity protection according to best practice cryptography.

Provision 5.5-8 The manufacturer shall follow secure management processes for critical security parameters that relate to the consumer IoT device and for the entire lifecycle of the critical security parameters.

The use of open, peer-reviewed standards for critical security parameters (commonly referred to as "key management") is strongly encouraged.

5.6 Minimize exposed attack surfaces

The "principle of least privilege" is a foundation stone of good security engineering, applicable to IoT as much as in any other field of application.

Provision 5.6-1 All unused network interfaces and all unused logical interfaces that are accessible through a network interface shall be disabled.

Disabling unused network and logical interfaces can significantly reduce the attack surface of a consumer IoT device. These interfaces may have been used only during the development phase of the device and are no longer required for normal operation, or may be specific to certain environments or purposes. By default, these interfaces are to be disabled before the device is made available to the public. The disabling can be realized for example by appropriate access control mechanisms that are for example preventing unauthorized access to or misuse of the unused interfaces. However, users may have the ability to manually enable any disabled interface that is required for their specific usage. In such a case it is to be ensured that the enabling capability cannot be misused easily, e.g. by appropriate access control and authentication mechanisms.

EXAMPLE 1: An administrative UI that is supposed to be accessed from the LAN is not accessible from the WAN by default.

EXAMPLE 2: A Direct Firmware Update (DFU) service exposed over Bluetooth® Low Energy is used for development but not expected to be used in production. It is disabled in the final product.

Provision 5.6-2 In the initialized state, the network interfaces of the consumer IoT device shall minimize the unauthenticated disclosure of security-relevant information.

Security-relevant information can be exposed over a network interface as part of the initialization process. When security-relevant information is shared by a consumer IoT device when establishing a connection, it can be used by attackers to identify vulnerable devices.

EXAMPLE 3: When finding vulnerable devices throughout the whole IP address space, security-relevant information could be information about the device configuration, kernel version or software version.

Provision 5.6-3 Consumer IoT device hardware should not unnecessarily expose physical interfaces to attack.

Physical interfaces can be used by an attacker to compromise firmware or memory on a consumer IoT device. "Unnecessarily" refers to the manufacturer's assessment of the benefits of an open interface, used for user functionality or for debugging purposes.

EXAMPLE 4: A micro-USB port meant to be used to power the consumer IoT device only is physically configured so as not to also allow command or debug operations.

Provision 5.6-4 Void.

Provision 5.6-4A Debug interfaces shall be disabled or protected via a best practice authentication or access control mechanism.

Debug interfaces are commonly used by manufacturers during the development and testing phases of the consumer IoT device's lifecycle. However, when placing the consumer IoT device on the market, it is crucial to ensure that potential attackers cannot misuse debug interfaces to compromise the consumer IoT device's security. To achieve this, the debug interfaces are to be disabled in software by default, using any means that prevent potential attackers from operating the device in debugging mode, which would allow them to modify the device's code, including its security mechanisms. It is to be impossible for the user of the consumer IoT device to enable any disabled debug interface that is not considered to be required for the consumer IoT device's lifecycle. However, if the debug interface is intermittently required after the consumer IoT device is being placed on the market, it would be enough if the interface is disabled in software by default but can be enabled, when required. In such a case it is to be ensured that the enabling capability cannot be misused easily, e.g. by appropriate access control and authentication mechanisms.

EXAMPLE 5: A UART serial interface is disabled through the bootloader software on the consumer IoT device. No logon prompt and no interactive menu is available due to this disabling.

Provision 5.6-4B Debug interfaces that are physical ports should be physically protected by the device.

EXAMPLE 6: A device casing prevents accessing a UART serial interface without opening the casing with tools or breaking the casing.

NOTE 1: If a debug interface has been disabled, it is not necessary to physically protect it.

Provision 5.6-5 The manufacturer should only enable software services that are used or required for the intended use or operation of the consumer IoT device.

EXAMPLE 7: The manufacturer does not provision the consumer IoT device with any background processes, kernel extensions, commands, programs or tools that are not required for the intended use.

Provision 5.6-6 Code should be minimized to the functionality necessary for the consumer IoT device to operate.

EXAMPLE 8: "Dead" or unused code is removed and not considered to be benign.

Provision 5.6-7 Software should run with least necessary privileges, taking account of both security and functionality.

EXAMPLE 9: Minimal daemons/processes run with "root" privileges. In particular the processes that use network interfaces require unprivileged users rather than requiring a "root" user.

EXAMPLE 10: Applications running on a consumer IoT device that includes a multi-user operating system (e.g. Linux[®]) use different users for each component or service.

NOTE 2: Linux[®] is the registered trademark of Linus Torvalds in the U.S. and other countries.

Software attacks on consumer IoT devices that aim to corrupt memory can be mitigated through mechanisms such as stack canaries, Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR). The manufacturer can use platform security features where they are available to help further reduce the risk. Reducing privileges that they run at and minimizing code also helps to mitigate this risk.

Provision 5.6-8 The consumer IoT device should include a hardware-level access control mechanism for memory.

Software exploits often use the lack of access control in memory to execute malicious code. Access control mechanisms limit whether data in memory on the consumer IoT device can be executed. Suitable mechanisms include technologies such as MMUs or MPUs, executable space protection (e.g. NX bits), memory tagging, and trusted execution environments.

Provision 5.6-9 The manufacturer should follow secure development processes for software deployed on the consumer IoT device.

Secure development processes, including using version control, or enabling security-related compiler options (e.g. stack protection) can help ensure software artefacts are more secure. Manufacturers can use these options when using toolchains that support them.

5.7 Ensure software integrity

Provision 5.7-1 The consumer IoT device should verify its software using secure boot mechanisms.

A hardware root of trust is one way to provide strong attestation as part of a secure boot mechanism. A hardware root of trust is a component of a system from which all other components derive their "trust" - i.e. the source of cryptographic trust within that system. To fulfil its function, the hardware root of trust is reliable and resistant to both physical and logical tampering, as there is no mechanism to determine that the component has failed or been altered. By utilizing a hardware root of trust, a consumer IoT device can have confidence in results of cryptographic functions, such as those utilized for secure boot. A hardware root of trust can be either backed by mechanisms used for secure storage of credentials or other alternatives providing baseline levels of security assurance proportionate to the required level of security for a given consumer IoT device.

Provision 5.7-2 If an unauthorized change is detected to the software, the consumer IoT device should alert the user and/or administrator to the issue and should not connect to wider networks than those necessary to perform the alerting function.

The ability to recover remotely from unauthorized changes can rely on a known good state, such as locally storing a known good version to enable safe recovery and updating of the consumer IoT device. This will avoid denial of service and costly recalls or maintenance visits, whilst managing the risk of potential takeover of the consumer IoT device by an attacker subverting update or other network communications mechanisms.

If a consumer IoT device detects an unauthorized change to its software, it will be able to inform the right stakeholder. In some cases, consumer IoT devices can have the ability to be in administration mode.

EXAMPLE: A thermostat in a room can have a user mode; this mode prevents changing of other settings. If an unauthorized change to software is detected, an alert to the administrator is appropriate, as the administrator has the ability to act on the alert (whereas a user does not).

5.8 Ensure that personal data is secure

Associated services in the following context are typically cloud services. Moreover these services are controlled or can be influenced by the manufacturer. These services typically are not operated by the user.

The following provisions also refer to confidentiality protection that often includes integrity protection according to best practice cryptography.

Provision 5.8-1 The confidentiality of personal data transiting between the consumer IoT device and associated services should be protected with best practice cryptography, appropriate to the properties of the technology, operating environment, risk and usage.

Provision 5.8-2 The confidentiality of sensitive personal data communicated between the consumer IoT device and associated services shall be protected with best practice cryptography, appropriate to the properties of the technology, operating environment, risk and usage.

NOTE: In the context of this provision, "sensitive personal data" is data whose disclosure has a high potential to cause harm to the individual. What is to be treated as "sensitive personal data" varies across products and use cases, but examples are: video stream of a home security camera, payment information, content of communication data and timestamped location data. Carrying out security and data protection impact assessments can help the manufacturer make appropriate choices.

Provision 5.8-3 All external sensing capabilities of the consumer IoT device shall be documented in an accessible way that is clear and transparent for the user.

EXAMPLE: An external sensing capability can be an optic or acoustic sensor.

Clause 6 of the present document contains provisions specific to protecting personal data.

5.9 Make systems resilient to outages

The aim of the provisions in the present clause is to ensure that IoT services are kept up and running as the adoption of IoT devices across all aspects of a consumer's life increases, including in functions that are relevant to personal safety. It is important to note that safety-related regulations can apply, but the key is to avoid making outages the cause of impact on the user and to design products and services that provide a level of resilience to these challenges.

Provision 5.9-1 Resilience should be built in to consumer IoT products, taking into account the possibility of outages of data networks and power.

Provision 5.9-2 Consumer IoT devices should remain operating and locally functional in the case of a loss of network access and should recover cleanly in the case of restoration of a loss of power.

NOTE: "Recovering cleanly" normally involves resuming connectivity and functionality in the same or improved state.

Provision 5.9-3 The consumer IoT device should connect to networks in an expected, operational and stable state and in an orderly fashion, taking the capability of the infrastructure into consideration.

EXAMPLE 1: A Smart Home loses connection to the internet following a power outage. When the network connection is restored, the consumer IoT devices in the home reconnect after a randomized delay to minimize network utilization.

EXAMPLE 2: After making an update available, the manufacturer notifies consumer IoT devices in batches to prevent them all simultaneously downloading the update.

IoT systems and devices are relied upon by consumers for increasingly important use cases that can be safety-relevant or life-impacting. Keeping services running locally if there is a loss of network is one of the measures that can be taken to increase resilience. Other measures can include building redundancy into associated services as well as mitigations against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks or signalling storms, which can be caused by mass-reconnections of consumer IoT devices following an outage. It is expected that the level of resilience necessary is proportionate and determined by usage, with consideration given to others that rely on the system, service or consumer IoT device given that an outage can have a wider impact than expected.

Orderly reconnection means in a manner that takes explicit steps to avoid simultaneous requests, such as for software updates or reconnections, from a large number of IoT devices. Such explicit steps can include the introduction of a random delay before a reconnection attempt according to an incremental back-off mechanism.

5.10 Examine system telemetry data

Provision 5.10-1 If telemetry data is collected from consumer IoT products, such as usage and measurement data, it should be examined for security anomalies.

EXAMPLE 1: Security anomalies can be represented by a deviation from normal behaviour of the consumer IoT device, as expressed by the monitored indicators, for example an abnormal increase of failed login attempts.

EXAMPLE 2: Telemetry from multiple devices allows a manufacturer to notice that updates are failing due to invalid software update authenticity checks.

Examining telemetry, including log data, is useful for security evaluation and allows for unusual circumstances to be identified early and dealt with, minimizing security risk and allowing quick mitigation of problems.

Clause 6 of the present document contains provisions specific to protecting personal data when telemetry data is collected.

5.11 Make it easy for users to delete user data

In the following, the term "delete" refers to the software-based process of making data no longer present, accessible or recognizable.

The simplest form of deleting data is to free up the occupied space by using the respective file system. The data remain on the storage system until the respective space is being reused and overwritten. A stronger form of deletion is "erasure", a deliberate process with the aim of making it impractical to recover the data; e.g. by overwriting the data.

Consumer IoT devices often change ownership and will eventually be recycled or disposed of. Mechanisms can be provided that allow the consumer to remain in control and delete personal data from services, devices and applications. When a consumer wishes to completely delete their personal data, they also expect retrospective deletion of backup copies.

Deleting personal data from a device or service is often not simply achieved by resetting a device back to its factory default state. There are many use cases where the consumer is not the owner of a device, but wishes to delete their own personal data from the device and all associated services such as cloud services or mobile applications.

EXAMPLE: A user can have temporary usage of consumer IoT products within a rented apartment. Carrying out a factory reset of the product can delete configuration settings or disable the device to the detriment of the apartment owner and a future user. A factory reset, deleting all data from the IoT device, would not be an appropriate way to delete the personal data of a single user in a shared use context such as this.

NOTE 1: Annex A of the present document contains an example model of device states including data storage for each state.

Deletion functionality is intended especially for situations when there is a transfer of ownership, when the consumer wishes to delete personal data, when the consumer wishes to delete a service from the device and/or when the consumer wishes to dispose of the device. It is expected that such functionality is compliant to applicable data protection law, including the GDPR [i.7].

Deleting personal data "easily" means that minimal steps are required to complete that action that each involve minimal complexity.

Such a deletion functionality can potentially present an attack vector.

Provision 5.11-1 Users shall be provided with functionality such that all their user data can be erased from the consumer IoT device in a simple manner.

NOTE 2: User data in this context means all individual data which is stored on the IoT device including personal data, user configuration and cryptographic material such as user passwords or keys.

NOTE 3: User data in this context refers to the data that is created by the user or generated by the device as a result of user activity (e.g. event logs). It does not include data that would be present prior to the user's first usage of the device.

Provision 5.11-2 The consumer should be provided with functionality on the consumer IoT device such that personal data can be deleted from associated services in a simple manner.

Provision 5.11-3 Users should be given clear instructions on how to delete and where possible to erase their personal data from the device and associated services.

Provision 5.11-4 Users should be provided with clear confirmation that personal data has been deleted and where possible erased from devices and associated services.

5.12 Make installation and maintenance of devices easy

Provision 5.12-1 Installation and maintenance of consumer IoT should involve minimal decisions by the user and should follow security best practice on usability.

EXAMPLE 1: The user uses a wizard to setup the consumer IoT device where a subset of configuration options is presented with the common defaults already specified and with appropriate security options already turned on by default.

Security issues caused by consumer confusion or misconfiguration can be reduced and sometimes eliminated by properly addressing complexity and poor design in user interfaces.

EXAMPLE 2: The user is able to restore the IoT product to a factory default state from the product itself or its associated services.

EXAMPLE 3: The IoT product through its associated services applies configuration changes to any selected IoT Devices owned by the consumer.

Provision 5.12-2 The manufacturer should provide users with guidance on how to securely set up their consumer IoT device.

However, the ideal is for a process that involves the minimum of human intervention and which achieves a secure configuration automatically.

Clear guidance to users on how to configure consumer IoT devices securely can also reduce their exposure to threats. An inventory of the IoT Devices in an IoT Product can be visible from the associated services including version, applied patches and updates for the user's convenience.

Provision 5.12-3 The manufacturer should provide users with guidance on how to check whether their consumer IoT device is securely set up and maintained in a secure state.

In the general case, the average overhead of securely setting up a consumer IoT device is higher than the average overhead of checking whether a consumer IoT device is securely setup. The check of a secure setup, from a process standpoint, can be undertaken in large part by the manufacturer through an automated process that communicates with the consumer IoT device remotely. Part of such an automated process could include validation of the consumer IoT device's capacity to establish a secure communication channel.

The manufacturer can help consumers keep their device secure by providing or communicating updated security information (i.e. terms of service, features, guidelines, instructions and notifications, etc.), in simple language and timely manner.

5.13 Validate input data

Provision 5.13-1 Void.

Provision 5.13-1A Data input at application layer to the device via user interfaces shall be validated by the device regarding unexpected data input to prevent system manipulations and failures.

EXAMPLE 1: Manipulation of the integrated database via SQL injection over a user interface is mitigated via discarding invalid data input.

Systems can be subverted by incorrectly formatted data or code transferred across different types of interface. Automated tools such as fuzzers can be used by attackers or testers to exploit potential gaps and weaknesses that emerge as a result of not validating data.

EXAMPLE 2: The consumer IoT device receives data that is not of the expected type, for example executable code rather than user inputted text. The software on the consumer IoT device has been written so that the input is parameterized or "escaped", preventing this code from being run.

Provision 5.13-1B Data input at application layer to the device via network interfaces shall be validated by the device regarding unexpected data input to prevent system manipulations and failures.

NOTE: This includes network accessible APIs without prior authentication and network accessible APIs for authentication mechanisms.

EXAMPLE 3: Out of range data is received by a temperature sensor. Rather than trying to process this input, the consumer IoT device identifies that the data are outside of the possible bounds, discards the data and captures the event as telemetry data.

6 Data protection provisions for consumer IoT

Many consumer IoT devices process personal data. Consumers have an expectation that they will be able to protect their personal data by configuring IoT device and associated service functionality appropriately. Hence, it is expected that manufacturers provide features within consumer IoT devices that support the protection of such personal data. In addition, there exist laws and regulations that relate to the protection of personal data in consumer IoT devices (for example the GDPR [i.7]). The present document intends to help manufacturers of consumer IoT devices provide a number of features for the protection of personal data from a strictly technical perspective.

Provision 6-1 The manufacturer shall provide consumers with clear and transparent information about what personal data is processed and for what purposes, by whom, and for how long, for each consumer IoT device and associated service. This also applies to third parties that can be involved, including advertisers.

EXAMPLE 1: This information could be provided by the manufacturer in a privacy policy.

EXAMPLE 2: A smart health tracker app stores medical information (sleep profiles, pulse readings, blood pressure), and activity information (step counts, running speed and location), from paired smart fitness devices belonging to the user. This information is provided in a centralized service in order for users to track their training activities and change in fitness over time. This data is held by the manufacturer as the provider of the service, it is not made available to any third parties except as regulated by law. The data is retained until either the user deletes it, or the user's account is deactivated (after 90 days of inactivity or by user action).

To support the information to the user, the manufacturer has a process in place to inform the user with a notification if personal data was compromised as described by the vulnerability management process.

Provision 6-2 Where personal data will be processed on the basis of consumers' consent, the consumer IoT device shall provide a means to acquire this consent in a valid way.

Obtaining consent "in a valid way" normally involves giving consumers a free, obvious and explicit opt-in choice of whether their personal data can be used for a specified purpose (see also the ETSI TR 103 621 [i.31] for some examples).

Provision 6-3 Void.

Provision 6-3A Where personal data will be processed on the basis of consumers' consent, the consumer IoT device shall provide a means to withdraw this consent at any time.

Provision 6-3B Where personal data will be processed on the basis of consumers' consent, the consumer IoT device shall provide a means of storing information about this consent.

EXAMPLE 3: The device stores timestamps indicating when consent was given or withdrawn, and the data processing purposes covered by the consent.

Provision 6-4 If telemetry data is collected from consumer IoT products, the processing of personal data should be limited to that which is necessary for the intended functionality identified in provision 6-5.

Some telemetry cannot be easily collected without a risk of personal data collection (e.g. crash dumps). Where telemetry data could contain personal data, the use of techniques such as data anonymization can reduce the risk of personal data compromise if the processing does not require the personal data.

Provision 6-5 If telemetry data is collected from consumer IoT products, consumers shall be provided with information on what telemetry data is collected, how it is being used, by whom, and for what purposes.

Provision 6-6 Data stored and processed on a consumer IoT device, or made available to an associated service by the consumer IoT device, for purposes identified in provision 6-1 shall be limited to that which is necessary for the purpose for which it is being collected or processed, and deleted once no longer necessary for any of the purposes identified.

EXAMPLE 4: A smart TV stores user viewing history and user program ratings in order to suggest programs of interest to the user and save them for later viewing. The viewing history is stored on the device for up to 1 year, after which it is deemed no longer relevant for this purpose and deleted. User ratings are retained indefinitely on the device but can be deleted by the user. The programs automatically saved are replaced after 28 days by default, with the user able to configure their own retention policy, including indefinite retention. The viewing history is also made available to the operator by the device for the purpose of improving suggestions only if the user has consented to this collection.

Provision 6-7 When the purpose of data collection from consumer IoT devices, or processing on the consumer IoT device, is solely to compute an aggregate result, the data collected should be the minimum required to compute the aggregate, the aggregation should happen as early as possible, and the retention of both collected data and the resulting aggregate should be minimized.

EXAMPLE 5: Federated learning and analytics enable multiple devices to collaboratively train machine learning models or compute data queries, under the coordination of a central server. Each device's raw data is stored locally and not exchanged or transferred; instead, focused updates intended for immediate aggregation are uploaded to achieve the learning objective.

Provision 6-8 Data anonymization technologies should be used to protect privacy during data collection, processing and storage.

EXAMPLE 6: IoT devices may locally add protective noise to data before sending it to centralized aggregators or processing coordinators.

Annex A (informative): Basic concepts and models

A.1 Architecture

A consumer IoT device is a collection of hardware and software components, generally with physical interfaces which can also be network interfaces. A general example and a specific "Smart Speaker" sophisticated example are shown below in figure A.1. These architectures are informative and it is not expected that a consumer IoT device would have all or some of the components pictured.




Figure A.1: Examples of a general architecture of a consumer IoT device and of an architecture for a Smart Speaker

Consumer IoT deployed in the home will often consist of a variety of consumer IoT devices with or without resource constraints that will be connected to the LAN, either directly through IP connectivity, such as over Ethernet or Wi-Fi®, or indirectly via a gateway or hub. This indirect connection to the LAN will generally use non-IP connectivity (e.g. protocols based on IEEE 802.15.4 [i.24]). A router will then connect the LAN to the WAN (i.e. the Internet). In some cases, however, a consumer IoT device within the home can connect directly to the WAN over other non-IP or IP connections (such as GSM or LoRaWAN).

Consumer IoT devices in the home will often connect outwards to (or be connected into by) online or local services. In the present document those that are included by the manufacturer (for example telemetry, or a companion mobile application) or that have to be installed as part of the initialization are classed as associated services - in cases where the user chooses to install a service, or access external content then these would not count as associated services. For example, some scenarios:

- websites accessed via a consumer IoT device's browser are likely to not be associated services as the user is deciding to access them, not the developer of the consumer IoT device software;
- software applications (such as an "app" that might be installed on a Smart TV) that run on a consumer IoT device; if they are installed by default and the user cannot easily delete them, then they would generally be classified as associated services. If, however, they are installed through a store at the choice of the user, then they would not be associated;
- connecting to a telemetry platform would be an associated service as this is usually pre-configured by the device manufacturer.

Figure A.2 provides an example of an architecture for this model of deployment. The "home" boundary represents the approximate extent of the scope defined for the present document - including communication to associated services.




Figure A.2: Example of a reference architecture for consumer IoT deployment in a home environment

Figure A.3 shows an example, realistic, deployment of consumer IoT within a home. The following use-cases illustrate how this setup would be used and clarify what would and would not be covered under definitions:

- The Smart TV communicates with two external services. The first is the Device Telemetry Service (an associated service); this captures, with user permission, information from the TV such as crash logs and data on usage to enable the developers to fix software defects and prioritize development of new functionality. The Smart TV also connects to a Video Sharing Service through an application downloaded by the user after initialization. This Video Sharing Service enables a user to watch entertainment via a third-party application, which is installable within the operating system used by the TV. This streaming service would not be an associated service.

- The Gateway provides access to a variety of consumer IoT devices with resource constraints, including an IEEE 802.15.4 [i.24] mesh network and a Light Sensor, used to monitor and manage the home. It connects to a Cloud Access Service that enables the user to control their Smart Lock remotely and see data from sensors. This is an associated service.
- The Smart Fridge has a web browser installed; this allows the user to view headlines from a news website while nearby. The news website would not be an associated service.
- The Weather Sensor is used by the user to check the temperature outside their home. As it is physically remote from the home itself it is unable to connect to the LAN. Instead it communicates via GSM directly to the WAN. The service the Weather Sensor connects to is an associated service.




Figure A.3: Example architecture of a consumer IoT deployment

A.2 Device states

Decommissioning consumer IoT devices is out of scope of the present document. A decommissioned consumer IoT device is in a state where sensitive data is not present. A consumer IoT device (from manufacturing to decommissioning) will transition between several states. These transitions are illustrated in figure A.4, to make clear how the defined states could be used in a consumer IoT device. In this model, a decommissioned consumer IoT device would be in the Factory Default state, as the Factory Reset process is likely to be the process used to remove all user data and configuration.

EXAMPLE: When decommissioned, a consumer IoT device can be recycled, resold or destroyed.




Figure A.4: State diagram for consumer IoT device states

Within these states, figure A.5 shows an example model for what data would be stored within an arbitrary consumer IoT device. It is not expected that this would be the same for every case.




Figure A.5: Model of example device storage in states

A.3 Interfaces

The present document defines and makes use of several types of interfaces, illustrated in figure A.6. Physical interfaces such as:

- antennas or RJ45 sockets for communication via a network;
- serial communication interfaces for debugging purposes e.g. via JTAG or UART; or
- interfaces for wired point-to-point connections e.g. via USB;

enable communication on physical layer. Logical interfaces such as web interfaces for users, APIs for other devices or (associated) services or provided by network stacks typically make use of physical interfaces for communication. User interfaces either enable direct interaction with the user e.g. via buttons, screens, speaker or audio/video recorder or are implemented as logical interfaces accessible via physical interfaces.




Figure A.6: Model illustrating interfaces

Annex B (informative): Implementation conformance statement pro forma

Notwithstanding the provisions of the copyright clause related to the text of the present document, ETSI grants that users of the present document can freely reproduce the pro forma in the present annex so that it can be used for its intended purposes and can further publish the completed annex including table B.1.

Table B.1 can provide a mechanism for the user of the present document (who is expected to be an entity involved in the development or manufacturing of consumer IoT) to give information about the implementation of the provisions within the present document.

The reference column gives reference to the provisions in the present document.

The status column indicates the status of a provision. The following notations are used:

M	The provision is a mandatory requirement
R	The provision is a recommendation
C	The provision is conditional. If the condition is not satisfied, the provision can be marked as N/A in an implementation conformance statement.
F	This provision applies to a feature, capability or mechanism. The existence of the feature, capability or mechanism is not determined to be mandatory/recommended by the provision. If the feature, capability or mechanism does not exist, the provision can be marked as N/A in an implementation conformance statement.

NOTE 1: Where the Feature (F) notation is used, the provision applies to all instances of the feature. The feature, capability or mechanisms are identified by the lettered footnotes at the bottom of the table with references provided for the relevant provisions.

NOTE 2: Where the Conditional (C) notation is used, this is conditional on the text of the provision. The conditions are provided in the numbered footnotes at the bottom of the table with references provided for the relevant provisions to help with clarity.

The support column can be filled in by the user of the present document. The following notations are used:

Y	The provision is supported by the implementation
N	The provision is not supported by the implementation
N/A	The provision is not applicable, either because a condition is not satisfied, or because a feature, capability or mechanism the provision applies to does not exist.

The detail column can be filled in by the user of the present document:

- If a provision is supported by the implementation, the entry in the detail column is to contain information on the measures that have been implemented to achieve support.
- If a provision is not supported by the implementation, the entry in the detail column is to contain information on the reasons why implementation is not possible or not appropriate.
- If a provision is not applicable, the entry in the detail column is to contain the rationale for this determination.

Table B.1: Implementation of provisions for consumer IoT security

Clause number and title			
Reference	Status	Support	Detail
5.0 Reporting implementation			
Provision 5.0-1	M		
5.1 No universal default passwords			
Provision 5.1-1	M F (a)		
Provision 5.1-2	M F (b)		
Provision 5.1-2A	R		
Provision 5.1-3	M F (c)		
Provision 5.1-4	M F (d)		
Provision 5.1-5	M C F (14, e)		
5.2 Implement a means to manage reports of vulnerabilities			
Provision 5.2-1	M		
Provision 5.2-2	R		
Provision 5.2-3	R		
5.3 Keep software updated			
Provision 5.3-1	R F (f)		
Provision 5.3-2	M C (15)		
Provision 5.3-3	M F (g)		
Provision 5.3-4A	R F (g)		
Provision 5.3-4B	R F (h)		
Provision 5.3-5	R F (g)		
Provision 5.3-6A	R F (h)		
Provision 5.3-6B	R F (i)		
Provision 5.3-7	M F (g)		
Provision 5.3-8	M C (12)		
Provision 5.3-9	R F (g)		
Provision 5.3-10	M F (j)		
Provision 5.3-11	R C (12)		
Provision 5.3-12	R C (12)		
Provision 5.3-13	M		
Provision 5.3-14	R C (3)		
Provision 5.3-15A	R C (3)		
Provision 5.3-15B	R C (3)		
Provision 5.3-16	M		
5.4 Securely store sensitive security parameters			
Provision 5.4-1	M F (k)		
Provision 5.4-2	M F (l)		
Provision 5.4-3	M		
Provision 5.4-4	M F (m)		
5.5 Communicate securely			
Provision 5.5-1	M		
Provision 5.5-2	R		
Provision 5.5-3	R		
Provision 5.5-4	R		
Provision 5.5-5	M F (n)		
Provision 5.5-6	R F (o)		
Provision 5.5-7	M F (o)		
Provision 5.5-8	M C (16)		
5.6 Minimize exposed attack surfaces			
Provision 5.6-1	M F (p)		
Provision 5.6-2	M		
Provision 5.6-3	R		
Provision 5.6-4A	M F (q)		
Provision 5.6-4B	R F (r)		
Provision 5.6-5	R		
Provision 5.6-6	R		
Provision 5.6-7	R		
Provision 5.6-8	R		
Provision 5.6-9	R		
5.7 Ensure software integrity			
Provision 5.7-1	R		
Provision 5.7-2	R F (s)		

Clause number and title			
Reference	Status	Support	Detail
5.8 Ensure that personal data is secure			
Provision 5.8-1	R F (t)		
Provision 5.8-2	M F (u)		
Provision 5.8-3	M F (v)		
5.9 Make systems resilient to outages			
Provision 5.9-1	R		
Provision 5.9-2	R		
Provision 5.9-3	R		
5.10 Examine system telemetry data			
Provision 5.10-1	R F (w)		
5.11 Make it easy for users to delete user data			
Provision 5.11-1	M		
Provision 5.11-2	R F (x)		
Provision 5.11-3	R		
Provision 5.11-4	R		
5.12 Make installation and maintenance of devices easy			
Provision 5.12-1	R		
Provision 5.12-2	R		
Provision 5.12-3	R		
5.13 Validate input data			
Provision 5.13-1A	M		
Provision 5.13-1B	M		
6 Data protection provisions for consumer IoT			
Provision 6.1	M		
Provision 6.2	M F (y)		
Provision 6.3A	M F (y)		
Provision 6.3B	M F (y)		
Provision 6.4	R F (w)		
Provision 6.5	M F (w)		
Provision 6.6	M F (z)		
Provision 6.7	R F (aa)		
Provision 6.8	R F (z)		
Condition:			
3) software components are not updateable;			
12) an update mechanism is implemented;			
14) the consumer IoT device has no resource constraint determined by the use case that prevents the implementation of a mechanism which makes successful brute-force attacks on authentication mechanisms via network interfaces impracticable;			
15) the consumer IoT device has no resource constraint determined by the use case that prevents the implementation of an update mechanism;			
16) existence of critical security parameters that relate to the consumer IoT device;			
Feature, capability or mechanism that needs to be present for the corresponding provision to apply:			
a) passwords can be used to authenticate users against the device or for machine-to-machine authentication;			
b) pre-installed unique per device passwords can be used to authenticate users against the device or for machine-to-machine authentication;			
c) cryptographic authentication mechanisms, including password based mechanisms, can be used to authenticate users against the consumer IoT device or for machine-to-machine authentication;			
d) authentication mechanisms can be used to authenticate users against the consumer IoT device;			
e) authentication mechanisms can be used for authenticating users or devices via network interfaces;			
f) software components that are not immutable due to security reasons;			
g) software components of the device can be updated;			
h) automatic software updates are supported;			
i) update notifications are provided when software updates are available;			
j) software updates can be delivered over a network interface;			
k) sensitive security parameters exist in persistent storage;			
l) hard-coded unique per device identities are used in the consumer IoT device for security purposes;			
m) critical security parameters are used for integrity or authenticity checks of software updates or for protection of communication with associated services;			
n) the consumer IoT device allows security-relevant changes in configuration via a network interface;			
o) critical security parameters used by the device can be communicated outside of the device;			
p) unused network or network accessible logical interfaces exist;			
q) debug interfaces exist on the device;			
r) debug interfaces that are physical ports exist on the device;			

Clause number and title			
Reference	Status	Support	Detail
s)			secure boot or other mechanism to detect unauthorized changes to IoT device software are supported by the device;
t)			the consumer IoT device sends personal data to associated services;
u)			the consumer IoT device sends sensitive personal data to associated services;
v)			the consumer IoT device includes external sensing capabilities;
w)			telemetry data can be collected from consumer IoT devices and products;
x)			personal data can be stored by an associated service;
y)			the consumer IoT device processes personal data on the basis of consumers' consent;
z)			the consumer IoT device processes personal data;
aa)			capabilities to collect data from consumer IoT devices or to processed data on the consumer IoT device, whose purpose is solely to compute an aggregate result.

Annex C (informative): Change history

Date	Version	Information about changes
February 2019	1.1.1	Publication as ETSI TS 103 645
June 2020	2.1.1	Publication as ETSI EN 303 645 Transposition into an EN and expansion to 68 provisions
June 2020	2.1.2	Publication as ETSI TS 103 645 - same technical content as ETSI EN 303 645 v2.1.1
January 2024	3.1.1	Publication as ETSI TS 103 645 – revision to improve applicability and testability

History

Document history		
V1.1.1	February 2019	Publication as TS 103 645
V2.1.1	June 2020	Publication
V2.1.2	June 2020	Publication as TS 103 645
V3.1.1	January 2024	Publication as TS 103 645
V3.1.2	June 2024	EN Approval Procedure AP 20240909: 2024-06-11 to 2024-09-09