ETSI TS 103 600 V1.2.1 (2022-02)



Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Testing; Interoperability test specifications for security Reference

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RTS/ITS-00565

Keywords

interoperability, ITS, security, testing

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Foreword

This Technical Specification (TS) has been produced by ETSI Technical Committee Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS).

Modal verbs terminology

In the present document "shall", "shall not", "should", "should not", "may", "need not", "will", "will not", "can" and "cannot" are to be interpreted as described in clause 3.2 of the ETSI Drafting Rules (Verbal forms for the expression of provisions).

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1 Scope

The present document contains specification of interoperability test descriptions to validate implementations of ETSI TS 103 097 [1], ETSI TS 102 941 [3] and ETSI TS 102 940 [i.1].

2 References

2.1 Normative references

References are either specific (identified by date of publication and/or edition number or version number) or non-specific. For specific references, only the cited version applies. For non-specific references, the latest version of the referenced document (including any amendments) applies.

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The following referenced documents are necessary for the application of the present document.

- [1] ETSI TS 103 097 (V1.4.1): "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Security; Security header and certificate formats".
- [2] IEEE Std 1609.2TM-2016: "IEEE Standard for Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments -Security Services for Applications and Management Messages", as amended by IEEE Std 1609.2aTM-2017 and EEE Std 1609.2bTM-2019.
- [3] ETSI TS 102 941 (V1.4.1): "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Security; Trust and Privacy Management".
- [4] Certificate Policy for Deployment and Operation of European Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems (C-ITS), (Release 1.1).

2.2 Informative references

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The following referenced documents are not necessary for the application of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area.

- [i.1] ETSI TS 102 940 (V1.3.1): "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Security; ITS communications security architecture and security management".
- [i.2] ISO/IEC 15408-2: "Information technology Security techniques Evaluation criteria for IT security; Part 2: Security functional components".
- [i.3] ETSI TR 103 415 (V1.1.1): "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Security; Pre-standardization study on pseudonym change management".
- [i.4] ETSI TS 102 731 (V1.1.1): "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Security; Security Services and Architecture".

3 Definition of terms, symbols and abbreviations

3.1 Terms

For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in ETSI TS 103 097 [1], ETSI TS 102 940 [i.1], ETSI TS 102 941 [3], ISO/IEC 15408-2 [i.2] and the following apply:

current CA: CA possessing the certificate containing in the trusted chain for at least one of certificate currently used by the SUT

foreign CA: any CAs possessing the certificate, been never used in the trusted chain for any end entity certificates used by the SUT

3.2 Symbols

For the purposes of the present document, the symbols given in ETSI TS 103 097 [1], ETSI TS 102 940 [i.1], ETSI TS 102 941 [3], ISO/IEC 15408-2 [i.2] apply.

3.3 Abbreviations

For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in ETSI TS 103 097 [1], ETSI TS 102 941 [3], ETSI TS 102 940 [i.1], ISO/IEC 15408-2 [i.2] apply.

4 Requirements and configuration

4.1 Requirements

4.1.1 Overview

Clauses 4.1.2, 4.1.3 and 4.1.4 define mandatory and optional requirements for the implementation of ITS station, PKI or TLM. All EUT shall support mandatory requirements. Essential optional requirements defined in clause 5 and in use-case descriptions.

NOTE: Interoperability testing between two IUTs cover mandatory requirements and optional requirements supported by the IUTs.

4.1.2 ITS stations

Mandatory requirements:

- The ITS-S shall support data communication using security mechanisms described in ETSI TS 103 097 [1] and PKI communication described in ETSI TS 102 941 [3].
- The ITS-S shall support algorithms and key length according to the Certificate Policy [4].
- In order to participate in secured communication tests, the ITS-S shall be able to send CAMs and DENMs using V2X communication.

Optional requirements:

PICS	Description
PICS_ITSS_REGION_SUPPORT	The ITS-S supports region validity restrictions in AT certificates. The ITS-S shall support at least Circular and Identified region types in order to participate to use-cases dependent of the present PICS value. See IEEE Std 1609.2 [2], clause 6.4.17.
PICS_ITSS_REQUEST_AA	ITS-S is able to request unknown AA certificate using peer-2-peer certificate distribution mechanism without infrastructure involved.
PICS_ITSS_RESPOND_AA	ITS-S is able to answer for the request for unknown AA certificate using peer-2-peer certificate distribution mechanism without infrastructure involved.
PICS_ECTL_SUPPORT	ITS-S can handle information provided in ECTL.
PICS_CRL_SUPPORT_CURRENT	ITS-S can handle information provided in CRL of the currently active RootCA.
PICS_CRL_SUPPORT_FOREIGN	ITS-S can handle information provided in CRL from other RootCAs.
PICS_CTL_SUPPORT	ITS-S can handle information provided in CTL.
PICS_ITSS_PKI_COMMUNICATION	ITS-S supports the PKI communication protocol (ETSI TS 102 941 [3]). Otherwise, the ITS-S is unable to participate in PKI test scenarios (clause 6.3).
PICS_ITSS_PKI_ENROLMENT	ITS-S supports the enrolment procedure described in PKI communication protocol (ETSI TS 102 941 [3]). Otherwise, the EC certificate shall be installed on the ITS-S manually.
PICS_ITSS_PKI_RE_ENROLMENT	ITS-S supports the re-enrolment procedure described in PKI communication protocol (ETSI TS 102 941 [3]).

4.1.3 PKI

Mandatory requirements:

• The CAs (RCA, EA, AA) shall support algorithms and key length according to the Certificate Policy [4].

Optional requirements:

PICS	Description
PICS_PKI_ITSS_NO_PRIVACY_REQ	ITS-S supports optional privacy requirement, e.g. RSU. The present
	PICS does not apply to most vehicular ITS-S.
PICS_PKI_ITSS_RENEW_AT	ITS-S is able to start the AT renewal procedure when all ATs in the
	pool are expired or about to be expired.
PICS_PKI_CA_MANAGEMENT	The CA (EA, AA) supports CA certificate request procedure.
	The RootCA supports certificate generation base on CA certificate
	request procedure.

4.1.4 TLM

Mandatory requirements:

• The TLM shall support algorithms and key length according to the Certificate Policy [4].

4.2 Configurations

4.2.1 CFG_SEC - ITS-S secured communication

This clause describes the configuration used to execute secure communication test scenarios. The configuration contains the following entities:

- Sender The ITS-S playing a sender role.
- Receiver The ITS-S playing a receiver role.
- Sender AA The authorization authority that issued the sender's AT.

- Receiver AA The authorization authority that issued the receiver's AT.
- NOTE: The AA is involved to pre-test conditions only. The way how ATs are installed on the SUT are out of scope of this configuration. The same AA can issue ATs for both sender and receiver if not defined otherwise in the use-case description.

In order to participate in the test with the present configuration, ITS-S shall be configured as following if it is not explicitly defined in the use-case description:

- The ITS-S shall be configured to send CAMs in high frequency (more than one CAMs/second) so that the ITS-S sends some of the CAMs with digest instead of ATs.
- All participating ITS-Ss are in the "authorized" state (equipped with valid ATs).
- All ATs of participating ITS-Ss allow the transmission of CAMs and DENMs in the time and place of UC execution.
- All ATs of participating ITS-Ss shall be signed using a valid AA certificate issued by a trusted root certificate authority (RCA).
- All AA certificates used for signing ATs participating ITS-Ss shall be valid for the time and location of the UC execution.
- All RCA certificates used for signing AA certificates shall be valid for the time and location of the UC execution.
- All AA and RCA certificates shall permit issuing of AT certificates containing CAM and DENM PSID.
- No EA, AA or RCA certificates shall be revoked.
- All RCA certificates shall be included in the ECTL.
- All involved CA certificates shall be known and trusted by all participating ITS-S.

4.2.2 CFG_PKI - PKI communication

This clause describes the configuration used to execute PKI communication scenarios. The configuration contains the following entities:

- ITS-S the ITS station triggering the scenario execution.
- EA enrolment authority by which the ITS-S is enrolled.
- AA authorization authority by which the ITS-S is authorized.
- RCA root certificate authority issuing the EA and AA certificates.
- DC distribution centres to provide RCA CTL and CRL.
- TLM/CPOC trust list manager and central point of contacts.
- Observer the ITS-S (or a network sniffer) allowing to detect that ITS-S is starting to send CAM messages.

NOTE 1: The RCA can be the issuer of both EA and AA.

The ITS-S shall be configured as following if another is not specified in the use-case description:

- The ITS-S shall be configured to send and receive CAMs using V2X communication.
- The ITS-S shall support the PKI communication protocol (see PICS_PKI_COMMUNICATION) defined in ETSI TS 102 941 [3].

The CAs (RCA, AA and EA) shall be configured as following if another is not specified in the use-case description:

• All participating RCA shall have RCA certificates included in the ECTL.

- All AA and EA shall have CA certificates signed by trusted RCA certificate.
- All CA certificates shall be valid for the time and location of the UC execution.
- All CA certificates shall permit issuing of certificates containing CAM and DENM PSID.
- No EA, AA or RCA certificates shall be revoked.
- All sub-CAs certificates shall be included in the CTL.

The TLM/CPOC shall be configured as following:

• TLM shall issue the ECTL containing all participating RCA.

The above configurations can be organized into three groups depending on the participants involved:

Configuration group	Participants involved
CFG_PKI_ENROLMENT	ITS-S, EA, Observer, [DC, TLM/CPOC]
CFG_PKI_AUTHORIZATION	ITS-S, EA, AA, Observer, [DC, TLM/CPOC]
CFG_PKI_CAs	EA, AA, RCA, [DC, TLM/CPOC]

NOTE 2: Connections to DCs and TLM/CPOC are optional in the scope of these tests. Information from ECTL and CTLs/CRLs can be delivered to participating devices using some other particular way.

5 Requirements to be tested

5.1 Overview

The clauses below collect and enumerate the requirements that can be tested with the present interoperability test specification.

5.2 ITS-S communication messages

NN	Requirement	References	UCs
1.1.	A sending ITS-S shall be able to correctly sign CAMs using	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-1-1
	valid AT certificates		UC-1-2
			UC-1-3
			UC-1-4
			UC-1-5
			UC-2-4
			UC-2-5
1.2.	A receiving ITS-S shall be able to verify CAMs signed using	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-1-1
	valid AT certificates		UC-1-2
			UC-1-3
			UC-1-4
			UC-1-5
1.3.	ITS-S shall be able to correctly handle (send and receive)	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-1-1
	CAMs signed with digests before and after transmission of the		UC-1-2
	AT certificate		UC-1-3
			UC-1-4
			UC-1-5
1.4.	ITS-S shall be able to check the timestamp of messages	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-1-1
	including the validity period of the used ATs		UC-1-2
			UC-1-3
			UC-1-4
			UC-1-5
			UC-2-2
1			UC-2-4
			UC-2-5

NN	Requirement	References	UCs
1.5.	 ITS-S shall be able to support peer-2-peer AA certificate distribution: P2P request of AA certificate P2P distribution of the requested AA certificate Accepting of AA certificate received using P2P distribution 	ETSI TS 102 941 [3] IEEE 1609.2a [2], clause 8	UC-1-3 UC-2-5
1.6.	ITS-Ss shall not transmit certificates using P2P distribution if another ITS-S already answered the request (discoverable by the sender)	ETSI TS 102 941 [3] IEEE 1609.2a [2], clause 8	UC-1-3 UC-2-5
1.7.	ITS-Ss shall be able to handle and verify DENMs signed with ATs containing certificate regional restrictions: id and circular	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-2-1
1.8.	ITS-Ss shall consider PSIDs and correspondent SSPs	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-1-1 UC-1-2 UC-1-3 UC-1-4 UC-1-5 UC-2-2 UC-2-5
1.9.	The ITS-S shall support algorithms and key length according to the EU Certificate Policy. This includes signing, verification, encryption and decryption	EU CP [4], clause 6.1.4	UC-1-1 UC-1-2 UC-1-3 UC-1-4 UC-1-5 UC-2-4 UC-2-5
1.10.	ITS-Ss shall consider CRLs	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-2-4
1.11.	ITS-Ss shall consider the whole certificate chain when verifying certificates	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-1-3 UC-2-5
1.12.	Correct change of pseudonyms, with respect to procedure, parameters, place and time	ETSI TR 103 415 [i.3] Table 4, EC CP/SP	UC-1-5

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5.3 ECTL Handling

NN	Requirement	References	UCs
2.1.	Check the existence of the ECTL	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-1-4
		EU Certificate Policy [4]	UC-2-5
			UC-2-3
2.2.	Check the expiration of the ECTL	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-1-4
		EU Certificate Policy [4]	UC-2-5
			UC-2-3
2.3.	Check the delta ECTL handling	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	
		EU Certificate Policy [4]	
2.4.	Check the presence of the current root CA ¹ certificate in the	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-1-4
	ECTL	EU Certificate Policy [4]	UC-2-5
			UC-2-3
2.5.	Check the presence of foreign root CA ¹ certificate in the ECTL	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-1-4
		EU Certificate Policy [4]	UC-2-5
			UC-2-3
2.6.	Handling ECTL signed using Brainpool P384r1 curve	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-1-4
		EU Certificate Policy [4],	UC-2-5
		clause 6.1.4	UC-2-3
NOTE	: The meaning of current and foreign CA is defined in clause 3	.1.	

NN	Requirement	References	UCs
3.1.	The ITS-S checks the RCA CTL for the Access Point of the EA	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-3-1
			UC-3-2
			UC-3-3
			UC-3-4
3.2.	Handling CTL signed using any present crypto domain	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-3-1
	(NIST-P256, Brainpool P256r1, Brainpool P384r1)		UC-3-2
			UC-3-3
			UC-3-4
			UC-4-1
			UC-4-2
			UC-4-3
			UC-4-4
			UC-4-5
3.3.	Check the RCA CTL for the Access Point of the AA	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-4-1
			UC-4-2
			UC-4-3
			UC-4-4
			UC-4-5

5.5 RCA CRL Handling

NN	Requirement	References	UCs
4.1.	Check the presence of the CRL from the current root CA	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-3-4
			UC-4-4
4.2.	Check the presence of the CRL from the foreign root CA	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-1-4
	(different RCA case)		UC-3-4
			UC-4-4
4.3.	Check the presence of the currently used AA certificate in the CRL from the current root CA	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-4-4
4.4.	Check the presence of the AA from remote ITS-S in the CRL of foreign root CA		UC-4-4
4.5.	Check the expiration of CRLs of current and foreign root CA		
4.6.	Check the presence of the current EA in the CRL of the EA's RCA		UC-3-4
4.7.	Handling CRL signed using any present crypto domain	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-1-4
	(NIST-P256, Brainpool P256r1, Brainpool 384r1)		UC-3-4
			UC-4-4

5.6 PKI communication - Enrolment Management

NN	Requirement	References	UCs
5.1.	The EA shall be able to track the ITS-S lifecycle	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	
5.2.	The EA shall be able to verify the presence of the ITS-S technical key in the local database	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-3-1 UC-3-2
5.3.	The EA shall be able to handle a correct Enrolment Request (valid enrolment behaviour)	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-3-1 UC-3-2
5.4.	The EA shall be able to handle an incorrect Enrolment Request (Canonical identity unknown - User not permitted to enrol - User authentication failed)	ETSI TS 102 941 [3] ETSI TS 102 731 [i.4]	UC-3-3
5.5.	The ITS-S is able to handle the CTL EA parameters in order to send requests to the <i>itsAccessPoint</i> URL if it is defined in the CTL	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-3-1 UC-3-2
5.6.	The ITS-S shall be able to do an initial Enrolment Request at the initialization of the ITS-S or after expiration of the previous EC	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	
5.7.	The ITS-S shall be able to do a Re-enrolment Request using its current EC	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]; EU Certificate Policy [4] clause 7.2, Table 11	UC-3-2

NN	Requirement	References	UCs
6.1.	The AA shall be able to handle the authorization request sent	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-4-1
	by an ITS-S		UC-4-2
			UC-4-3
			UC-4-5
6.2.	The AA shall only accept authorization requests with pop	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-4-1
-	(proof of possession) signature in case of ITS-S with privacy		UC-4-3
	requirements		UC-4-5
6.3.	The AA shall be able to build and send the authorization	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-4-1
	validation request to the EA		UC-4-2
			UC-4-3
			UC-4-5
6.4.	The EA shall be able to validate the authorization validation	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-4-1
	request received from the AA:		UC-4-2
	Accept successful authorization validation request		UC-4-3
	 Check that encrypted signature is used for AT 		UC-4-5
	requests from ITS-S with privacy requirements		
	Check the desired subject attributes in the certificate		
	request		
	Check and update if necessary the validation period		
	for the certificate		
6.5.	The EA shall be able to build and send an authorization	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-4-1
	validation response to the AA		UC-4-2
			UC-4-3
			UC-4-5
6.6.	The AA shall be able to build and send an authorization	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-4-1
	response to the ITS-S		UC-4-2
			UC-4-3
			UC-4-5
6.7.	The authorization response sent by AA shall follow the	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-4-1
	decision of the EA with respect to the authorization validation		UC-4-2
	response		UC-4-3
			UC-4-5
6.8.	The ITS-S shall be able to build and send the authorization	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-4-1
	request		UC-4-2
			UC-4-3
			UC-4-5
6.9.	The ITS-S shall be able to build and send the authorization	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-4-1 (optional)
	request containing region restriction certificate attribute		UC-4-2 (optional)
			UC-4-3 (optional)
			UC-4-5 (optional)
6.10.	The ITS-S shall be able to request several authorization tickets	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-4-5
6.11.	The AA shall accept authorization requests without encrypted	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-4-2
5	EC signature in case of ITS-S without privacy requirements		

5.8 PKI interoperability

NN	Requirement	References	UCs
7.1.	AA shall be able to communicate with EAs belonging to different RCAs when their corresponding Root CAs are trusted by ECTL and AA and EA both know the certificates and access points of each other.	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-4-3
7.2.	If the EA has two Access Points in the CTL, the AA shall choose the <i>aaAccessPoint</i> for its authorization validation request.	ETSI TS 102 941 [3]	UC-4-1 UC-4-2

6 Interoperability test descriptions

6.1 Overview

Interoperability test descriptions consist of three groups:

- ITS-S secured communication
- PKI communication
- CA certificate requests

These groups are described in the clauses below.

6.2 ITS-S secured communication

6.2.1 Successful basic communication

6.2.1.1 Use-case 1-1 - Both ITS-S authorized by the same AA

		Interoper	ability Test Description				
Identifier	TD_ITS_SEC_U	TD ITS SEC UC1-1					
Objective	Secure communi	cation betweer	ITS-S authorized by the sa	ame AA			
Description	Two ITS-S, authors	prized by the sa	ame AA, are sending CAMs	and both accept these CAMs			
Configuration	The CFG_SEC c	onfiguration sh	all be used with additional	requirements:			
-	The ATs	s of all participa	ating ITS-S are issued by th	e same AA			
		· · ·					
Pre-test							
conditions							
REQ / PICS	Tested Requ	irements	PICS				
	1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4,	1.8, 1.9					
Step	Туре		Description	Result			
1	Stimulus	The sender is	triggered to send valid CAI	Ms			
	(by Sender)						
2	2 Verify The receiver v		alidates received CAMs	All received CAMs are accepted			
	(by Receiver)			by the receiving ITS-S			




Figure 1: Secured communication when both ITS-S authorized by the same AA

6.2.1.2 Use-case 1-2 - Different AAs of the same PKI

		Interope	rability Test Description			
Identifier	TD_ITS_SEC_UC1-	-2				
Objective	Secure communicat	ion betweer	n ITS-S authorized by diff	erent but commonly trusted AAs		
Description		Two ITS-S, authorized by different AA (belonging to the same RCA), are sending CAMs and both accept these CAMs				
Configuration						
Pre-test conditions						
REQ / PICS	Tested Require	ments	ents PICS			
	1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.8	8, 1.9				
Step	Туре		Description	Result		
1	Stimulus (by Sender)	The sender is triggered to send val		d CAMs		
2	Verify (by Receiver)	The receiver validates the CAMs		All received CAMs are accepted by the receiving ITS-S		




Figure 2: Secured communication when ITS-Ss was authorized by the different AAs of the same PKI

6.2.1.3 Use-case 1-3 - Peer-to-peer distribution of AA certificate

	Interoperability Test Description				
Identifier	TD_ITS_SEC_UC1-3	TD ITS SEC UC1-3			
Objective	Secure communication betweer AAs	Secure communication between ITS-S authorized by different and initially partially unknown			
Description	Two ITS-S, authorized by different AA, are sending CAMs. The AA authorizing the sender is initially unknown from the receiver's perspective. The receiver therefore needs to request the AA certificate before trusting the received CAMs				
Configuration	 The CFG_SEC configuration shall be used with the following additions: The ATs of the participating ITS-S are issued by different AAs. Both AA certificates are issued by the same commonly trusted RCA. The AA authorizing the sender is initially unknown from the receiver's perspective. The AA authorizing the receiver is known from the sender's perspective. 				
Pre-test conditions	Ensure that no other IT AA certificate request (TS-S (beside the sender) in the surrounding will answered the (see note).			
REQ / PICS	Tested Requirements PICS				
		Receiver: PICS_ITSS_REQUEST_AA Sender: PICS_ITSS_RESPOND_AA			

		Interoperability Test Description				
Step	Туре	Description	Result			
1	Stimulus (by Sender)	The sender is triggered to send valid CAMs.				
2 Verify		The receiver validates the CAMs of the sender	The CAM is not accepted by the receiving ITS-S (yet) because of the inability to verify the certificate chain of the signer due to the missing AA certificate.			
3	Action (by Receiver)	 The receiver is adding a request for the missing AA certificate next CAM. 				
4	Verify (by Sender)	The sender validates the CAMs of the receiver	The CAM containing the request for the AA certificate is accepted by the receiving ITS-S.			
5	Action (by Sender)	• The sender is appending the	AA certificate to its next CAM.			
6	Verify (by Receiver)	The receiver validates the CAM of the sender containing the appended AA certificate	 The CAM is accepted by the receiving ITS-S (which is now able to verify the certificate chain). 			
NOTE: Depending on the circumstances of the test setup there might be multiple ITS-S listening to the channel and reacting on AA certificate requests. As the sender's devices will not append the AA certificate if another ITS-S already answered the request, the pre-condition needs to be fulfilled in order to complete the test sequence of the use case.						




Figure 3: Peer-to-peer certificate distribution

6.2.1.4 Use-case 1-4 - Participating ITS-S are registered in different RC

	I	nterope	rability Test Description			
Identifier	TD_ITS_SEC_UC1-4	ID ITS SEC UC1-4				
Objective	Secure communication	n betweer	n ITS-S authorized by AAs	of different RCAs		
Description	Two ITS-S, authorized by AAs belonging to different RCAs, are sending CAMs and both accept these CAMs					
Configuration	 The CFG_SEC configuration shall be used with the following additions: The ATs of the participating ITS-S are issued by different AAs. The sender AA certificate and the receiver AA certificate are issued by different, but commonly known and trusted RCAs. 					
Pre-test conditions						
REQ / PICS	Tested Requireme	ents PICS		PICS		
	1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.8, 1 2.2, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6	1.9, 2.1,				
Step	Туре		Description	Result		
1	Stimulus (by Sender)	The sender is triggered to send valid CAMs.				
2	Verify (by Receiver)	The receiver validates the CAMs • The CAM is accepted by the receiving ITS-S.				




Figure 4: Secured communication using certificates from different PKIs

	I	nterope	rability Test Description			
Identifier	TD_ITS_SEC_UC1-5					
Objective	ITS-S are changing the ATs and related identifiers (pseudonym change) as expected					
Description	Two ITS-S, authorized by the same AA, are sending CAMs and both accept these CAMs. The two ITS-Stations are running the same GNSS simulation. The ITS-S shall perform pseudonym changes according to the EC CP/SP strategy. See ETSI TR 103 415 [i.3], Table 4					
Configuration	 The CFG_SEC configuration shall be used with the following additions: The ATs of all participating ITS-S are issued by the same AA. The ITS-S are configured to use the GNSS simulation correspondent to selected certificate changing strategy. 					
Pre-test	Both GNSS simulat	tions, of s	sender and receiver, shall b	be set to the same starting point. It		
conditions	needs to be ensure	ed that bo	th ITS-Ss stay within comn	nunication range throughout the test		
REQ / PICS	Tested Requireme	ents		PICS		
	1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.8, 1.9, 1.11, 1.12					
Step	Туре		Description	Result		
1	Stimulus (by Sender) Stimulus (by Receiver)	 The sender is triggered to send valid CAMs. The GNSS simulation is started. The GNSS simulation is started (about the same time as the 				
2	(by Receiver) (by Receiver) Action (by Sender)	througho simulatio		The CAMs are accepted by the receiving ITS-S n changes according to the change		
	Verify (by Receiver)	pseudor receiver disappea	eiver identifies hym changes OR the identifies the arance of the old sender subsequent appearance v sender	 Pseudonym changes of the sender are identified. The pseudonym changes happen according to the expected change strategy (e.g. within the expected time frame and section of the GNSS trace). 		

6.2.1.5 Use-case 1-5 - Pseudonym changing




Figure 5: Pseudonym changing

6.2.2 Exceptional behaviour basic communication

6.2.2.1 Use-case 2-1 - Invalid certificate region

	Interoperability Test Description				
Identifier	TD_ITS_SEC_UC2-1				
Objective	No communication between IT	No communication between ITS-S within unauthorized regions			
Description	The sending ITS-S is triggered to send DENMs. The regional restrictions of the available ATs do not include the place of the UC execution				
Configuration					
Pre-test conditions					
REQ / PICS	Tested Requirements	PICS			
	1.7	PICS ITSS REGION SUPPORT			

	Interoperability Test Description						
Step	Туре	Description	Result				
1	Stimulus (by Sender)	The sender is triggered to	e send DENMs.				
2	Verify (by Receiver)	The receiver validates incoming DENMs	 Either no DENM is received (because the sender rejects sending out DENMs without proper permissions) - preferred Result; Or a DENM of the sender is received and the DENM is not accepted by the receiving ITS-S (as the place of sending is not within the allowed regions of the AT used for authorizing the DENM). 				

6.2.2.2 Use-case 2-2 - Invalid ValidityPeriod of ATs

	Interope	rability Test Description		
TD_ITS_SEC_UC2-2				
Rejected sending of CAMs if no AT with a valid ValidityPeriod is available				
The sending ITS-S is triggered to send CAMs. The ValidityPeriod of all available ATs does not include the time of the UC execution (\rightarrow all ATs are either expired or not valid yet). See note				
 The CFG_SEC configuration shall be used with the following additions: The ATs of all participating ITS-S are issued by the same AA. All ATs available for the participating ITS-S are not valid at the time of the UC execution (either expired or not valid yet). The ITS-S are in the "enrolled" state. 				
during the UC	C execution			
Tested Requireme	ents		PICS	
Туре		Description	Result	
Stimulus (by Sender)	•		send CAMs.	
Verify (by Receiver)	The rece CAMs	eiver validates incoming	 Either no CAM is received (because the sender rejects sending out CAMs without valid ATs) - preferred Result; Or a CAM of the sender is received and the CAM is not accepted by the receiving ITS-S (as the AT used for authorizing the CAM is not valid at the time of message creation). 	
	TD_ITS_SEC_UC2-2 Rejected sending of C The sending ITS-S is to include the time of the See note The CFG_SEC configue The ATs of a • All ATs availate execution (eiter execution (eiter) • The ITS-S are • The sending during the UC Tested Requirem 1.4 Type Stimulus (by Sender) Verify	TD_ITS_SEC_UC2-2 Rejected sending of CAMs if no The sending ITS-S is triggered include the time of the UC exec See note The CFG_SEC configuration sh • The ATs of all participa • All ATs available for the execution (either expir • The ITS-S are in the "o • The sending ITS-S shaduring the UC execution • UC execution • The sending ITS-S shaduring the UC execution • UC execution • The sending ITS-S shaduring the UC execution • UC execution • Type • Stimulus • (by Sender) • Verify The reco	Rejected sending of CAMs if no AT with a valid ValidityPe The sending ITS-S is triggered to send CAMs. The Validit include the time of the UC execution (→ all ATs are either See note The CFG_SEC configuration shall be used with the follow • The ATs of all participating ITS-S are issued by t • All ATs available for the participating ITS-S are in • The ITS-S are in the "enrolled" state. • The sending ITS-S shall not have the possibility during the UC execution (→ the ITS-S shall be "c • The sending ITS-S shall not have the possibility for the UC execution (→ the ITS-S shall be "c • The sending ITS-S shall not have the possibility for the UC execution (→ the ITS-S shall be "c • The sending ITS-S shall not have the possibility for the UC execution (→ the ITS-S shall be "c • The sending ITS-S shall not have the possibility for the UC execution (→ the ITS-S shall be "c • The sending ITS-S shall not have the possibility for the UC execution (→ the ITS-S shall be "c • The sender is triggered to (by Sender) • Verify The receiver validates incoming	

6.2.2.3 Use-case 2-3 - PSID exceptional behaviour

6.2.2.3.1 Use-case 2-3a - CAM PSID missing in ATs - rejected sending

			rability Test Description			
Identifier	TD_ITS_SEC_UC2-3a					
Objective	Rejected sending of CAMs if ATs are missing the CAM PSID					
Description		riggered	to send CAMs. Its available	e ATs do not include the PSID for		
Configuration	 CAMs (36) The CFG_SEC configuration shall be used with the following additions: The ATs of all participating ITS-S are issued by the same AA. All ATs available for the participating ITS-S do not include the PSID for CAMs. The ITS-S are in the "authorized" state (equipped with valid ATs, besides not being authorized for sending out CAMs). 					
			,			
Pre-test conditions						
REQ / PICS	Tested Requireme	ents		PICS		
	1.8					
Step	Туре		Description	Result		
1	Stimulus (by Sender)	•	The sender is triggered to	send CAMs.		
2	Verify (by Receiver)	The rece CAMs	eiver validates incoming	 Either no CAM is received (because the sender rejects sending out CAMs without proper permissions) - preferred Result; Or a CAM of the sender is received and the CAM is not accepted by the receiving ITS-S (as the AT used for authorizing the CAM does not have the PSID for doing so). 		

6.2.2.3.2 Use-case 2-3b - DENM PSID missing in ATs - rejected sending

	Interoperability	/ Test Description		
Identifier	TD_ITS_SEC_UC2-3b			
Objective	Rejected sending of DENMs if ATs are	e missing the DENM PSID		
Description	The sending ITS-S is triggered to send DENMs. Its available ATs do not include the PSID for DENMs (37)			
Configuration	All ATs available for the parti	IS-S are issued by the same AA. cipating ITS-S do not include the PSID for DENMs. zed" state (equipped with valid ATs, besides not being		
Pre-test conditions				
REQ / PICS	Q / PICS Tested Requirements PICS			
	1.8			

		Interoperability Test Description	
Step	Туре	Description	Result
1	Stimulus (by Sender)	The sender is triggered to	send DENMs.
2	Verify (by Receiver)	The receiver validates incoming DENMs	 Either no DENM is received (because the sender rejects sending out DENMs without proper permissions) - preferred Result; Or a DENM of the sender is received and the DENM is not accepted by the receiving ITS-S (as the AT used for authorizing the DENM does not have the PSID for doing so).

6.2.2.4 Use-case 2-4 - Using of AT issued by AA included in the CRL

		Interope	rability Test Description			
Identifier	TD_ITS_SEC_UC2-4	SEC_UC2-4				
Objective			with ATs that are issued by			
Description	The receiving ITS-S does not know the AA that authorized the ATs of the sender. The signer identifier of the received AT refers to a revoked AA. Therefore the receiver does not request the AA certificate but ignores the received CAM					
Configuration	 The ATs of th The sender A The sender d AA is revoked The receiver The AA author being include 	nfiguration shall be used with the following additions: of the participating ITS-S are issued by different AAs. er AA certificate is revoked. er does not possess the current CRL (and therefore does not know that the				
Pre-test conditions	Ensure that the execution of the ex	ne sender is not able to retrieve the current CRL before and during the he test.				
REQ / PICS	Tested Requireme					
	1.1, 1.4, 1.9, 1.10	PICS_CRL_SUPPORT_CURRENT OR PICS_CRL_SUPPORT_FOREIGN				
Step	Туре		Description	Result		
1	Stimulus (by Sender)	The sender is triggered to send valid CAMs.				
2	Verify (by Receiver)	The rece of the se	eiver validates the CAMs ender	The CAM is not accepted by the receiving ITS-S and the receiving ITS-S is not requesting the missing AA certificate.		




Figure 6: Secured communication using AT issued by AA included in the CRL

6.2.2.5 Use-case 2-5 - Unknown RCA

	Interope	rability Test Description			
Identifier	TD ITS SEC UC2-5				
Objective	Rejection of messages of ITS-S	S belonging to an untrusted RCA			
Description	The receiving ITS-S does not k	now the RCA of the sender. The untrusted RCA is not part of the			
-	ECTL. The sender AA is not kn	own, too, and needs to be requested			
Configuration	The CFG_SEC configuration sh	nall be used with the following additions:			
-	The ATs of the particip	pating ITS-S are issued by different AAs.			
	The sender AA certific	ate is issued by an unknown RCA (not part of the ECTL).			
	• The AA authorizing the sender is initially unknown from the receiver's perspective.				
	• The AA authorizing the receiver is known from the sender's perspective.				
	The ITS-Ss are in the "authorized" state.				
Pre-test	Ensure that no other I	TS-S (beside the sender) in the surrounding will answered the			
conditions	AA certificate request	(see note).			
REQ / PICS	Tested Requirements	PICS			
	1.1, 1.4, 1.5,	Receiver: PICS_ITSS_REQUEST_AA AND			
	1.6 (see note),	PICS_ECTL_SUPPORT			
	1.8, 1.9, 1.11, 2.1, 2.2, 2.4,				
	2.5, 2.6	Sender: PICS_ITSS_RESPOND_AA			

		Interoperability Test Description	
Step	Туре	Description	Result
1	Stimulus (by Sender)	The sender is triggered to	send valid CAMs.
2	Verify (by Receiver)	The receiver validates the CAMs of the sender	The CAM is not accepted by the receiving ITS-S (yet) because of the inability to verify the certificate chain of the signer due to the missing AA certificate.
3	Action (by Receiver)	The receiver is adding a re to its next CAM.	equest for the missing AA certificate
4	Verify (by Sender)	The sender validates the CAMs of the receiver	The CAM containing the request for the AA certificate is accepted by the receiving ITS-S.
5	Action (by Sender)	The sender is appending t	the AA certificate to its next CAM.
6	(by Receiver)	The receiver validates the CAM of the sender containing the appended AA certificate	The CAM is not accepted by the receiving ITS-S (which is now able to check the certificate chain and detect the unknown RCA).
chan certif	inel and reacting on AA	ances of the test setup there might be A certificate requests. As the sender's already answered the request, the pre sequence of the use case.	devices will not append the AA




Figure 7: Secured communication when unknow RCA is not included in the ECTL

6.3 PKI communication

6.3.0 Overview

Interoperability tests for PKI communication can be accomplished through a sequence of the UCs below. Comprehensive scenarios (see clause 6.4) including a sequence of use cases shall describe the ITS-S and PKI communications as a whole, starting with enrolment, authorization by the same or different AA, and finally sending a first message (CAM or DENM).

6.3.1 Enrolment behaviour

6.3.1.1 Use-case 3-1 - Valid enrolment behaviour

		Interoperability Test Description					
Identifier	TD_ITS_SEC_UC	3-1					
Objective	Valid enrolment b	ehaviour.					
Description	when the enrolme	nt process is	nders" are registered to their PKI. Check that the EC certificate is received nt process is triggered on the ITS-S "sender". It is recommended for the PKI pontaining EA entry with EA certificate and one or two access points URLs.				
Configuration				d with additional requirements:			
-	 The ITS- 	S is in the "Ini	itialized and Unenrolled"	state (registered to the EA).			
Pre-test conditions							
REQ / PICS	Requirem	ents PICS					
	3.1, 3.2, 5.2, 5.3,	5.5 PICS_ITSS_PKI_ENROLMENT					
Step	Туре	Description Result					
1	Stimulus	ITS-S is triggered to send Enrolment request.					
2	Action	ITS-S sends the valid Enrolment Request message.					
3	Verify	The EA validates the enrolmentThe enrolment request is valid.request message.Image: Comparison of the enrolment request is valid.					
4	Action	EA generate	es and sends enrolment of	credential EC.			
5	Verify	ITS-S receiv	ves and validates the EC	The EC is valid.			




Figure 8: Valid enrolment behaviour

6.3.1.2 Use-case 3-2 - Enrolment behaviour with already enrolled station

Identifier TD_ITS_SEC_UC3-2 Objective Valid re-enrolment behaviour. Description ITS-S stations "senders" are registered to their PKI and was already enrolled. Check that the new EC certificate is received when the enrolment process is triggered on the ITS-S. Configuration The CFG_PKI_ENROLMENT configuration shall be used with additional requirements:		Interoperability Test Description				
Description ITS-S stations "senders" are registered to their PKI and was already enrolled. Check that the new EC certificate is received when the enrolment process is triggered on the ITS-S. Configuration The CFG_PKI_ENROLMENT configuration shall be used with additional requirements:	Identifier	TD_ITS_SEC_UC3-2				
new EC certificate is received when the enrolment process is triggered on the ITS-S. Configuration The CFG_PKI_ENROLMENT configuration shall be used with additional requirements:	Objective	Valid re-enrolment behaviour.				
Configuration The CFG_PKI_ENROLMENT configuration shall be used with additional requirements:	Description					
 The ITS-S is in the "Enrolled and Unauthorized" state (has a valid EC) 	Configuration	The CFG_PKI_ENROLMENT configuration shall be used with additional requirements:				
		The ITS-S is in the "Enrolled and Unauthorized" state (has a valid EC).				

Interoperability Test Description					
Pre-test conditions					
REQ / PICS	R	equirements		PICS	
	3.1, 3.2, 5.2, 5.3,	5.5, 5.7	PICS_ITSS_P	KI_ENROLMENT	
			PICS_ITSS_PKI_RE_ENROLMENT		
Step	Туре	Description		Result	
1	Stimulus	ITS-S is triggered to send re	e-Enrolment requ	iest.	
2	Action	ITS-S sends the valid re-Er	nrolment Reques	t message.	
3	Verify	The EA validates the re-enr	olment request	The re-enrolment request is	
		message.	-	valid.	
4	Action	EA generates and sends ne	ew enrolment cre	dential EC.	
5	Verifv	ITS-S receives and validate	s the new EC	The new EC is valid	




Figure 9: Enrolment behaviour with already enrolled station

6.3.1.3 Use-case 3-3 - Enrolment behaviour when ITS-S is not registered on the EA

		Interope	Interoperability Test Description			
Identifier	TD_ITS_SEC_U					
Objective	Enrolment behav	viour when ITS	-S is not registered on the E	EA.		
Description			e not registered into their PKI. Check that the new EC certificate is not received ant process is triggered on the ITS-S.			
Configuration	The CFG_PKI_E	NROLMENT of	configuration shall be used	with additional requirements:		
_	The ITS	S-S is in the "In	itialized and Unenrolled" sta	ate (Not registered to the EA).		
Pre-test conditions						
REQ / PICS	Requirer	nents PICS				
	3.1, 3.2, 5.4	PICS_ITSS_PKI_ENROLI		MENT		
Step	Туре	Description		Result		
1	Stimulus	The ITS-S is triggered to send Enrolment request.				
2	Action	ITS-S sends the valid Enrolment Request message.				
3	Verify	The EA rejects the enrolment request The enrolment request is not valid.				
		message.				
4	Action	EA returns the Enrolment Response Code unknownits.				
5	Verify	ITS-S receiv	ves the enrolment	ITS-S remains in the "Initialized and		
		response co	ode.	Unenrolled" state.		




Figure 10: Enrolment behaviour when ITS-S is not registered on the EA

6.3.1.4 Use-case 3-4 - Enrolment behaviour when EA is on the CRL

		Interope	rability Test Description			
Identifier	TD_ITS_SEC_UC3	TD_ITS_SEC_UC3-4				
Objective	Enrolment behavio	ur when EA i	is on the CRL.			
Description				onding EA was included into the CRL.		
			send the enrolment reque	st when triggered or does not consider		
	received EC certific					
Configuration				d with additional requirements:		
			itialized and Unenrolled" s	state.		
	The EA is	on the CRL.				
	Г					
Pre-test						
conditions	Deguirege			DICC		
REQ / PICS	Requireme			PICS		
	3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 4.6, 0		PICS_ITSS_PKI_ENROL			
Step	Туре		Description	Result		
1		Stimulus The ITS-S is triggered to send Enrolment request.				
2a	Verify ITS-S checks the CRL and detects ITS-S does not send the Enrolment					
	that the EA is revoked. Request message.					
			OR			
2b	Action	ITS-S sends	s the valid Enrolment Req			
3	Verify					
	enrolment request message.					
4	Action The revoked EA generates and sends enrolment credential EC.					
5	Verify	ITS-S receives the EC and verifies ITS-S rejects the received certificate.				
			is revoked according to			
		the CRL.				
		1	FINALLY			
6	Verify			ITS-S is not enrolled.		
				h the "Unenrolled" state at the end of		
				nding on the circumstances of the test		
		e free to run e	either the first sub-sequen	ce (Steps: 1, 2a, 6) or the second one		
(Step:	s: 1, 2b, 3, 4, 5, 6).					





Figure 11: Enrolment behaviour when EA is on the CRL

6.3.2 Authorization behaviour

6.3.2.1 Use-case 4-1 - Valid authorization behaviour

		Interope	ability Test Description		
Identifier	TD_ITS_SEC_UC	4-1			
Objective	Valid authorization	n behaviour.			
Description	ITS-S stations are	enrolled to th	eir PKI. Check that the AT	certificate is received when the	
				sends AT request with encrypted EC	
				or AT requests; otherwise AT	
	requests may be r	ejected by Pk	(ls.		
	See note.				
Configuration				used with additional requirements:	
	The ITS-	S is in the "Er	rolled and Unauthorized" s	state.	
	1				
Pre-test					
conditions REQ / PICS	Deguiner			PICS	
REQ/PICS	Requirem 3.2, 3.3, 6.1, 6.2, 0			PIC3	
	6.6, 6.7, 6.8,	0.3, 0.4, 0.3,			
	6.9 (optional), 7.2				
Step	Туре		Description	Result	
1	Stimulus	The ITS-S is triggered to send Authorization Request.			
2	Action	ITS-S sends	s the valid Authorization Re	equest message With PoP.	
3	Verify	The AA vali	dates the Authorization	The Authorization Request is valid.	
			essage With PoP.		
4	Action	The AA sends the Authorization Validation Request message to the EA			
		using the aaAccessPoint available in the EaEntry.			
5	Verify		fies the Authorization	The Authorization Validation Request	
	A //	Validation Request message. is valid.			
6	Action	The EA sends the Authorization Validation Response.			
7	Verify	The AA verifies the Authorization The Authorization Validation			
8	Action	Validation Response. Response is valid. The AA generates and sends the Authorization ticket AT.			
9	Action		lerates and sends the Auth les and verifies the	The AT is valid.	
9	Verify			The AT is valid.	
10	Stimulus	authorization ticket AT.			
10	Action	The ITS-S is triggered to send a CAM. The ITS-S broadcasts a CAM signed with AT.			
				ial test scenarios PKI_SC1-1 or	
	SC1-2 (see Table 1		Jo-2 as part of the sequent		
111_0		/•			





6.3.2.2 Use-case 4-2 - Authorization behaviour with optional privacy requirements

		Interope	rability Test Description	
Identifier	TD_ITS_SEC_U	C4-2	· ·	
Objective	Authorization beh	aviour with op	tional privacy requirement	S.
Description		ved when the	authorization process is tri	acy requirement. Check that the AT iggered on the ITS-S and ITS-S sends
Configuration	The ITS	-S is in the "Er -S is configure	nrolled and Unauthorized"	used with additional requirements: state. on request message with unencrypted
Pre-test conditions				
REQ / PICS	Requiren	nents		PICS
	3.2, 3.3, 6.1, 6.3, 6.7, 6.8, 6.9 (optio 7.2	6.4, 6.5, 6.6, PICS_PKI_ITSS_NO_PRIVACY_REQ		
Step	Туре		Description	Result
1	Stimulus	The ITS-S is triggered to send Authorization Request.		
2	Action	ITS-S sends the valid Authorization Request message with unencrypted EC signature.		
3	Verify	The AA validates the Authorization Request message with unencrypted EC signature.		
4	Action	The AA sen		ation Request message to the EA he Ea he Ea he
5	Verify	The EA verifies the AuthorizationThe AuthorizationThe Authorization Validation RequestValidation Request message.is valid.		
6	Action	The EA sends the Authorization Validation Response.		
7	Verify	The AA verifies the AuthorizationThe Authorization ValidationValidation Response.Response is valid.		
8	Action	The AA generates and sends the Authorization ticket AT.		
9	Verify	ITS-S receives and verifies the AT is valid. authorization ticket AT.		
10	Stimulus	The ITS-S is triggered to send a CAM.		
11	Action		proadcasts a CAM signed	
			pecific type of participating is Use Case is to be skippe	ITS-S (those without privacy ed.




Figure 13: Authorization behaviour with optional privacy requirements

6.3.2.3 Use-case 4-3 - Authorization behaviour when AA and EA are from different PKI

	Interope	rability Test Description	
Identifier	TD_ITS_SEC_UC4-3		
Objective	Authorization behaviour when A	AA and EA are from different PKI.	
Description	ITS-S station is registered at one PKI and sends AT request to AA of another PKI. The AA shall send AT validation request to the EA of the first PKI and answer with AT certificate. CAs may belong to different cryptographic domains (NIST, Brainpool).		
Configuration	 The CFG_PKI_AUTHORIZATION configuration shall be used with additional requirements: The ITS-S is in the "Enrolled and Unauthorized" state by the first PKI. The ITS-S has a valid enrolment credential EC issued by the EA from the first PKI. The AA has a valid certificate issued by the RCA of the second PKI. CTL-1 from first PKI is available and contains <i>EaEntry</i>. CTL-2 from second PKI is available and contains <i>AaEntry</i>. 		
Pre-test conditions			
REQ / PICS	Requirements	PICS	
	3.2, 3.3, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, 6.9 (optional), 7.1, 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6	PICS_ECTL_SUPPORT	

	Interoperability Test Description					
Step	Туре	Description Result				
1	Stimulus	The ITS-S is triggered to send Authorization Request to AA form second PKI.				
2	Action	ITS-S send the valid Authorization Rec second PKI.	quest message With PoP to A from			
3	Verify	The AA from second PKI verifies the Authorization Request message With PoP.	The Authorization Request is valid.			
4	Action	The AA from second PKI sends the Au message to the EA from first PKI using EaEntry from CTL-1.	•			
5	Verify	The EA from first PKI verifies the Authorization Validation Request message.	The Authorization Validation Request is valid.			
6	Action	The EA from first PKI sends the Autho	rization Validation Response.			
7	Verify		The Authorization Validation Response is valid.			
8	Action	The AA from second PKI generates and sends the Authorization ticket AT.				
9	Verify	ITS-S receives and verifies the authorization ticket AT.	The AT is valid.			
10	Stimulus	The ITS-S is triggered to send a CAM.				
11	Action	The ITS-S broadcasts a CAM signed with AT.				




Figure 14: Authorization behaviour when AA and EA are from different PKI

6.3.2.4 Use-case 4-4 - Authorization behaviour when AA is on the CRL

	Interoperability Test Description			
Identifier	TD_ITS_SEC_UC4-4			
Objective	Authorization behaviour when AA is on the CRL.			
Description	ITS-S stations are registered to their PKI and the corresponding AA was included into the CRL. Check that the ITS-S does not send the authorization request to this AA when triggered or does not consider received AT certificate received from this AA.			
Configuration	 The CFG_PKI_AUTHORIZATION configuration shall be used with additional requirements: The ITS-S is in the "Enrolled and Unauthorized" state. The AA is on the CRL. 			

		Interope	ability Test Description	
Pre-test		•	•	
conditions			1	
REQ / PICS	Requiremen	its		PICS
	3.2, 3.3, 4.1, 4.3			
Step	Туре		Description	Result
1			s triggered to send Authoriz	
2a	,			ITS-S does not send the
	t	hat the AA		Authorization Request message.
			OR	
2b			the valid Authorization Re	
3	Verify 7	The AA vali	dates the Authorization	The Authorization Request is valid.
	F	Request me	essage With PoP.	
4				tion Request message to the EA
			AccessPoint available in th	
5	Verify 1	The EA veri	fies that the AA is	The EA rejects the Authorization
	r	evoked.		Validation Request.
6	Action 1	The AA retu	rns an error code.	
			OR	
2c	Action I	TS-S sends	the valid Authorization Re	equest message With PoP.
3	Verify 1	The AA validates the Authorization 1		The Authorization Request is valid.
			essage With PoP.	
4	Action 1	The AA sen	ds the Authorization Valida	tion Request message to the EA
		ising the aa	AccessPoint available in the	
5	Verify 1	The EA veri	fies the Authorization	The Authorization Validation Request
			equest message.	is valid.
6	Action 1	The EA sen	ds the Authorization Valida	
7	Verify 1	The AA veri	fies the Authorization	The Authorization Validation
		/alidation R		Response is valid.
8	Action 1	The AA gen	erates and sends the Auth	orization ticket AT.
9	Verify I	TS-S receiv	es the AT and verifies	ITS-S rejects the received certificate.
	t	hat the AA	is revoked according to	
	t	he CRL.	-	
			FINALLY	
10	Verify			ITS-S is not authorized.
NOTE: The n	nain goal of the test se	equence he	ere is having the ITS-S with	the "Unauthorized" state at the end
of the	execution, which cou	ld be done	in three different ways. De	pending on the circumstances of the
				uence (Steps: 1, 2a, 10), the second
sub-s	equence (Steps: 1, 2b	o, 3, 4, 5, 6,	10) or the third one (Steps	s: 1, 2c, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10).




Figure 15: Authorization behaviour when AA is on the CRL

		Interope	rability Test Description			
Identifier	TD_ITS_SEC_UC					
Objective	Authorization behaviour with AA from another PKI when AA is on the CRL.					
Description	ITS-S stations are registered to their PKI and configured to use the revoked AA of another PKI					
	for authorization.					
	Check that the IT	S-S does not s	send the authorization requ	uest to this AA when triggered or does		
	not consider rece	ived AT certific	cate received from this AA			
	See note 1.					
Configuration				used with additional requirements:		
	 The ITS-S is in the "Enrolled and Unauthorized" state. 					
	 The ITS- 	S is configure	d to use the AA from anot	ner PKI for authorization.		
	The AA	from another F	PKI is on the CRL.			
Pre-test						
conditions						
REQ / PICS	Requirem	nents		PICS		
	3.2, 3.3, 4.1, 4.3					
				-		
Step	Туре		Description	Result		
1	Stimulus	The ITS-S is	s triggered to send Authori	zation Request.		
2a	Verify		the CRL and detects	ITS-S does not send the		
		that the AA	is revoked.	Authorization Request message.		
			OR			
2b	Action			equest message With PoP.		
3	Verify		dates the Authorization	The Authorization Request is valid.		
			essage With PoP.			
4	Action	The AA sends the Authorization Validation Request message to the EA				
		using the aa	AccessPoint available in t	he <i>EaEntry</i> of the CTL of the PKI		
			S is enrolled.			
5	Verify			The EA rejects the Authorization		
	A .:	revoked.		Validation Request.		
6	Action	The AA retu	irns an error code.			
			OR III III III			
2c	Action			equest message With PoP.		
3	Verify		dates the Authorization	The Authorization Request is valid.		
	A .:		essage With PoP.			
4	Action			ation Request message to the EA		
				he <i>EaEntry</i> .of the CTL of the PKI		
5	Verify		S is enrolled. fies the Authorization	The Authorization Validation Request		
5	verny			is valid.		
6	Action		equest message. ds the Authorization Valida			
7	Verify		fies the Authorization	The Authorization Validation		
'	verny	Validation R		Response is valid.		
8	Action		erates and sends the Auth			
9	Verify		ves the AT and verifies	ITS-S rejects the received certificate.		
3	Verny		is revoked according to			
		the CRL.				
	1	I''' O''E'	FINALLY			
10	Verify			ITS-S is not authorized.		
		t sequence he	ere is having the ITS-S with	the "Unauthorized" state at the end		
				epending on the circumstances of the		
				uence (Steps: 1, 2a, 10), the second		
				s: 1, 2c, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10).		
			e is identical to the behavio			




Figure 16: Authorization behaviour with AA from another PKI when AA is on the CRL

6.3.2.5 Use-c	case 4-5 - Check	renewal of	expired AT	certificates
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		Interope	rability Test Description		
Identifier	TD_ITS_SEC_UC4-5				
Objective	Check renewal of	expired AT ce	ertificates.		
Description	Check that ITS-S	requests for n	ew AT when all ATs in the	pool are expired or about to be	
	expired.				
	See note.				
Configuration				sed with additional requirements:	
	The ITS-	S is in the "Au	uthorized" state already.		
	1				
Pre-test					
conditions			1		
REQ / PICS	Requirem			PICS	
		6.3, 6.4, 6.5,	PICS_PKI_ITSS_RENEW	/_AT	
	6.6, 6.7, 6.8,	_			
	6.9 (optional), 6.10)			
.	-		B		
Step	Туре		Description	Result	
1	Stimulus			zation Request when their ATs are	
	A .:		be expired.		
2	Action			equest message With PoP.	
3	Verify		dates the Authorization	The Authorization Request is valid.	
4	A		Request message With PoP. The AA sends the Authorization Validation Request message to the EA		
4	Action				
5	Verify		AccessPoint available in the first field of the field of the Authorization	The Authorization Validation Request	
5	verny		Request message.	is valid.	
6	Action		ds the Authorization Valida		
7	Verify		fies the Authorization	The Authorization Validation	
'	verny	Validation R		Response is valid.	
8	Action		erates and sends the Auth		
9	Verify		es and verifies the	The AT is valid.	
3	veniy	authorizatio			
10	Stimulus		s triggered to send a CAM.	1	
11	Action		proadcasts a CAM signed v		
• •				the sequential test scenarios	
	SC1-3 (see Table 1)			ine sequential test scenarios	
- I NI_V		<i>.</i>			





Figure 17: Renewal of expired AT certificates

6.3.3 CA certificate request and distribution

6.3.3.1 Use-case 5-1 - Initial CA certificate request

		Interope	rability Test Description		
Identifier	TD_ITS_SEC_U	C5-1			
Objective	Initial CA certifica	te request.			
Description		CA generates the valid CaCertificateRequestMessage and provides it to RCA. RCA generates a new CA certificate, provides it to the CA, updates and publishes the CTL accordingly.			
Configuration			on shall be used with addit elf-signed certificate.	ional requirements:	
Pre-test conditions					
REQ / PICS	Requiren	nents		PICS	
		PICS_PKI_CA_MANAGEMENT			
Step	Туре		Description	Result	
1	Stimulus	The CA (EA	or AA) is triggered to requ	est its certificate from the RCA.	
2	Action	The CA (EA	or AA) sends the CaCertil	ficateRequestMessage to the RCA.	
3	Verify	The RCA ve request.	erifies CA certificate	The CA certificate request is valid.	
4	Action	 The RCA generates certificate to the CA (EA or AA). The RCA update CTL with the certificate of the CA (EA or AA). 			
5	Verify	certificate.	or AA) receives its	 The certificate is valid. The CTL is updated an available. 	
NOTE: This t	est can be run as p	part of the seq	uential test scenarios PKI_	SC3-1 (see Table 3).	



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1: CAs (EA, AA) prepares CaCertificateRequestMessage and transmit it to RCA 2: RCA generates CAs certificates 3: RCA updates CTL with new certificates

Figure 18: Initial CA certificate request

6.3.3.2 Use-case 5-2 - Re-keying of CA certificate

		Interoper	ability Test Description			
Identifier	TD_ITS_SEC_UC	TD_ITS_SEC_UC5-2				
Objective	Re-keying of CA c	ertificate.				
Description		CA generates the valid CaCertificateRekeyingMessage and provides it to RCA. RCA generates a new CA certificate, provides it to the CA, updates and publishes the CTL accordingly.				
Configuration		•	on shall be used with additi elf-signed certificate.	onal requirements:		
Pre-test conditions						
REQ / PICS	Requirem	ents		PICS		
			PICS_PKI_CA_MANAGEMENT			
Step	Туре		Description	Result		
1	Stimulus	The CA (EA	or AA) is triggered to upda	ate its certificate with new public key.		
2	Action	The CA (EA	or AA) sends the CaCertif	icateRekeyingMessage to the RCA.		
3	Verify	The RCA verifies CA Rekeying The CA Rekeying request is valid. request.				
4	Action	 The RCA generates certificate to the CA (EA or AA). The RCA update CTL with the new certificate of the CA (EA or AA). 				
5	Verify	The CA (EA or AA) receives its certificate with the new key.• The certificate is valid. • The CTL is updated an available.				
NOTE: This t	est can be run as pa	art of the seq	uential test scenarios PKI_	SC3-1 (see Table 3).		




Figure 19: Re-keying of CA certificate

6.4 Comprehensive scenarios

Comprehensive scenarios may include a group of ITS-S and their PKI, a group of ITS-S and different PKIs or only PKI certification authorities. When an ITS-S is involved, the test scenario shall start by the enrolment, then the authorization and finish with broadcasting a message (CAM, DENM) to the neighbouring using the issued ATs.

ITS-S shall request CTLs and CRLs if necessary and missing AA certificates. New CRL containing one AA can be issued during the test.

The following tables provide the sequence of some of the aforementioned use cases describing comprehensive scenarios.

Table 1: ITS-S secured communication scenarios for CFG_SEC configuration

Scenario	Description	UCs sequence
PKI_SC1-1	Communication using valid AT from the same PKI (can be executed multiple	UC1-1
	times with certificates from different PKI)	UC1-2
	Communication using valid AT from different AA from the same PKI	UC1-4
	Communication using valid AT from AA from two different PKIs	
PKI_SC1-2	Peer-2-Peer distribution of AA certificate from the same PKI	UC1-3
PKI_SC1-3	Pseudonym changing	UC1-5
PKI_SC1-4	Exceptional scenarios:	UC2-1
	Invalid AT certificate region	UC2-2
	Invalid AT validity period	UC2-3a
	Missing of application PSID in AT	UC2-3b
PKI_SC1-5	Using of AT issued by revoked AA	UC2-4
	Using of AT issued by AA signed by untrusted RCA	UC2-5

Table 2: PKI communication scenarios for CFG_PKI_ENROLMENT and CFG_PKI_AUTHORIZATION configurations

Scenario	Description	UCs sequence
PKI_SC2-1	Enrolment procedure	UC3-1
	Re-enrolment with the same EA	UC3-2
	Authorization with the same PKI	UC4-1
	Authorization with the same PKI with optional privacy	UC4-2
	Renewal of AT certificates after expiration of validity period	UC4-5
	Authorization with the same PKI when AA is revoked	UC4-4
PKI_SC2-2	Enrolment procedure	UC3-1
	Authorization with AA from another PKI	UC4-3
	Authorization with AA from another PKI when AA is revoked	UC4-4
PKI_SC2-3	Enrolment when ITS-S is not registered in the EA	UC3-3
PKI_SC2-4	Enrolment when EA is in CRL	UC3-4

Table 3: PKI CA management scenarios for CFG_CAs configuration

Scenario	Description	UCs sequence
PKI_SC3-1	Initial CAs certificate request	UC5-1
	Re-keying of CAs certificate	UC5-2

Annex A (informative): Bibliography

• ETSI EG 202 798 (V1.1.1): "Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Testing; Framework for conformance and interoperability testing".

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History

Document history		
V1.1.1	May 2019	Publication
V1.2.1	February 2022	Publication